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HOLLYWOOD’S DISAPPEARING ACT: INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME 
Claire Wright* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hollywood has a dirty little secret: a great many of the U.S.’ cul-
tural and entertainment products are not even “Made in the USA” any-
more,1 and Hollywood itself appears to be for sale to the highest bidder.  
In November 2005, the Los Angeles Economic Development Corpora-
tion reported that approximately 33% of U.S.-developed feature films 
are filmed outside of the U.S. today,2 and there are indications that this 
figure could be much higher.3  Forty-five percent of all major studio 
                                                          
*  Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  I was aided by helpful comments from 
Professor Robert Lutz of Southwestern University School of Law, Professor Alan O Sykes of the 
University of Chicago, The Law School, and Professor Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School. 
 1. A movie shot in another country possesses the country of origin of that other country.  See 
Tariff Act of 1930 § 304, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 134 (2005).  The country of origin 
of an imported product is the country of manufacture.  See 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) (2005). 
2 2. Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, Film Industry Profile of California/Los 
Angeles County 6, 14 (November 2005) [hereinafter Film Industry Profile] (utilizing data obtained 
from the Tuesday edition of the Hollywood Reporter), available at http://www.laedc.info/pdf/Film-
2005.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006).  These data reveal that this percentage was 32% in 2003.  Id. at 
14.  The Hollywood Reporter monitors feature film production by major studios as well as inde-
pendent companies.  For each feature film, the trade magazine reports the film location (or loca-
tions, if applicable).  Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, What is the Cost of Run-
Away Production? Jobs, Wages, Economic Output and State Tax Revenue at Risk When Motion 
Picture Productions Leave California  15 (August 2005) [hereinafter What is the Cost of Run-Away 
Production?], available at www.film.ca.gov/ttca/pdfs/link_overview/ cfc/California_Film_Commis 
sion_Study.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006).  See also Letter from Tim McHugh, Executive Director, 
et al., Film and Television Action Committee, to Ronald Lorentzen, Acting Director, Office of Pol-
icy, Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 12 (June 28, 2004) [hereinafter FTAC 
Letter]  (generally commenting on Unfair Trade Practices Task Force 69 Fed. Reg. 30,285 and not-
ing on page 12 that data maintained by the Directors Guild of America (DGA) shows that one-third 
of movies shown in theaters in 2003 and shot under DGA contracts were made outside of the U.S.), 
available at www.ftac.org/files/FinalTaskForceLetter.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 3. See infra Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 (portraying data compiled on May 15, 2005 from the interna-
tional movie data base, which can be found at www.imdb.com, which indicate that, by the 2004 
release year, 65% of U.S.-developed feature films were shot outside of the U.S.).  Note that these 
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films were shot outside of the U.S. during 2004,4  and for a number of 
years, an even higher percentage of U.S.-developed television programs 
and movies-of-the week (MOWs) were filmed in other countries.5  For 
example, at least one study reported that, in 1999-2000, the percentage 
of U.S. - developed MOWs made outside of the U.S. was 59%.6 
A great many of the films shot outside of the U.S. are shot in Can-
ada,7 which has the most established film incentive programs, both on 
the federal and provincial level.8  The list of U.S.-developed movies 
filmed in Canada is long and impressive.9  So many U.S.-developed 
movies are filmed in Canada that it is referred to in the industry as “Hol-
lywood North,”10 and Canada’s actors’ union, the Alliance of Canadian 
Cinema Television and Radio Artist (ACTRA), even offers a workshop 
to teach Canadian actors how to use American accents, so that fewer 
American actors need be hired on any film that is shot in Canada.11 
A sample of the big budget, well-known feature films shot there 
within recent years includes Brokeback Mountain, Good Will Hunting, 
Catwoman, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, The Day After Tomorrow, I, 
                                                                                                                                 
charts do exaggerate the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry in the sense that the searches 
performed did not account for the fact that a film may be made in multiple foreign locations, and 
hence such a film is counted multiple times in the charts.  However, it is not common for a film to 
be shot in multiple foreign locations.  The author is not aware of any other manner in which the ex-
hibits may be based on incomplete or inaccurate data.  At the same time, as it isn’t clear how and 
when data is entered into this data base, the reader is cautioned that there is no guarantee that the 
data on which these exhibits are based are otherwise complete and accurate. 
 4. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15. 
 5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, The Migration of U.S. Film and Television Production 
27-29 (January 18, 2001)  [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE] (citing The Monitor 
Company, The Economic Impact of U.S. Film and Television Runaway Film Production (June 
1999) [hereinafter The Monitor Company] and Letter fromRobert Solomon, Chairman, Governmen-
tal Affair, Southern California Chapter of the Association of Imaging and Technology and Sound 
(ITS) to Michael Fink, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (July 5, 2000) [hereinafter 
Solomon Letter]).  The U.S. Department of Commerce and The Monitor Company reports are both 
available at http://www.ftac.org/html/2a.dgasag.html (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 6.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, note 6, at 28 (citing the Solomon Letter). 
 7.  The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that, in 1998, Canada captured more 
than 80% of all U.S.-developed feature film and television projects); see also infra Exhibits 5 and 6 
(showing that, by 2001, Canada produced 19% of all feature films filmed worldwide that year); see 
also infra Exhibits 7, 8, and 9 (illustrating that Canada produced 31% (20% of the 65%) of all U.S.-
developed feature films produced outside of the U.S.). 
 8. See infra Section V (Canadian PSTC Film Incentives). 
 9. See sample list of U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada during 2000-2005, 
attached as Appendix A (compiled from data maintained in the international movie data base, which 
can be found at www.imdb.com). 
 10. CTV, Canada the New Hotspot for Video Game Creators, available at http://www.ctv.ca/ 
servlet/articlenews/story/ctvnews/1110995669946_56 (last visited November 4, 2005). 
 11. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 19 (citing Tamsen Tillson, Canuck Thesps Get Earful: 
Gross Gives ACTRA Keynote, DAILY VARIETY (June 2, 2004)). 
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Robot, Cinderella Man, Electra, and Armageddon.12  Even many quin-
tessentially “American films” have been shot outside of the U.S., pri-
marily in Canada.13  The outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry for 
economic reasons, which began in the early 1990s and picked up consid-
erable steam in the late 1990s,14 is continuing unabated.  The fact that in 
the spring of 2005 Jennifer Garner was in Vancouver filming Catch and 
Release, Brad Pitt was in Calgary filming The Assassination of Jesse 
James, and Ben Affleck was in Toronto filming the movie Truth, Justice 
and the American Way15 illustrates the pervasiveness of this phenome-
non. 
In fact, the outsourcing of the U.S. film industry is so well-
entrenched and accepted by film industry management that there are re-
ports that U.S. film industry workers who have organized activities pro-
moting the retention of film production in the U.S. have been “black-
listed” in Hollywood.16  Just as in the McCarthy era in the 1950s, these 
film industry workers say that they are being accused of being Commu-
nists and of engaging in potentially dangerous “un-American activi-
ties.”17  As a result, they claim that they are finding it difficult, if not im-
                                                          
 12. See supra note 9; see also database of film productions and production locations main-
tained by the publisher Variety.  The database can be searched for specific titles or by films filmed 
outside of the U.S.  Variety Home Page, available at http://www.variety.com (follow “Film Produc-
tion” hyperlink; then follow “Film Production” hyperlink under “Charts and Data”) (last visited 
November 6, 2005). 
 13. See Variety Home Page, available at http://www.variety.com (follow “Film Production” 
hyperlink; then follow “Film Production” hyperlink under “Charts and Data”) (last visited Novem-
ber 6, 2005).  Examples of such movies include Rudy: The Rudy Giuliani Story, which portrays the 
life of Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City, Chicago, which depicts the true-crime 
story involving Velma Kelly and Roxie Hart in Chicago in the 1920s, Miracle, showing the U.S. 
hockey team triumph over the Soviet team at the 1980 Olympics, Independence Day, which was 
released on July 4, 1996, and portrays a fictitious attempted takeover of the world by aliens, and 
Cold Mountain, which concerns the Civil War period of U.S. history.  All of these films were shot 
in Canada, except for Cold Mountain, which was shot in Romania. 
 14. The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 2-3; but see Neil Craig Associates, International 
Film and Television Production in Canada: Setting the Record Straight About U.S. ‘Runaway’ Pro-
duction” 1 (October 2004) (“The total direct and indirect economic impact of this activity on the 
United States in 1998 was CAN$1.7 billion, only a fraction of the US$10.3 billion claimed in the 
Monitor Report.  That report contains contradictory claims and basic arithmetic errors, double 
counts figures and uses methodologies that are highly unusual in standard economic analysis.”), 
available at http://www.filmontario.ca/news.php (last visited May 8, 2006). 
 15. Review of Catch and Release, available at http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=106 
99 (last visited November 6, 2005).  Review of The Assassination of Jesse James, available at 
http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=12064 (last visited November. 6, 2005).  Review of Truth, 
Justice, and the American Way, available at http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=10632 (last 
visited November. 6, 2005). 
 16. Author’s interview with Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC) members Gene 
Warren, Tim McHugh, and Ann Champion, Burbank, California (July 9, 2005). 
 17. Id.; see also Interview on August 4, 2004 of Brent Swift, Former President of FTAC, by 
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possible, to find work in the film industry in the U.S.18  If these reports 
are true, the meaning of “un-American activities” clearly has been 
turned on its head.  What could be more American than arguing that one 
of America’s premier industries should remain in America?  Or, more 
specifically, that American actors should actually portray Americans in 
stories that reflect and promote American culture and values? 
This article addresses whether the film incentives offered by other 
countries are consistent with those countries’ obligations under interna-
tional law and can be countered with countervailing duties under U.S. 
domestic law.  In particular, this article discusses in some detail whether 
the foreign film incentives are consistent with these countries’ obliga-
tions under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement).19 
To be sure, it is not illegal for a U.S. film company to film a movie 
in a foreign location for artistic reasons.  In addition, at the present time, 
it is not illegal to produce a film project in a foreign location in order to 
take advantage of lower wage rates and/or a favorable currency ex-
change rate.  Furthermore, some countries and commentators argue that 
there is, or should be, a “cultural exemption” to the international trade 
rules, such that incentives provided by a government to domestic pro-
ducers in order to promote local cultural items are outside of the scope 
of any international obligations.20  That argument is not at issue here, 
                                                                                                                                 
Andrea R. Vaucher, reported in Using Trade Pacts to Stem Loss of TV and Film Jobs to Canada, 
New York Times (August 5, 2004), available at http://www.ftac.org/html/2-news.html (last visited 
May 8, 2006). 
 18. See supra note 16. 
 19. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275 
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [not reproduced in I.L.M.]  [hereinafter SCM Agreement], available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp (follow “Search for Documents: Simple Search” hyperlink; 
then enter “LT/UR/A-1A/9” into “Document Symbol” search field) (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 20. See, e.g., The Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, Further 
Opportunities: New Strategies for Culture and Trade Canadian Culture in a Global World, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA (FEBRUARY  1999), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/canculture-en.asp (last visited May 6, 2006).  In the WTO case of Canada – Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, adopted on March 14, 1997, paras. 3.67-3.71, Canada essen-
tially argued before the Panel that there is a “cultural exemption” to the WTO rules.  That is, it al-
leged that Canadian cultural products such as periodicals are unique and therefore cannot possibly 
be “like products” to cultural products produced in other countries; hence, Canada’s differential 
treatment of such products does not violate the National Treatment Principle incorporated in the 
first sentence of Article III.2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 17 91999), 1867 U.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].  
The Panel in that case, however, rejected Canada’s argument that there is a “cultural exemption” to 
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however, because there is no requirement that the film maker include 
any minimum amount of local content in order to obtain the incentives 
that are the subject of this article.21 
The question addressed in this article is whether, under U.S. and 
WTO law, a foreign government can artificially lower the costs of pro-
duction in an industry to such an extent that a number of U.S. companies 
choose to establish local production companies in that country and 
forego production in the U.S., thereby decimating the industry in the 
U.S.  Specifically, as a case study, this article focuses on the Production 
Services Tax Credit (PSTC) film incentives that Canada offers to domes-
tic and foreign film companies alike to produce films that need not pos-
sess any Canadian content.22  These incentives are based on the percent-
age of Canadian labor utilized.  They are exceedingly generous, and they 
have been very successful in attracting U.S. film companies to film their 
movies in Canada.23  Of course, if the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
were to find that the PSTC Programs in Canada are counter to Canada’s 
obligations under the SCM Agreement, similar incentives provided by 
other WTO Members (and indeed the film incentives provided by the 
U.S. federal government and several U.S. states) may also have to be 
                                                                                                                                 
the WTO rules and went on to conclude that the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-origin 
periodicals at issue were in fact “like products.”  See id. at para. 6.1. Canada appealed the latter con-
clusion of the Panel. See WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted on June 30, 1997, p. 2 (II.A  Arguments of the 
Participants – Canada).  The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s decision on the “like products” 
question on the basis that the Panel had not considered appropriate or sufficient evidence on the 
issue.Id. at  pp. 14, 22 (VIII. Findings and Conclusions – (b)).  However, it went on to conclude that 
the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-origin periodicals were directly competitive and substi-
tutable products in any case and therefore Canada had violated the second sentence of Article III.2 
of the GATT 1994.  Id. at p. 22 (VIII. Findings and Conclusions – (c)). 
 21. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives).  Some commentators argue that 
governments should at least be permitted to subsidize their own cultural industries, including their 
film industries, when those industries are in their embryonic stage. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, 
SPEAKING FOR FUN AND PROFIT, ch. 12 Leveling the Entertainment World  8 (West forthcoming 
2006).  (“[The] special economic features of the entertainment industry’s production and marketing 
costs certainly justify a small and poor Senegal providing government assistance to try to create an 
Oscar, not just a World Football, contender.”). However, this argument is not relevant to the subsi-
dies that Canada currently is providing to its film industry, as that industry is no longer in its infancy 
stage.  See, e.g., Canadian Film and Televisions Production Association, in association with Price-
waterhouseCoopers, L’Association des Producteurs de Films et de Television du Quebec, and the 
Department of Canadian Heritage, The Canadian Film and Television Production Industry: A 1999 
Profile 5 (February 1999) (“Canadian feature films  . . . are recognized internationally as among the 
finest in the world.”); CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE (CAVCO), 2001-02 
CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE 
PERIOD APRIL 1, 2001 TO MARCH 31, 2002, AT 4 (2002) (“The Canadian government has long rec-
ognized the importance of film and video as a cultural resource . . . .”). 
 22. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives). 
 23. Id.; see also supra note 9. 
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abolished.  In general, whether any other WTO Member’s film incen-
tives contravene that Member’s WTO obligations would depend on the 
magnitude of the harm caused by those incentives to the feature film 
production industry in one or more other WTO member(s).24 
In any case, many of the film incentive programs offered around the 
world have been enacted specifically in order to counteract those pro-
vided by Canada.25 For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, both 
Australia and New Zealand created similar film incentive programs.26  
These programs were quite successful in luring U.S. film producers to 
film their movies in Australia and New Zealand.27  In response, the Ca-
nadian federal government increased its film subsidy amount from 11% 
to 16% of qualifying Canadian labor costs in February of 2003.28  Next, 
in November of 2004, the U.S. federal government responded by enact-
ing Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Jobs Crea-
tion Act of 2004, which allows producers of smaller budget films to de-
duct 100% of film production costs in the year incurred.29  Then, the 
three Canadian provinces where the majority of U.S. films are shot, Brit-
ish Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, all raised their subsidy percentages 
in January of 2005.30  While approximately 30 out of the 50 states have 
had some local film incentive programs in place for some time, several 
states, including California, recently have increased their subsidies or are 
considering doing so.31  This round-robin effect is the predictable out-
come of the U.S.’ failure to challenge Canada’s film incentives in the 
first place.  Thus, even if the WTO Dispute Settlement Body were to 
rule that all of these film incentive programs cause adverse effects and 
should be abolished, the overall effect of such a WTO ruling essentially 
                                                          
 24. See infra Part VI, Section D.2  (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be 
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry). 
 25. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
 26. See Appendix D for a description of some of the major film incentive programs in other 
countries. 
 27. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 12. 
 28. Id. at 11. 
 29. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) [herein-
after American Jobs Creation Act of 2004] (Section 244 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
created a new Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code, codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §181 
(2005)). 
 30. See infra notes 93–95; see also Appendix B, which lists the major film incentives offered 
by the Canadian provincial governments. 
 31. See What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 16 (Illinois, Louisiana, 
New Mexico, New York and Pennsylvania have been the most enthusiastic suitors, courting produc-
tion companies . . . . More than 17 other states have introduced legislation that would create similar 
enticements.”); see also Appendix C, which lists the major film incentives offered by the various 
U.S. states. 
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would be a return to the status quo ante - Canada’s rich film incentive 
scheme. 
The article concludes that the above-described foreign film incen-
tives, and the PSTC film incentives in Canada in particular, most likely 
are inconsistent with those WTO Members’ obligations under WTO law, 
as they adversely affect the U.S. feature film production industry.  The 
U.S. Government could therefore pursue a dispute settlement case on 
this issue in the WTO, requesting that Canada (and other countries with 
similar film incentive programs) be ordered to abolish those incentives.  
In the U.S., the U.S. Government could also initiate an action to impose 
countervailing duties on the subsidized films when they are imported 
into the U.S.  After providing an analysis supporting this conclusion, this 
article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the various reme-
dies that could be pursued, considers the obstacles to a legal challenge to 
the film incentive programs, and provides recommendations for how in-
terested parties in the U.S. might proceed. 
II.  ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES32 
From an economic standpoint, subsidies provided by a government 
to a particular domestic enterprise or industry interfere with the free 
market economy principles of supply and demand.  In particular, the 
subsidies support companies and products that otherwise would not exist 
in the marketplace, and therefore the subsidies are an inefficient use of 
government, and hence ultimately taxpayer, funds.  In addition, the 
benefits that the recipients receive may be considered to be unfair both 
by the recipient’s competitors and by the taxpayers who are not directly 
involved in the subsidized company or industry and thus are dispropor-
tionately burdened by the taxes assessed to pay for the subsidies.  Empty 
sports stadiums around the country that were built with taxpayer money 
(and which in some cases are still being paid for by the local taxpayers) 
provide a good example of the economic disadvantage of government 
subsidies.33 
Specifically in the global trade arena, goods that have been subsi-
                                                          
 32. In the case of government subsidies to the film industry, there is also a significant non-
economic disadvantage inherent in such subsidies.  This is the danger that governments, through 
their economic support of the film industry, will pressure film producers not to produce movies 
critical of those governments.  This point has been made by a number of commentators.  See, e.g., 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at  8. 
 33. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, RADICALLY MODERATE LAW REFORM, Insulating Taxpayers 
from Both Teams and Studios (forthcoming).  (Copy on file in Law Review office at the University 
of Akron Law School). 
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dized by their home countries do not compete fairly with unsubsidized 
goods in the international marketplace.34  Companies producing a “like 
product” in a country into which the subsidized goods are imported may 
find that they cannot compete with the subsidized imports and as a result 
both domestic production and exports of the domestic product may be 
hampered.  As indicated above, this unfair trade advantage often leads 
an importing country to establish its own competing subsides, which, in 
turn, can lead to the establishment of even more generous foreign sub-
sidy programs.35 
In summary, domestic subsidies tend to distort international trading 
patterns through encouragement of the production and exportation of the 
subsidized product, and discouragement of the production and exporta-
tion of products manufactured in non-subsidizing countries.36  This im-
balance in the global economy leads affected nations to respond with 
their own subsidy programs, and the ensuing subsidy war has the same 
trade-distorting effect in the global economy as do undisciplined tariffs 
and quota increases.37  From an economic perspective, then, domestic 
subsidies tend to decrease the economic welfare of competing industries 
and workers in non-subsidizing nations, taxpayers in the subsidizing na-
tions, and the global economy as a whole.38 
In the instant case, for example, if the government subsides to the 
film industry remain in existence, a number of nations could end up with 
empty sound stages and recording studios and yet their taxpayers could 
be left paying the debt incurred by their governments to build these 
stages and studios for many years to come.  From an overall economic 
standpoint, it would seem preferable for all of the WTO trading partners 
to refrain from providing subsidies to their domestic film production 
companies (other than perhaps for the production of local cultural films) 
and simply allow the best film production companies in the world to 
survive. 
                                                          
 34. JOHN JACKSON, WILLIAM DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 767-68 (4th ed., West  2002). 
 35. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text. 
 36. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 767-73 (citing articles on economic rationale behind prohibition against 
actionable subsidies such as follows: Gary Hufbaur & Joanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in Interna-
tional Trade, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 5-6 (1984),  Warren F. Schwartz & 
Eugene W Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
831 (1972); Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Critique, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
199 (1989)). 
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III.  SIGNIFICANCE OF FILM INDUSTRY TO U.S. ECONOMY AND CULTURE 
The entertainment industry clearly is one of the most important in-
dustries in the U.S.  Historically, it has made a substantial contribution 
to both the U.S. gross domestic product and U.S. export sales.  In 2002, 
the entertainment sector employed approximately 4.7 million people and 
generated sales of over half a trillion dollars.39  This constituted more 
than five percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.40  Furthermore, in-
ternational sales generated approximately half of these revenues.41  
These export earnings are quite significant, in light of an overall U.S. 
trade deficit of $726 billion by the end of 2005, which constituted an 
18% increase over 2004.42 
The U.S. film industry, as a component of the entertainment indus-
try, in 2002 employed between 153,000 and 353,076 people and paid 
these people between $9.3 billion to $21.2 billion.43  More than half of 
these people lived in California and earned two-thirds of these salaries 
and wages.44  The film industry, at least until recently, has also contrib-
uted significantly to the economies of several other states, including 
most importantly New York and Illinois.45  These direct salaries and 
wages have a multiplier effect throughout the economy, which often is 
estimated to be between 2 and 3 times.46  The industry as a whole gener-
ated revenue of $52 billion in 2002.47  A significant portion of these fig-
ures is attributable to the feature film industry.48 
Without question, U.S. entertainment products are enjoyed by peo-
                                                          
 39. The Office of the United States Trade Representative, Zoellick Joins  Entertainment In-
dustry Launch of Free Trade Coalition, Press Release 1 (May 13, 2003), available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-726528.html (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Robert E. Scott, with research assistance from David Ratner, Trade Picture: Rapid growth 
in oil prices, Chinese imports pump up trade deficit to new record, Economic Policy Institute 1 
(February 10, 2006) (citing U.S. Department of Commerce statistics). 
 43. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 5, at 2 (citing Motion Picture As-
sociation of America (MPAA) figures for each of the higher numbers and U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, figures for each of the lower numbers). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g.,  U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 8.  Motion picture economic activ-
ity accounts for more than 13 percent of New York’s information industry establishments and some 
seven percent of Illinois’ information sector establishments.  Id. 
 46. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5 at 23 (discussing various multi-
pliers used in the entertainment and film industries). 
 47. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 1 (citing figures published by U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census). 
 48. See Film Industry Profile, supra note 2 (reporting employment and wage data for various 
segments of the entire film industry over the course of several years). 
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ple all over the world,49 and it is often said that, as a nation, the U.S. is 
best known for its entertainment industry.50  Although moviemaking was 
first created in France in the late 1800’s, Thomas Edison brought this 
technology back to the U.S.,51 and the U.S. has been the predominant 
player in the industry worldwide since World War I.52  U.S. travelers, for 
example, cannot help but marvel at the reach of the U.S. film industry 
into even the remotest corners of the globe.  For example, one can travel 
many hours by plane to some non-English-speaking country, where 
communication with the taxi driver at the airport is a very trying experi-
ence, and yet the local theatres nonetheless primarily exhibit U.S.-
developed feature films. 
The U.S. entertainment industry, and especially the U.S. feature 
film industry, unquestionably is the envy of many other countries around 
the world.53  Consequently, many other countries have attempted to 
emulate the U.S.’ success in this arena.54  In particular, they have offered 
their own feature film industry, as well as the U.S. feature film industry, 
very generous incentives to produce films in their countries in order to 
compete directly with the U.S.-developed feature films produced in the 
U.S.55  As discussed further below, the U.S. film industry, and the U.S. 
feature film industry in particular, have suffered a significant contraction 
in recent years, largely due to the outsourcing of the film industry to 
other countries.56  Again, Canada has the most established film incentive 
program,57 and this article focuses on the PSTC film incentives that are 
provided by the Canadian governments. 
IV.  U.S. FILM INDUSTRY 
As a case study, this article focuses not only on the PSTC film in-
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., GEORGE CLACK, PORTRAIT OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES INFORMATION 
AGENCY, Exporting Popular Culture 1 (“For better or worse, many nations now have two cultures: 
Their indigenous one and one consisting of the sports, movies, televisions programs, and music 
whose energy and broad-based appeal are identifiably American.”). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 2-3; see also Frank Wicks, Picture This: Scientist? Busi-
nessman? The Inventor Who Popularized His Fortune Well., MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, available 
at http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/july04/features/pictthis/pictthis.html (last visited March 
9, 2006). 
 52. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 2-3. 
 53. See supra note 49. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Appendix D. 
 56. See infra Section VI, Part D.2 (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be 
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry). 
 57. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives). 
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centives in Canada, but it also focuses on the harm that these incentives 
are causing to a subset of the entire U.S. film industry – the feature film 
industry.  The entire film industry in the U.S. generally refers to the pro-
duction of at least the following: 
(1) full-length feature films; 
(2) movies of the week (again, otherwise known as MOWs or 
made-for-television movies); 
(3) series television shows; 
(4) television commercials; and 
(5) music videos.58 
These various types of films are produced by either one of the 
seven “major” film studios or one of the numerous smaller production 
companies called “independents.”59  The “majors” are members of the 
Motion Picture Association of American (MPAA), while many of the 
independent film companies are members of the American Film Market-
ing Association (AFMA).60 
Also, whatever the film genre, usually there are three phases to the 
development of the film: pre-production, production, and post-
production.61  Pre-production tasks include script writing, set design, se-
lection of cast, crew, and location, costume design, and budgeting.62  
U.S. film companies tend to perform some of the pre-production tasks in 
the U.S., even in those situations where they decide to shoot the film 
outside of the U.S., but relatively few people are needed to perform 
these tasks. 
Once the above tasks have been completed, the “film” can be pro-
                                                          
 58. The description of the film industry relies heavily on information reported in U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 9-16 and in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Career Guide to Industries, Motion Picture and Video Industries (2006-07 Edition, 
last modified on December 20, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs038.html  (last 
visited April 28, 2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. The websites of these associations are http://www.mpaa.org and 
http://www.afma.com.  The MPAA’s members are Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Sony Pictures 
Entertainment Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios LLLP, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.  See 
MPAA, Members pages, available at http://www.mpaa.org/ABoutUSMembers.asp (last visited 
March 10, 2006). 
 61. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 15. 
 62. Id. 
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duced or shot in the U.S. or elsewhere.63  The actual shooting of the film 
is a very labor-intensive process.64 
When principal photography on a film is shot outside of the U.S., 
that film has to be sent to the U.S. for storage, distribution, and some-
times the performance of the post-production activities.  Today, this usu-
ally means the importation into the U.S. of a physical good, such as a 
film reel, a DVD, a CD or a computer drive or disc.65  When the film is 
completed, the production company usually stores the physical product 
in a secure “film vault,” so as to ensure against its damage, loss, theft 
and piracy.66 
For nearly a century, motion pictures were shot onto a strip of light-
sensitive, perforated film stock which was then developed to produce a 
negative.  From this negative, a print was struck and various scenes were 
spliced together by the editor to create the final product. 
Today, while the majority of motion pictures still originate on film, 
there is a rapidly growing trend to use digital video (high-definition) 
cameras for production.  It is too early to predict the complete demise of 
film as the originating medium, but we are beginning to see its sunset. 
Once the principal photography on a film has been completed, the 
post-production activities must be performed. Post-production activities 
include editing, color imaging, and the addition of soundtracks, visual 
effects, musical scoring, titles and credits, and dubbing.67  This phase has 
almost entirely moved into the digital world.  The computer has replaced 
the editing machine (Moviola) and the optical lab.  Former industry 
standard items such as grease pencils, tape splicers and film rewinds 
have gone the way of the dial telephone.  Today, U.S. film companies 
sometimes perform these post-production activities in the U.S. and 
sometimes they perform these post-production activities outside of the 
U.S.  In any case, proportionately fewer people are required to perform 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14. 
 65. Not that today, the majority of feature films still even originate on motion picture film.  
See, e.g, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 58, at 2. 
 66. See, e.g., John Borland, New Technology a Boon for Big Screen, CNET News.com 4 
(June 30, 2003) (“Magnetic storage is still unstable compared with film, which can last hundreds, or 
even thousands, of years. Studios store many of their archival films in vaults deep underground at 
an old salt mine in Kansas or at a former limestone mine in Pennsylvania.”), available at 
http://news.com.com/Vision+ Series+Hollywoods+digital+blockbuster/2030-1070_3-1001643.html 
(last visited April 29, 3006); see also King Content: Don’t Write Off Hollywood and the Big Media 
Groups Just Yet, THE ECONOMIST 1 (January 19 2006) (“‘Pain is temporary, film is forever.’”), 
available at http://www.economist.com/opionion/displaystory.cfm?/story_id=5411930 (last visited 
May 6, 2006). 
 67. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 15. 
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modern post-production tasks and the time required has also shrunk 
dramatically. 
V.  CANADIAN PSTC FILM INCENTIVES 
The federal and provincial governments in Canada for many years 
have offered a large variety of incentives to attract foreign film produc-
ers, as well as encourage domestic production.68  For example, Canada 
has provided some direct financial grants, working capital loans, favor-
able loan rates with guarantees provided by the Canadian government, 
waivers for local costs and fees, funding for equity investment, and ag-
gressive marketing campaigns promoting Canada.69  Canada has also of-
fered a wide range of tax incentives in order to entice both domestic and 
foreign film companies to shoot their films in Canada.70 
In the past, most of the film incentives offered by Canada were 
conditioned on inclusion of a minimum percentage of Canadian con-
tent.71  There are still some incentive programs that require Canadian 
content,72 and U.S. film producers not infrequently take advantage of 
these incentives.  The Canadian content tax incentives are the most gen-
erous of all of the incentives offered by Canada, generally equivalent to 
25% of qualifying labor expenses,73 which are the wages and salaries 
paid to Canadian residents or taxable Canadian corporations (for 
amounts paid to employees who are Canadian residents).74  However, 
several of the film incentive programs in Canada no longer require Ca-
nadian content.75 
The most generous incentive not conditioned on inclusion of Cana-
dian content offered by the Canadian federal government is the Federal 
Film and Video Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC).76  This program 
was established in 1997, and it first became available for films shot in 
                                                          
 68. See, e.g, id. at 71. 
 69. Id. at 71-73. 
 70. Id. at 71-72. 
 71. See The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 20. 
 72. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: 
ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003, TO 
MARCH 31, 2004, at 8 (2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-
cavco/pubs/2003-04/activ_03-04_e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 5. 
 75. Id. at 16. 
 76. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services 
Tax Credit (PSTC), (August 2, 2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-
cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm  (last visited March 30, 2006). 
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Canada on or after January 1, 1998.77  In order to qualify for the tax 
credit, the production costs for the proposed project must be at least $1 
million (CAN),78  and the tax credit awarded is equal to sixteen percent 
(16%) of “qualifying labor costs,” defined above.79 
The PSTC Program is actually structured as a transfer of funds 
rather than as a rebate of taxes paid, but the funds ostensibly are to be 
used to help the company pay future employment taxes owed to the Ca-
nadian federal government.  Hence, the PSTC Program acts as a direct 
reduction of the employment costs associated with shooting a film in 
Canada, and, today, film companies often receive a check equal to 16% 
of the qualifying labor costs within a few weeks of filing their PSTC ap-
plication, sometimes even prior to their commencement of filming in 
Canada.80 
Applicants for the PSTC tax incentive must be either a taxable Ca-
nadian corporation or a foreign-owned corporation with a permanent es-
tablishment in Canada.81  Accordingly, many U.S. film studios have 
formed a Canadian branch of their corporations, such as Sony Pictures 
Home Entertainment-Canada and SKG Studios Canada, Inc.  Others 
have partnered with Canadian production companies, such as Alliance 
(Universal), TVA International (20th Century Fox), Remstar (Universal), 
and Cineplex Odeon (Universal).  U.S. producers can also simply con-
tract for productions services directly with Canadian companies.82 
The PSTC Program is co-administered by the Canadian Audio-
Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), which is part of the Department 
of Canadian Heritage, and the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA).  
CAVCO determines the eligibility of the production and issues an ac-
creditation certificate.83  Then, the CRA distributes the funds to the film 
company.84 
                                                          
 77. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Ser-
vices Tax Credit (PSTC), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-
cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm  (last visited August 13, 2005). 
 78. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Ser-
vices Tax Credit (PSTC)  Guidelines, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccav 
co/progs/cisp-pstc/pubs/guide_en.pdf  (last visited November 4, 2005). 
 79. Id. at 3-4 (gives overview of PSTC tax credit). 
 80. Id. at 13-19 (discussing Canada Revenue Agency’s processing of PSTC claims). 
 81. Id. at 4-5 (discussing how PSTC works). 
 82. See The Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, available at http://www.cmpd 
a.ca/index.jspa (last visited March 30, 2006). 
 83. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services 
Tax Credit (PSTC), (August 2, 2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-
cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm  (last visited August 13, 2005). 
 84. See http://www.pch.gc.ca/progrs/ac-ca-progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cisp-stc/pubs/pstc/1_e. 
cfm#2 (last visited March 20, 2006). 
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Most of the productions that receive PSTC funds are fiction or 
dramatic programs, and the total costs of production for projects that 
qualified for PSTC funding by the end of March 2004 was $16.1 billion 
(CAN).85  The portion of these budgets that had been spent in Canada 
between 1998 and March of 2004 was $8.1 billion (CAN), or 50.1% of 
the total.86  For the fiscal year commencing April 1, 2003 and ending 
March 31, 2004, the cost of production for films receiving PSTC funds 
was $2.3 billion (CAN) and the amount spent in Canada on PSTC pro-
ductions that same year was $1.2 billion (CAN).87  The overwhelming 
majority (approximately 95%) of originating copyright holders of 
CAVCO-certified PSTC productions have been from the United States.88 
Similarly, most if not all of the provinces in Canada provide a tax 
credit or a tax rebate of an additional percentage of the qualifying labor 
expenses incurred in the province.  This percentage (with occasional 
maximum amounts based on the aggregate dollar amount of the credit or 
a percentage of total production expenses) ranges from 18% to 50%.89  
The federal and provincial PSTC funds are cumulative, so the PSTC 
funds received by a film company can be quite substantial.90 
As indicated above, at least partly in response to new generous film 
incentives in other countries,91 the Canadian federal government raised 
the PSTC percentage from 11% to 16% in February of 2003.92  Then, in 
2005, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario, 
where the overwhelming majority of foreign films are shot in Canada, all 
amended their own PSTC programs to make them more generous.  Brit-
ish Columbia and Ontario raised their PSTC percentage from 11% to 
                                                          
 85. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, supra note 72, at 16. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Appendix B. 
 90. DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Pro-
duction in Canada  9 (March 2005). 
 91. For example, the U.K., Ireland, Australia, and a number of other countries provide similar 
incentives to their domestic and foreign film companies in order to entice them to shoot feature 
films in those countries.  See Appendix D.  Some of these other film incentive programs are even 
more generous than the incentive programs in Canada.  These incentives include, by way of exam-
ple, low interest loans, loan guarantees, income tax breaks, free training, free use of film stages and 
sound studios, and outright cash grants.  See id.  At the time that the Canadian federal government 
raised its PSTC subsidy rate, however, the Canadian dollar was also gaining in strength, so that the 
costs of producing a film in Canada were also increasing.  See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL 
CERTIFICATION OFFICE, 2002-2003 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered 
by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2003 16 (2003). 
 92. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, supra note 78, at 3-4. 
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18%,93 and Quebec raised its PSTC percentage from 11% to 20%.94  Ap-
parently, the provinces raised their rates at least in part to counter the 
U.S. federal government’s new federal tax incentive for producers of 
smaller-budget films.  Again, in the Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the U.S 
Congress enacted Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code.95  This al-
lows producers of feature films with budgets of $15 million or smaller to 
deduct 100% of the costs to produce such a film in the years in which 
these costs were incurred, so long as 75% or more of the production 
costs of the film are incurred in the U.S.96  The maximum budget of the 
film is $20 million if the film is shot in an economically depressed 
area.97  This federal incentive is in addition to various incentives that ex-
ist in approximately 30 of the 50 U.S. states.98 
From the point of view of the Canadian governments, the purpose 
of allowing the U.S. film companies to participate in these incentive 
programs is two-fold.  First, the PSTC Program “is a mechanism de-
signed to encourage the employment of Canadians . . . .”99  Second, Ca-
nadian governments are using the PSTC Program to enhance the devel-
opment of their own local film industries over time.100  The Canadian 
governments readily admit both of these goals, at least when defending 
the incentives to their own taxpayers.101  In the short term, however, they 
are using U.S.-developed stories, major U.S. stars, and some U.S. writ-
ers and directors to teach them the trade.  That is, they are using Holly-
                                                          
 93. British Colombia Film Commission, Tax Credits, available at http://www.bcfilmcom 
mission.com/finance (last visited August 13, 2005); Ontario Media Development Corporation, Tax 
Incentives, available at http://www.omdc.on.ca/English/page-1-61-1.html (June 2, 2005) (last vis-
ited August 13, 2005). 
 94. Quebec City Film and TV Commission, Incentives, available at http://www.filmquebec. 
com (last visited August 16, 2005). 
 95. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, supra note 29. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Appendix C. 
 99. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 16. 
 100. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 4-5 (the Cana-
dian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO) was created in part to administer the PSTC Pro-
gram and thereby promote the development of the film industry in Canada). 
 101. See, e.g., Ontario Ministry of Finance, Ontario Budget 2006: Budget Paper C Details, 
Section entitled “Corporations Tax Act,” subsection entitled “Enhancing the Ontario Production 
Services Tax Credit” (“This Budget proposes measures that would foster economic growth and job 
creation in the entertainment and creative cluster . . . As announced on February 9, 2006, the gov-
ernment proposes to extend the 18 per cent tax credit rate for the [Ontario Production Services Tax 
Credit] OPSTC until March 31, 2007. This proposed extension reflects the government’s commit-
ment to support Ontario’s film and television industry, and to help ensure that it remains competi-
tive.”), available at http://www.ontariobudget.ca/English/paperc.html (last visited on April 29, 
2006). 
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wood to put Hollywood out of business. 
VI.  THE CONSISTENCY OF CANADA’S PSTC FILM INCENTIVES WITH 
THE SCM AGREEMENT 
All WTO Members are required to sign the SCM Agreement when 
they join the WTO.  Hence, as the U.S. and Canada have been Members 
of the WTO since its inception in January 1995, they have been parties 
to the SCM Agreement since that time.  In order to demonstrate that 
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are inconsistent with the SCM Agree-
ment, it first must be illustrated that these incentives constitute a “sub-
sidy” as Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines this term.  Then, it 
must be demonstrated that the PSTC incentives are provided in connec-
tion with the manufacture, production or export of merchandise or 
goods102 – namely, feature films.  Finally, it must be demonstrated that 
the PSTC incentives constitute either a prohibited subsidy or an action-
able subsidy provided to a specific industry that causes adverse effects to 
the interests of another WTO Member.103 A graphical depiction of the 
legal analysis required to demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film incen-
tives contravene Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement fol-
















                                                          
 102. See SCM Agreement, Article 10, n. 36; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, Art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 91999), 1867 U..T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 103. See SCM Agreement, Articles 2, 3, 5. 
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A.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Constitute a  Subsidy 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as “a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a 
Member . . . [for example,] where: . . .government revenue that is other-
wise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax 
credits) . . . [ ] and a benefit is thereby conferred.”104  Clearly, the PSTC 
film incentives benefit the film companies that receive them.  Further-
more, the PSTC film incentives provided by the Canadian governments 
                                                          
 104. SCM Agreement, Articles 1.1(a)(1)(ii), 1.1(b). 
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are, in fact, a financial contribution by the Canadian governments to 
these companies.  Finally, as the incentives specifically are tax credits, 
they are a named example of government revenue that otherwise would 
be due that is foregone.105  Hence, there can be no question that Can-
ada’s PSTC film incentives meet the definition of a “subsidy” set forth 
in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
B.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in Connection with the 
Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – Namely, Feature Films 
Article 10, note 36 of the SCM Agreement indicates that the SCM 
provisions apply only to subsidies granted by WTO Members in connec-
tion with the “manufacture, production or export of any merchan-
dise . . . .”  The term “merchandise” is used interchangeably with the 
words “good” and “product” throughout the SCM Agreement.106  For the 
sake of convenience, the word “good” or “goods,” as applicable, will be 
used throughout the remainder of this article unless otherwise noted, but 
the word “merchandise” or “product” could just as easily have been 
used.  None of these terms is defined in the SCM Agreement.  Yet, the 
conclusion that the SCM Agreement applies only to the manufacture, 
production or export of goods is further evidenced by the fact that the 
SCM Agreement is one of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Agreements 
on Trade in Goods included in Annex 1A to the April 15, 1994 
Marakesh Agreement Establishing  the WTO.107  Article XV.1 of the 
Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),108 
                                                          
 105. The fact that the PSTC film incentives are employee tax credits is evidenced by the text of 
the applicable Canadian tax laws as well as the name of these tax programs. See, e.g, Canada In-
come Tax Act, Section 125.5 (2006).  On both the federal and provincial level, the programs are 
referred to as the Production Services Tax Credit Programs. (Emphasis added). 
 106. For example, Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iii), 3.2(b), and 14(d), paragraphs (d) and (h) of Annex I, 
and notes 58 and 59 of the SCM Agreement all contain the word “good” or “goods.” Articles 3 and 
5 of the SCM Agreement use the word “product” or “products,” and note 36 of the SCM Agreement 
utilizes the word “merchandise.”  Note also that note 36 of the SCM Agreement indicates that it is 
derived from paragraph 3 of Article VI of the GATT 1994, and paragraph 3 of Article VI contains 
the word “product” while note 36 of the SCM Agreement contains the word “merchandise.” 
 107. See supra note 19.  This conclusion is also supported by the fact that SCM Agreement is 
the successor agreement to the Subsidies Code (Agreement on Interpretation and Application of 
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII), which was signed by the Members of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1, T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947] 
during the 1979 Tokyo Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations.  As its formal name indicates, 
the Subsidies Code was an elaboration of the subsidies provisions contained in Articles VI, XVI, 
and XXIII of the GATT 1947.  As the GATT 1947 applied only to goods, there is no question that 
the SCM Agreement, which superseded the Subsidies Code, applies only to subsidies regarding a 
“good.”  The GATT 1994 itself superseded the GATT 1947 in the WTO era. 
 108. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
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which clarifies that the WTO Members have not yet made any commit-
ments to reduce or eliminate subsidies provided to the service indus-
tries,109 also confirms this conclusion. 
Should the U.S. challenge the Canadian governments’ PSTC film 
incentives in the WTO, Canada is likely to claim that its incentives are 
not provided in connection with the production or export of the feature 
films themselves, but rather are provided in connection with the film 
workers contributing their services in the creation of those films.  Then, 
as the SCM Agreement applies only to goods, not services, Canada 
could claim that its incentives do not contravene the SCM Agreement.  
Canada made a very similar argument in the WTO case of Canada - 
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals.110  In a WTO proceeding on 
this issue, Canada might also claim that feature films in any case do not 
constitute “goods.” 
There is no evidence that Canada provides the PSTC incentives in 
connection with the exportation of films, and thus this possibility is not 
discussed further in this article.  However, should Canada argue that its 
PSTC incentives are not provided in connection with the films per se but 
rather in connection with the production services contributed by Cana-
dian film workers, this argument is likely to fail for the same reasons 
that Canada’s argument failed in the case of Canada – Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals. Furthermore, should Canada argue that feature 
films in any case are not “goods,” there are plausible arguments that can 
be made to support such a conclusion.111  At the same time, there is 
overwhelming support for the contrary conclusion.  Each of these two 
objections that Canada could raise to avoid application of the SCM 
Agreement provisions to its PSTC incentives is discussed further below. 
In the case of Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 
Canada originally had imposed an import ban on certain foreign-origin 
periodicals.  The WTO Panel in that case found that this ban violated the 
quantitative restrictions provision set forth in Article XI of the GATT 
1994, and Canada did not appeal this conclusion.112  The WTO Appel-
                                                                                                                                 
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.LM. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
 109. The WTO Members, with respect to subsidies provided to the service industries, are pre-
pared only “to enter into negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral disci-
plines to avoid . . . trade-distortive effects.” GATS, Article XV.1. 
 110. WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted on June 30, 1997, at 3 (II.A.1 Arguments of the Participants – 
Canada – Applicability of the GATT 1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act). 
 111. See infra notes 162 -163 and accompanying text. 
 112. See WT/DS31/AB/R supra note 110, at 1-6 (I. Introduction and II.A Arguments of the 
Participants – Canada). 
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late Body, in its report in this case, pointed out that when Canadian gov-
ernment officials had learned that some foreign publishers had evaded 
Canada’s import ban by electronically transmitting the content of their 
magazines to Canada and printing their magazines there, Canada had 
then imposed a very high excise tax on the advertising revenues received 
by those publishers from Canadian advertisers.  Canada did not impose 
any excise tax on the advertising revenues received by the publishers of 
Canadian-origin periodicals. 
The U.S. then challenged Canada’s excise tax as violating the Na-
tional Treatment Principle contained in the first sentence of Article III.2 
of the GATT 1994, on the ground that the Canadian–origin periodicals 
and the U.S.-origin periodicals in question were “like products” and the 
excise tax imposed on the foreign-origin periodicals was in excess of 
that imposed on the Canadian periodicals.113  The National Treatment 
Principle contained in Article III.2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994 
provides that “[t]he products [of any WTO Member] imported into the 
territory of any other [WTO Member] shall not be subject . . . to internal 
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied . . . 
to like domestic products.”114  In the alternative, the U.S. claimed that 
the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-original periodicals in 
question were at least “directly competitive or substitutable products” 
and thus Canada’s excise tax on the U.S.-original periodicals violated 
the second sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994.115  The second 
sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994 states that WTO Members 
should not afford protection to domestic goods vis-à-vis foreign-origin 
goods that are directly competitive or substitutable with those domestic 
goods.  Canada responded to the U.S.’ allegations, in part, by arguing 
that its tax was imposed not on the periodicals themselves but on the ad-
vertising services contained in those periodicals. 116  Furthermore, as 
Canada had not yet agreed to comply with the National Treatment Prin-
ciple with respect to the advertising services industry, Canada concluded 
its excise tax could not violate the National Treatment Principle.117 
In response to Canada’s argument regarding its excise tax, the Ap-
pellate Body first conceded that advertising services were an important 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 7-9 (II.B.2 Arguments of the Participants – United States – Applicability of Part V.1 
of the Excise Tax Act with Article III.2 of the GATT 1994). 
 114. GATT 1994, Article III.2. 
 115. See WT/DS31/AB/R supra note 110, at 8-9 (II.B.2 - Arguments of the Participants – 
United States – Consistency of Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act with Article III.2 of the GATT 1994). 
 116. Id. at 2-6 (II.A.1 Arguments of the Participants – Canada – Applicability of the GATT 
1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act ). 
 117. Id. 
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service component of the good at issue – a periodical.118  In addition, the 
Appellate Body clarified that certain government measures could affect 
the international trade in both a “good” and a “service” and hence impli-
cate both the GATT 1994 and the GATS.119  It then went on to hold that 
Canada’s excise tax affected the international trade in the good – the pe-
riodical, and thus the tax had to comply with the provisions of the GATT 
1994.120  The Appellate Body explained that its decision in this regard 
was based on the fact that Canada’s excise tax was imposed on, and col-
lected from, the publishers of the periodicals, not the advertising compa-
nies.121  Furthermore, the Appellate Body pointed out, the tax was col-
lected on the basis of the advertising revenues that the foreign publishers 
received in connection with each separate issue of a periodical.122 
As discussed above, with respect to the PSTC film incentives, the 
production companies, not the film workers, must apply to the applicable 
Canadian governments in order to receive the incentives.123 The tax 
credit granted by each of the governments is equal to a stipulated per-
centage of the qualifying labor expenses (or, in some cases, total produc-
tion expenses)124 incurred by the producer to create each separate film.125  
Some of the Canadian provinces even cap the incentive at an absolute 
dollar figure or a percentage of the total production expenses incurred on 
the film,126 which further illustrates that the relevant unit of measure is a 
feature film, rather than the production services contributed during the 
creation of the film.  Additionally, the Canadian governments pay these 
incentives to the producers of the films, not to the film workers involved 
in the production of the films.127 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the various Canadian govern-
ments clearly target their promotional materials regarding the PSTC film 
incentives to the film production companies, and they market the incen-
tives on the basis that these companies can significantly reduce a film’s 
total production costs by shooting the film in Canada.128  The Canadian 
governments also have often touted the success of the PSTC film incen-
                                                          
 118. Id. at 11 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994). 
 119. Id. at 12 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 11 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See infra note 176. 
 124. See Appendix B (Alberta). 
 125. See Appendix B. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 78, at 4-5 (dis-
cussing how PSTC works). 
 128. See infra note 303. 
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tive programs by pointing to the significant number of films that have 
been shot in Canada as a result.129  These governments have explained 
that they provide the PSTC film incentives, specifically because the in-
centives result in more films being shot in Canada, and those films then 
create immediate jobs for their people as well as assist in the develop-
ment of the Canadian film industry.130 These are clear admissions on 
Canada’s part that its PSTC film incentives are granted in connection 
with the feature films themselves and hence affect the international trade 
in feature films.131 
In light of the above, if the U.S. were to bring a case in the WTO 
challenging Canada’s PSTC film incentives and Canada then claimed 
that its governments provide the incentives only in connection with film 
production services, a WTO Panel almost certainly would follow the 
Appellate Body’s decision in Canada – Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals132 and conclude that the PSTC incentives are a subsidy that 
is provided in connection with the feature films themselves.  This is es-
pecially likely, given the fact that the “services” at issue here – the film 
production services – are even more intimately related to the production 
of a feature film than advertising services are to the production of a peri-
odical.  That is, Canada had a stronger argument in the case of Canada – 
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals that its excise tax affected a 
service distinct from the good in which the service was incorporated, and 
yet the Appellate Body nonetheless rejected Canada’s argument.133 
                                                          
 129. See, e.g, Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Pro-
duction in Canada  4 (March 2005)  (“The foreign location production sector has exhibited the most 
rapid growth – roughly 350 percent over the past ten years . . . .”); see id. at 9 (“A key factor in the 
appeal of Canada as a location of choice for foreign productions was the introduction of the Produc-
tion Services Tax Credit (PSTC) by the federal government, in 1997.”). 
 130. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 4-5, 16. 
 131. Note that Canada does not claim that it provides the PSTC film incentives in order to en-
courage the distribution of the completed films.  Once a film has been produced in Canada, Can-
ada’s stated goals in providing the incentives have been accomplished.  Accordingly, there is no 
argument or concern that the PSTC film incentives may be provided in connection with film distri-
bution or film projection services (whether effected through digital or non-digital technology). 
 132. It is recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in international dispute 
resolution bodies, including the WTO.  See Richard Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: 
Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 A.J. I.L. 247, 254, n. 51 (April 2004) (cit-
ing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-29 (6th ed. 2003)).  In practice, 
however, WTO panels and the Appellate Body very often follow prior WTO decisions.  Id. at 254, 
n. 54 (citing Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decision and International Trade Law (Part One of a 
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 853 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto 
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 
1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication 
(Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 910-13 (2001)). 
 133. Note that Canada itself even argued in this case that advertising services are a more dis-
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Should the U.S. challenge Canada’s PSTC incentives in the WTO, 
it also would be very helpful to the U.S. that Canada, in Canada – Cer-
tain Measures Concerning Periodicals, conceded that the printed ver-
sion of a periodical is a “good.”  This is the case, because a feature film 
is directly analogous to a periodical.  Both items require that numerous 
service providers dedicate their time and effort in the production of the 
finished item.  In the case of a periodical, these service providers in-
clude, for example, journalists, editors, designers, graphic artists, adver-
tising salespeople, and photographers.  In the case of a feature film, such 
service providers include, by way of example, set designers, set builders, 
casting directors, costume designers, make-up artists, stunt people,  writ-
ers, directors, producers, actors, special effects experts, sound techni-
cians, photographers, and editors. 
In the case of both a periodical and a feature film, however, once 
the service providers have completed their various tasks, the item in 
question is recorded on some tangible, movable carrier medium.  In the 
case of a periodical, this medium typically is a series of pages of paper 
on which words are printed and photographs are displayed.  In the case 
of a feature film, the medium today is usually motion picture film, at 
least initially.  It then can be copied onto a videotape, a hard drive, a 
floppy disc, a compact disc (CD) or a digital video disc (DVD).  With 
respect to both a periodical and a feature film, the finished item consists 
primarily of artistic and editorial content that is protected by the copy-
right laws, and at least in the case of a feature film, the owners of the 
film typically store one or more tangible form(s) of the film in a secure 
storage vault, so as to protect against its damage, loss, theft, and piracy.  
Both periodicals and feature films have tariff classifications assigned to 
them in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
(the Harmonized System or HS)134 that is utilized by WTO Members,135 
and this latter point is significant, as the HS lists only “products” that 
                                                                                                                                 
tinct service related to the production of a periodical than are services contributed in the production 
of the periodical itself. See W/DS31/AB/R 3 (adopted June 30, 1997) (II.A.1 Arguments of the Par-
ties – Canada – Applicability of the GATT 1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act). 
 134. See, e.g.,  HS heading 3704 (exposed but undeveloped film); HS heading 3706 (exposed 
and developed motion picture film); HS heading 8524 (recorded videotapes, compact discs (CDs), 
digital video discs (DVDs), and floppy discs); HS 8471 (hard drives); HS 4902 (periodicals). 
 135. The WTO Members are not required to follow the HS, but they all do so, as it provides an 
internationally recognized classification scheme for the goods that are traded among the Members.  
See, e.g., Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, A Guide to Navigating 
the AUSFTA Tariff Schedules and Rules of Origin Annexes 3 (“Members of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) use the Harmonised System (HS) for tariff classification”), available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/guide_tariff/index.html (last updated March 6, 
2004) (last visited May 3, 2006). 
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can be transported across international borders.136 
Then, following the production of either a periodical or a feature 
film, a variety of service providers typically assist in the marketing, sale, 
and distribution of the item.  Both items can be distributed in a physical 
or digital form,137 and, in the case of a feature film, service providers 
also assist in the projection of the film in theaters.  Given all of these 
close similarities between a periodical and a feature film, the Appellate 
Body’s decision in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 
which treats a periodical as a “good” under the GATT 1994, provides 
very strong support for the conclusion that a feature film likewise is a 
“good” under the WTO Agreements, including the SCM Agreement.138 
This conclusion is further supported by the WTO Appellate Body 
decision in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect 
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada.139  This case was brought by 
Canada against the U.S. under the SCM Agreement, and the Appellate 
Body opinion addressed the meaning of the word “good” contained in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement at some length. 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement states that a subsidy 
under the SCM Agreement may consist of a government’s provision to 
an enterprise or industry of goods or services other than general infra-
structure, or, alternatively, a government’s purchase of goods from an 
enterprise or industry.140  The item in question in that case was standing 
                                                          
 136. See Werner Antweiler Jr., Policy Analysis Division, Faculty of Commerce and Business 
Administration, University of British Columbia, Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System (HTML version) 1 (“The Harmonized System is an international six-digit commodity classi-
fication developed under the auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council. Individual countries 
have extended it to ten digits for customs purposes, and to 8 digits for export purposes.”) (emphasis 
added), available at http://pacific.commerce.uba.ca/trade/HS.html  (last visited May 3, 2006); see 
also U.S. – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted on January 19, 2004, at para. 61 (“Article II of the GATT 
deals with the binding of tariffs in respect of particular “products . . . .”). 
 137. As indicated above, the Appellate Body decision in Canada – Certain Measures Regard-
ing Periodicals revealed that some publishers had, in fact, evaded Canada’s import ban on certain 
foreign-origin periodicals by transmitting the content of their magazines to Canada via the internet 
and printing their magazines in Canada.  The Appellate Body nonetheless treated these magazines 
as if they had been imported into Canada, because Canada should have permitted their importation 
in the first place.  See WT/DS31/AB/R 15-20 (adopted on June 30, 1997) (“Imported” split-run and 
domestic non-split-run periodicals of the same type are directly competitive or substitutable, the 
imported periodicals are taxed in excess of the domestic periodicals and this discriminatory tax 
measure clearly affords protection to the domestic periodicals; hence, Canada’s excise tax violates 
the second sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994). 
 138. See supra note 132. 
 139. WT/DS257/AB/R 1 (adopted on January 19, 2004). 
 140. The SCM Agreement, Article 14(d) further explains that “the provision of goods or ser-
vices or purchase of goods by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless 
the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than 
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timber that various Canadian provinces had agreed to allow specific 
companies and individuals to harvest and sell in exchange for the pay-
ment of a fee that allegedly did not constitute adequate remuneration to 
those provinces.  The agreements entered into by the Canadian provinces 
and harvesters were referred to as “stumpage contracts.”  The U.S. con-
sidered the stumpage contracts that Canada was providing to these har-
vesters to constitute a “subsidy” as defined by the SCM Agreement, and 
the U.S. proceeded to assess countervailing duties on imports into the 
U.S. of the finished lumber that had been derived from the standing tim-
ber.  Canada responded that the standing timber which was the subject of 
the stumpage contracts was not movable and hence was not a “good” 
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement.  Thus, according to 
Canada, the U.S. had violated the SCM Agreement by imposing coun-
tervailing duties on imports of finished lumber from Canada.141 
The Appellate Body in that case rejected Canada’s argument that 
the word “good” in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) refers only to an 
item that is tangible, movable, and capable of being assigned a specific 
classification in the HS, which again is the tariff classification scheme 
utilized by the WTO Members.142  The Appellate Body went on to point 
out that “[t]he meaning of a treaty provision, properly construed, is 
rooted in the ordinary meaning of the terms used,”143 and it noted that 
Black’s Law Dictionary defined a “good” as  “tangible or movable per-
sonal property other than money.”144  It elaborated “that the Shorter Ox-
                                                                                                                                 
adequate remuneration. SCM Agreement, Art. 14(d). The adequacy of remuneration shall be deter-
mined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country 
of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and 
other conditions or purchase or sale).” Id. Note also that Article 1.1(a)(1) lists various other items 
that may constitute a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement, including, for example, cash provided 
by a government (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)) and tax reductions and exemptions granted by a government 
(Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)). 
 141. WT/DS257/AB/R para. 61 (adopted on January 9, 2004). 
 142. Id. at paras. 62-67. 
 143. Id. at para. 58 (quoting Article 31(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.M. T.S. 331, 8 International Legal Materials 679  [hereinaf-
ter the “Vienna Convention”]) (“A  treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose.”). 
 144. Id. at para. 58 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701-02 (7th ed. 1999). See also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 714 (8th ed. 2004) (containing the same definition for “good”). This 
definition of the word “good” provided in Black’s Law Dictionary is consistent with other interna-
tionally recognized meanings of the word “good.”  For example, Article 3.1 of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) suggests that a “good” is 
any item of personal property that can be “manufactured” or “produced.”  See 52 Federal Register 
6262, 6264-80 (March 2, 1987), United States Code Annotated, Title 15 Appendix (Supp. 1987), 
Article 3.1. 
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ford English Dictionary similarly offers a more general definition of the 
term ‘goods’ as including ‘property or possessions’ especially – but not 
exclusively—‘movable property.’”145  Then, in accordance with these 
more general definitions of a “good,” the Appellate Body held that the 
standing timber in question is a “good” as that term is used in Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement and accordingly the U.S. was 
within its rights to initiate a countervailing duty investigation regarding 
the imports of finished lumber from Canada.146 
While the Appellate Body, in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty De-
termination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,147 
was careful to caution that the meaning it had adopted for the word 
“good” in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement might not be 
equivalent to the definition of the term “good” used elsewhere in the 
SCM Agreement or in another WTO Agreement.148  The definitions for 
the word “good” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary and the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary are still useful with respect to the meaning of 
the word “good” appearing in Article 10, note 36 and elsewhere in the 
SCM Agreement.  Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions 
for the words “product” and “merchandise” are similar.  As stated above, 
these words are used interchangeably with the word “good” in the SCM 
Agreement.  Specifically, the word “product” is defined in Black’s Law 
Dictionary as “[s]omething that is distributed commercially for use or 
consumption and that is usually  . . . tangible personal property . . . .”149  
Likewise, the term “merchandise” is defined as: “a movable object in-
volved in trade or traffic; that which is passed from hand to hand by pur-
chase and sale . . . This definition generally excludes . . .  intangi-
bles . . . .”150  Black’s Law Dictionary, in turn, broadly defines the word 
“tangible” as “[h]aving or possessing physical form . . . or [c]apable of 
being understood by the mind.”151 
A feature film clearly is a movable object that can be sold and 
traded, either domestically or internationally.  Furthermore, the carrier 
medium for a film (whether in the form of motion picture film, video-
tape, CD, DVD, or a software disc or hard drive) possesses a physical 
form, and the information recorded on the medium is certainly capable 
                                                          
 145. Id. at para. 58 (citing Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Ste-
venson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. I, p. 1125)). 
 146. Id.  at para 67. 
 147. WT/DS257AB/R 1 (adopted on January 19, 2004). 
 148. Id. at para. 63. 
 149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (8th ed. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 1008. 
 151. Id. at 1494. 
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of being understood by the human mind.  Thus, while recognizing that 
WTO decisions are not binding on future WTO panels,152 the Appellate 
Body decision in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada provides further 
strong evidence that a feature film is a good under the SCM Agreement. 
Additional support for the conclusion that a feature film is a good 
under the SCM Agreement is provided in Articles  III.10 and IV of the 
GATT 1994, as well as a number of U.S. statutes and cases.  Article 
III.10 and IV of the GATT 1994  (previously the GATT 1947) have long 
provided that WTO Members can maintain “screen quotas.”  A screen 
quota is a minimum amount of time that local theatres are required to 
exhibit domestically-developed feature films.153  These GATT provi-
sions were considered to be necessary, as otherwise a Member’s use of 
screen quotas, through which a Member can provide more favorable 
treatment to a domestic feature film than to a foreign feature film, would 
violate the National Treatment Principle contained in Article III of the 
GATT 1994.  While these GATT 1994 provisions refer specifically to 
“cinematograph” or “motion picture” films, certainly it is understood by 
the WTO Members that they can rely on these screen quota provisions in 
the GATT 1994 with respect to locally-developed films recorded on a 
medium other than motion picture film.  A number of WTO Members 
currently employ screen quotas on a regular basis,154 and some countries 
have even extended the idea of screen quotas to actual import quotas for 
foreign feature films.  China, for example, maintains an annual import 
quota of 20 foreign films,155 while India maintains an annual import 
quota of 100 foreign films.156  These GATT 1994 provisions specifically 
referring to feature films provide especially strong support for the con-
clusion that a feature film is a good under the SCM Agreement. 
As indicated, a feature film has also been treated as a good 
throughout much of U.S. domestic law.  For example, a film must be 
considered to be a tangible “good” in order to receive copyright protec-
tion under Section 102(a) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code.157  A film also is 
considered to be a “good” under the antitrust laws (see, e.g., United 
                                                          
 152. See supra note 132. 
 153. See, e.g., various screen quota systems discussed at http://www.terramedia.co.uk/law/quot 
as_and_levies.htm (last visited May 6, 2006). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See GATS/ SC/135, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/Schedules of Conces-
sions/Trade in Services/All Commitments/China, p. 19 (last visited May 9, 2006). 
 156. See GATS/ SC/42, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/Schedules of Concessions/Trade 
in Services/All Commitments/India, p. 6 (last visited May 9, 2006). 
 157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)), and under the U.S. Customs 
laws, given that there are several Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
U.S. (HTS) classifications assigned to feature films recorded in different 
formats.158 The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is replete with references 
to films, with most of these references concerning the depreciation of 
films and videotapes.159  As only products can be depreciated, these IRC 
provisions provide strong support for the conclusion that a feature film is 
a good.  Furthermore, § 263A(b)(2)(C) of the IRC160 specifically states 
that “the term “tangible personal property” shall include a film, sound 
recording, video tape, book, or similar property.”  A stronger statement 
on the issue of whether a feature film is a good or a service is difficult to 
imagine.161 
At the present time, the strongest argument supporting the conclu-
                                                          
 158. See supra note 134. 
 159. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 167, 168, 263A, and 465 (West Supp. 2005). 
 160. 26 U.S.C. § 263A (West Supp. 2005). 
 161. An interesting discussion of how Lew Wasserman, President of MCA, and Jack Valenti, 
President of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), succeeded in convincing the 
courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and Congress that a feature film should be considered to be 
tangible property entitling film investors to an investment tax credit, is provided by Connie Bruck in 
Profiles, The Personal Touch, Jack Valenti has fought Hollywood’s battles in Washington for thirty-
five years.  Can he still get his way?, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (August 13, 2001) (cited in The Center 
for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film Production From the 
U.S. to Canada: Year 2000 Production Report 5 (2001)).  Jack Valenti also at least initially opposed 
any type of exemption in international trade agreements for cultural items such as feature films, al-
legedly stating at times that if  a  film is “just a toaster with pictures” (a phrase first used by former 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Mark Fowler in an interview in Rea-
son Magazine on November 1, 1981 (See, e.g.,  http://www.terramedia.co.uk/quotations/Quotes_F. 
htm (last visited on May 7, 2006)), then it should be treated as such by the international trade laws. 
See, e.g, Kerry A. Chase, Globalization versus Localization: Cultural Protection and Trade Conflict 
in the World Entertainment Industry (draft of paper presented at panel “Hollywood and Hegemony: 
Cinema, Capitalism and World Power” at the annual meeting of the International Studies Associa-
tion, Westin Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles, March 14-18, 2000) 18, n. 40 (citing Senate Commit-
tee on Finance, Review of the Uruguay Round commitments to open foreign markets, hearings be-
fore the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, first session, April 17 and 
18, 1991, S. hrg. 102-105, pp. 61-2); see also House Committee on Ways and Means, North Ameri-
can Free Trade  Agreement, hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means and its Subcom-
mittee on Trade, U.S. House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, second session, September 9, 15, 
17, and 22, 1992, Serial 102-135, pp. 179-180 (“Valenti told Congress that ‘if Canada .  . . [insists] 
that a cultural exclusion be part of that North American Free Trade Agreement, our government 
must walk away from that table, or sign an agreement with Mexico only.’”); see also PAUL WEILER, 
RADICALLY MODERATE LAW REFORM, INSULATING TAX PAYERS FROM BOTH TEAMS AND 
STUDIOS, 19 (forthcoming) (“Hollywood leader, Jack Valenti once remark[ed] that since television 
is just a ‘toaster with pictures,  . . . if we’re now guaranteeing free trade for the toaster, we should be 
doing the same thing for television pictures.’”). See also, speech delivered by FCC Chairman Reed 
E. Hundt to the National Press Club, (Washington, D.C. July 27, 1995) (“Putting his point more 
colorfully, [former FCC Chairman ] Mark [Fowler] said the TV is just a ‘toaster with pictures.’”), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh517.txt (last visited May 7, 2006). 
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sion that a feature film is not a good is that while the carrier medium of a 
film possesses a physical form, the message conveyed in the film can 
only be perceived by the mind.162  Canada could point out that Section 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S. (the UCC) essentially is 
based on this concept with respect to computer software.  This provision 
of the UCC, which concerns secured transactions, provides that a soft-
ware program, other than one embedded into a machine or other physical 
good, is a “general intangible” rather than a good and hence does not 
serve as adequate security for a debt.163  In light of all of the arguments 
                                                          
 162. This is in contrast even to a periodical, at least when the carrier medium for the periodical 
is a magazine.  When one holds a magazine, s/he does not need to imagine the news articles and 
photographs contained therein.  They are all reflected on the printed page. 
 163. Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the UCC], Art. 9, § 9-102(1). Article 2, Section 2-
105 of the UCC more generally provides that goods are “all things (including specially manufac-
tured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the 
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in action.”  UCC Art.2, 
§ 2-105. Note also that when computer software was first added to the U.S. tariff code, duties were 
assessed on software imported from all countries only on the value of the carrier medium.  See, e.g., 
N.Y. A81783 (Customs ruling in 1996 that software was classified under HTS subheading 
8524.91.0030 and was dutiable at the rate of 5.8 cents per square millimeter of recording surface), 
available at http://rulings.cbp.gov – CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System (last visited 
May 4, 2006).  Other countries disagreed with this approach, and charged duties on the entire value 
of a software program, and “[h]istorically, the World Trade Organization Committee on Customs 
Valuation sanctioned the practice of valuing carrier media bearing data or instructions (i.e., soft-
ware) for use in data processing equipment either inclusive or exclusive of the value of the software 
recorded on carrier media.” PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Trade Intelligence:Americas 11 (Janu-
ary/February 2006), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/eng/tax/its/M060043WMSNewsletterFin. 
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006).  After the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technol-
ogy Products was signed by a number of WTO Members, including the U.S. and Canada, however, 
the issue of whether all or only part of a software program constitutes a “good” essentially became 
moot under the trade laws, as the WTO Members agreed in the ITA to reduce to zero all duties as-
sessed on information technology products, including software.  See WT/MIN(96)/16, Singapore, 
December 13, 1996, 96-5438 [hereinafter the ITA], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/itadec_e.doc) (last visited May 4, 2006); see also subheading 8524.99.4000 of the HTS, 
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 33 (2006) (software is classifiable under this 
subheading and is dutiable at the rate of zero for countries entitled to the most favored nation 
(MFN) rate of duty), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0602c.85.pdf (last 
visited on May 5, 2006).  Today, the U.S. still assesses duties on software imported from countries 
not entitled to the MFN rate of duty at the rate of 86.1 cents/square millimeter of recording surface.  
See id. Even so, the fact that the U.S., with respect to such countries, has chosen to assess duties 
only on the value of the floppy disc rather than the entire value of a software program contained on 
a disc can be interpreted as simply a preference to encourage trade in a new technology, rather than 
as evidence that the U.S. agrees that software programs do not constitute “goods.”  Cf.  Rita Hayes, 
U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Statement to WTO on Electronic Commerce Proposal, WTO General 
Council meeting, at 7-8 (February 19, 1998).  
I am not discussing how we define what is an electronic transmission, that is, whether it 
is a good, a service, or something in between. While it may prove to be fascinating theo-
retically, I am not proposing that we debate at this time the nature of electronic transmis-
sions. There should be WTO work in this area and we want to work with others on 
ideas . . . The growth of this environment has brought us into the Information Age. And 
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set forth above, however, should the U.S. challenge Canada’s PSTC film 
incentives in a WTO proceeding, Canada’s reference to this provision of 
the UCC likely would not be accorded much weight.  This is especially 
the case, given that the U.S. Government itself has in the past treated 
computer software to be a product for purposes of the U.S. trade laws.164 
Moreover, the U.S. Government currently collects duties (at the rate of 
2.7% ad valorem) on the full value of a feature film (rather than solely 
on the value of the carrier medium) when it is recorded on a CD or 
DVD.165  If only the CD or DVD containing a feature film is a “good” 
when a feature film is imported into the U.S. on a CD or DVD, the U.S. 
Government should be assessing duties only on the value of that CD or 
DVD.166 
In summary, as discussed above, it appears that the PSTC film in-
centives constitute a “subsidy” as that term is defined in Article 1 of the 
SCM Agreement and the incentives are provided in connection with the 
                                                                                                                                 
part of this environment has been that these electronic transmissions are not considered 
as importations for customs duty purposes. 
Id., available at http://www.geoscopeie.com/espaces/e998USinfotec.html (last visited May 4, 
2006). 
 164. See CASE Software of Singapore decision, 54 Fed. Reg. 37013 (1989). 
 165. See subheading 8524.39.8000 of the HTS, 32, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (2006), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0602c.85.pdf (last 
visited May 4, 2006); see also NY R02791 (Customs ruling that DVDs containing early childhood 
education information are classified under HTS subheading 8524.39.8000 and are dutiable at the 
rate of 2.7%), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov – CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System 
(last visited April 21, 2006). 
 166. Assessment of duties on the entire value of the CD or DVD containing a film (rather than 
simply on the value of the carrier medium) on the ground that the film as well as the carrier medium 
is a good is consistent with the GATT 1994, Article IV, which treats cinematographic films as 
goods.  That is, the images recorded on cinematographic film are tangible in the sense that they are 
perceptible to the human mind but they cannot be viewed or touched any more easily than can the 
images recorded on a CD or DVD. 
  Canada’s PSTC films incentives clearly are provided in connection with the production of 
the initial recording of a film in a tangible format.  It is this tangible product that is produced in 
Canada and then is copyrighted and stored by the owner of the film in a secure film vault.  Accord-
ingly, the issue of whether the electronic transmission of a feature film is a product is beyond the 
scope of this article.  As indicated above, an electronic transmission currently is not considered to 
be an “importation” and the WTO members have agreed for the time being not to assess duties on 
an electronic transmission. See paragraph 46 of WTO Ministerial Declaration, Hong Kong, 
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (December 18, 2005) (“We declare that Members will maintain their current 
practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions until our next Session.”), avail-
able at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm (last visited May 6, 
2006).  This does not necessarily mean, however, that an item such as a feature film that can be 
electronically transmitted across borders but can then be reconstituted into a physical form in the 
importing country is not a “good.”  See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 163.  In general, it would seem that 
anything that can be perceived by the human mind, has the capability of being manifested in a 
physical form, and can be copied and counted, should be considered to be a good.  This proposed 
definition of a good, however, is also beyond the scope of this article. 
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manufacture or production of feature films, which are goods.  Assuming 
that these criteria are met, the SCM Agreement167 is applicable and it 
specifically provides that the incentives are inconsistent with Canada’s 
WTO obligations if they constitute either a prohibited subsidy or an ac-
tionable subsidy that is provided to a specific industry and adversely af-
fects the interests of another WTO Member.168  Thus, these two types of 
subsidies are addressed further below. 
C.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Most Likely Do Not Constitute 
Prohibited Subsidies 
Prohibited subsidies are considered to be illegal per se under the 
SCM Agreement, meaning that they are considered to be so trade-
distorting by definition that an explicit demonstration of injury or “ad-
verse effects” caused by these subsidies to the domestic industry of a 
complaining WTO Member is not required.  There are two types of pro-
hibited subsidies: import substitution subsidies and export subsidies.169  
An import substitution subsidy is a subsidy “based in substance or in 
fact upon the use of domestic, as opposed to imported, components.”170  
Similarly, an export subsidy is a subsidy “based in substance or in fact 
upon a firm’s export performance.”171 
There is no evidence that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are condi-
tioned either upon the use of Canadian-origin components or upon the 
                                                          
 167. See SCM Agreement, Articles 1, 2, 3, 5. 
 168. Note that on October 20, 2005, the great majority of members of the United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) signed the Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,  CLT-2005/Convention Diversite-Cult 
Rev., adopted at Paris (October 20, 2005)  [hereinafter the Convention].  One of the main purposes 
of the Convention is to exempt “cultural products and services” from the international trade laws.  
In particular, Article 6.2 of the Convention provides that countries should be permitted to subsidize 
their cultural products and services, including feature films, at least to some extent, without violat-
ing any international agreement such as the SCM Agreement.  The U.S. and Israel voted against this 
Convention, and Australia and a few other countries abstained.  The U.K. signed the Convention, 
but made so many reservations that it is not clear how the Convention would apply with respect to 
the U.K.  All other UNESCO members signed the Convention.  This Convention is not binding on 
the WTO (see Convention, Article 20), and it would take several years for the WTO Members to 
amend the SCM Agreement so as to exempt cultural products.  At the same time, the Convention 
indicates that most countries desire some type of recognition that “cultural products” and “cultural 
services” are different than other products and services and should be accorded special treatment 
under the international trade rules.  Even if the SCM Agreement were amended to provide that 
countries could subsidize the production of their own distinct cultural products, however, Canada’s 
PSTC film incentives still would be illegal under the SCM Agreement to the extent that they subsi-
dize the creation of U.S.-developed films. 
 169. See SCM Agreement, Articles 3.1, 3.2. 
 170. SCM Agreement, Article 3.2. 
 171. SCM Agreement, Article 3.1. 
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exportation of the films produced with the benefit of the PSTC film in-
centives.  Thus, it is unlikely that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are 
prohibited subsidies, and hence prohibited subsidies are not discussed 
further in this article. 
D.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Most Likely do Constitute 
Actionable Subsidies that are Provided to a Specific Industry and Cause 
Adverse Effects 
Government benefits meeting the definition of a “subsidy” under 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement but not constituting “prohibited subsi-
dies” as defined above are referred to as “actionable subsidies.”172  Ac-
tionable subsidies are inconsistent with a WTO Member’s obligations 
under the SCM Agreement only if they are provided to a specific enter-
prise (company) or industry173 and cause “adverse effects to the interests 
of other Members.”174  As discussed below, Canada’s PSTC film incen-
tives are provided to a specific industry.  Furthermore, these incentives 
clearly appear to be causing adverse effects to the U.S., which is another 
WTO Member.  Hence, it appears likely that Canada’s PSTC film incen-
tives contravene Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement. 
1.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided to a  Specific 
Industry 
Article 1.2 of the SCM states that a subsidy is not actionable under 
the SCM Agreement unless it is “specific” in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 2.  Article 2.1(a), in turn, provides that a subsidy “ is 
specific to an  . . . industry . . . [w]here the granting authority, or the leg-
islation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly lim-
its access to a subsidy to certain enterprises . . . .” 
The various PSTC film incentive programs in Canada state that the 
incentives are limited to Canadian operations producing certified film 
projects.175  Without question, then, the PSTC film incentives are pro-
vided to a specific industry – namely, the Canadian film industry. 
                                                          
 172. SCM Agreement, Part III.  (Note that  non-actionable subsidies, as set forth in Part IV of 
the SCM Agreement, were discontinued as of December 31, 1999, per Article 31 of the SCM 
Agreement). 
 173. See SCM Agreement, Articles 1.2, 2. 
 174. SCM Agreement, Article 5. 
 175. See, e.g, Canada Income Tax Law, Subsection 125.5 (2006) (Foreign film companies 
wishing to avail themselves of these incentives must establish a Canadian operation, enter into a 
joint venture with a Canadian film company, or subcontract the film production in question to a Ca-
nadian film company). 
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2.  Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be Causing 
Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry 
The SCM Agreement provides that “adverse effects” to the interests 
of another WTO Member may be demonstrated by a showing of: 
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member[ ]; 
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indi-
rectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of 
concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994 [ ]; [or] 
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.[ ]176 
It is possible that paragraph (b), above, is not relevant in this case.  
Thus, the possibility of establishing adverse effects under that paragraph 
is not discussed further in this article.  On the other hand, it clearly ap-
pears that the PSTC film incentives in Canada are causing adverse ef-
fects to the U.S. feature film industry under both paragraph (a) and para-
graph (c), above.  “Injury” in paragraph (a), above, “mean[s] material 
injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic in-
dustry or material retardation of the establishment of such an indus-
try . . . .”177  “Serious prejudice” in paragraph (c), above, “includes the 
threat of serious prejudice”178 and essentially means that the products 
from the subsidizing WTO Member are causing or threatening to cause 
the market share of that Member to increase and the complaining Mem-
ber(s) to decrease in various markets.179  Each of these two prongs of the 
                                                          
 176. SCM Agreement, Article 5, paragraphs (a)-(c). 
 177. SCM Agreement, Article 15, n. 45 (“Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless 
otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material in-
jury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall 
be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.”); see SCM Agreement, Article 5, 
n.ote 11 (The term “injury” is used in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement in the same sense that it is 
used in Part V (encompassing Articles 10 – 23) of the SCM Agreement). 
 178. SCM Agreement, Article 5, note 13. 
 179. See SCM Agreement, Article 6.3(d) (By its terms, paragraph (d) of Article 6.3 of the SCM 
Agreement makes clear that market share data is determinative); SCM Agreement, Article 6.4 (“For 
the purpose of [SCM Article 6] paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall in-
clude any case in which . . . it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares 
of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product  . . . .”); Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, Wt/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 
adopted on July 2, 1998 [hereinafter Indonesia – Autos],  paras. 14.210-14.211 (“[With respect to 
whether “serious prejudice” can be found under Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement,] market 
share data may be highly relevant evidence for the analysis of such a claim.”), available at 
http://www.wto.org/docsonline/gen-home.asp (follow “Search for Documents: “Simple Search” 
hyperlink; then enter “WT/DS54/R” into Document Symbol” search field 9 (last visited May 6, 
2006)). Certainly, market share data also is relevant on the fourth test for a finding of “serious 
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“adverse effects” test is discussed further, below. 
a.  Material Injury 
Again, the SCM Agreement180 provides that the determination of 
injury in this context “shall  . . . be taken to mean material injury to a 
domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or ma-
terial retardation of the establishment of such an industry.” 181  In addi-
tion, Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that such a determi-
nation shall “involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of 
the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices 
in the domestic market for like products[ ] and (b) the consequent impact 
of these imports on the domestic producers of such products.” 
More specifically, Articles 15.2 and 15.4 of the SCM Agreement 
clarify that: 
With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating 
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase 
in subsidized imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production 
or consumption in the importing Member.  With regard to the effect of 
the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the 
subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product of the 
importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise 
to depress prices to a significant degree or to prevent price increases, 
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.  No one 
or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. 
. . . 
The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domes-
tic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors 
and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including ac-
tual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, pro-
ductivity, return on  investments, or utilization of capacity; factors af-
fecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash 
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital 
                                                                                                                                 
prejudice,” set forth in paragraph (c) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, which is “the effect of 
the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price 
of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price de-
pression or lost sales in the same market.” See SCM Agreement, Article 6.3(c). 
 180. See SCM Agreement, n. 11 (The term “injury” is used in Article 5 in the same sense that 
it is used in Part V of the SCM Agreement). 
 181. SCM Agreement, n. 45. 
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or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been 
an increased burden on government support programmes. 
This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors nec-
essarily give decisive guidance. 
 
In a subsidies case, there is no requirement that the different causes 
of “injury” or “threat of injury” to a domestic industry be compared so 
as to ascertain whether the subsidies provided are the most important, or 
even one of the most important, causes of the injury or threat of in-
jury.182  So long as the subsidized imports in question are one of the 
causes of the injury or threat thereof (and the harm caused by other fac-
tors is not attributed to the subsidized imports), the subsidy program in 
question is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.183 
As indicated, this article focuses on the harm that the PSTC film in-
centives provided y the Canadian governments to feature film producers 
are causing to the U.S. Therefore, each of the various indicators of harm 
mentioned above and discussed further below focuses on the harm oc-
curring in that industry.  To begin with, though, the product in the U.S. 
that is “like” the subsidized Canadian-origin feature films must be ascer-
tained. 184 
(1)  Like Product to Subsidized Feature Films 
Article 15, note 46 of the SCM Agreement provides that: 
Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit simi-
laire”) shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e., 
alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the ab-
sence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in 
all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product 
under consideration.185 
Furthermore, with respect to ascertaining whether a foreign and a 
domestic product are “like products,” almost all GATT and WTO Pan-
els186 have followed the approach set forth in the Report of the Working 
                                                          
 182. SCM Agreement, Article 15.5; see also JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34, at 
728. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See SCM Agreement, Articles 6.3, 15.1 (“Serious prejudice” and “material injury” analy-
ses concern the harm caused by a subsidy to the industry in the complaining WTO Member that 
produces a “like product”). 
 185. SCM Agreement, Article 14, note 46. 
 186. See, e.g, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
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Party on Border Tax Adjustments, which was then adopted by the GATT 
Contracting Parties in 1970.187  The relevant section of Border Tax Ad-
justments provides: 
[T]he interpretation of the term should be examined on a case-by-case 
basis.  This would allow a fair assessment in each case of the different 
elements that constitute  a “similar” product.  Some criteria were sug-
gested for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a product is 
“similar”: the product’s end-uses in a given market; consumers’ tastes 
and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s prop-
erties, nature and quality.188 
Additional criteria considered by other WTO Panels on the issue of 
“like products” include whether the two products possess the same tariff 
classification and how producers of the two products have analyzed 
market segmentation.189 
When a U.S.-developed feature film is produced in Canada rather 
than in the U.S. on account of the exceedingly generous PSTC film in-
centives provided by the Canadian governments, the same feature film 
would not actually be produced in the U.S.  Thus, two separate copies of 
the same feature film, one of Canadian-origin and one of U.S.-origin, 
cannot be compared.  One can compare, however, a feature film that is 
produced in Canada with the same feature film, had it been produced in 
the U.S.  The feature film produced in Canada would not be identical to 
the feature film that otherwise would have been produced in the U.S.  To 
be sure, though, the feature film, had it been produced in the U.S. would 
possess characteristics closely resembling those of the subsidized feature 
film.  That is, the feature film, whether produced in Canada or the U.S., 
would portray the same story and contain essentially the same scenes.  
Certain scenes and actors probably would be different.  As discussed 
above, however, the leading actors typically would be the same, whether 
the feature film is produced in Canada or the U.S.  There is no evidence 
that the ultimate customer of feature films, the movie-going public, per-
ceives that U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada are dissimi-
lar to U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S.  Moreover, if 
the movie-going public were to ever perceive such a difference, U.S. 
                                                                                                                                 
WT/DS11/R, adopted on November 1, 1996, at 11 (H.1 Article III:2) (citing Report of the Working 
Party on Border Tax Adjustments, infra note 187). 
 187. Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th 
Supp.), December 2, 1970, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax. 
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 188. Id. at 97, para. 18. 
 189. Indonesia –Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.177, 14.197. 
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film producers in all likelihood would no longer shoot their films in 
Canada.  Accordingly, a U.S.-developed feature film produced in Can-
ada and the same feature film produced in the U.S., would appear to be 
“similar” and hence “like” in accordance with the above-quoted broad 
definition of “like products” in Article 15, note 46 of the SCM Agree-
ment. 
Moreover, with respect to a U.S.-developed feature film produced 
in Canada and the same feature film produced in the U.S., they would 
have the same physical characteristics, end use (high-quality film enter-
tainment lasting approximately two hours), and tariff classification under 
the HS.  Furthermore, as there is no evidence that the movie-going pub-
lic discerns any difference between a U.S.-developed feature film pro-
duced in Canada and a U.S.-developed feature film produced in the U.S., 
it would appear that both the public and the producers of the feature 
films consider such films to be interchangeable.  The factor of  “con-
sumers’ tastes and habits” would therefore also indicate that a feature 
film produced in Canada is “like” the same feature film produced in the 
U.S. 
In fact, all U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S. pos-
sess characteristics closely resembling U.S.-developed feature films pro-
duced in Canada and subsidized by the Canadian governments.  They 
possess the same physical features and tariff classification, and they all 
have the same end use of entertaining people with a feature-length film 
portraying U.S.-developed stories, cultural values, and themes.  It even 
appears that, to an extent, the movie-going public considers such feature 
films as a group to be interchangeable with one another.  This is demon-
strated when a person is unable to view one feature film, either at the 
theatre or the movie rental store, s/he will often chose another feature 
film to view instead.190  Significantly, there is no evidence that the coun-
try of production of the film – U.S. or Canada – affects a person’s choice 
of which feature film to view. 
At the same time, it appears that people do not necessarily substi-
tute a TV program for a feature film, especially as TV programs tend to 
                                                          
 190. See review of the movie Last American Virgin, posted on Permalink, A Small Victory: 
One Man’s Underrated Film is Another’s Piece of Crap (August 9, 2003). This movie often gets 
tied in with the other teen sex movies of the 80’s; Valley Girl and Fast Times at Ridgemont High. 
People often confuse the abortion story in Virgin with the abortion story in Fast Times. And they 
confuse the soundtracks of all the movies and sometimes they think Nick Cage was in Virgin, but he 
was in Valley Girl.  They are all simply the same movie with interchangeable characters and plot 
lines, but only one had Jeff Spicoli.”), available at www.asmallvictory.net/archives/004180.html 
(last visited May 4, 2006). 
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
WRIGHT1.DOC 6/1/2006  2:40:25 PM 
2006] INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME 777 
be shorter in duration than a feature film.191  To date, these two different 
types of film products have been sold through different distribution 
channels.192  In addition, film producers, at least until very recently, have 
tended to segment the film market into “feature films” and “TV pro-
grams,” as is evidenced by the common division of film companies that 
produce both types of films into the “Feature Film Division” and the 
“TV Division.”193  Thus, U.S.-developed feature films produced in Can-
ada do not appear to be “like” U.S.-developed TV programs produced in 
the U.S. 
In light of all of the above, it appears that the proper domestic in-
dustry in the U.S. to investigate to determine whether the PSTC film in-
centives provided to Canadian producers of feature films (including U.S. 
companies with operations in Canada) are causing material injury or a 
threat thereof in the U.S. is the U.S. feature film production industry.  
Therefore, all of the factors mentioned in Article 15 of the SCM Agree-
ment as being relevant on the issue of material injury and discussed be-
low focus on the harm suffered by that industry. 
(2)  Significant  Increase in Subsidized Imports 
Numerous reports demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film incentives 
have been successful in luring U.S. film producers north of the U.S. bor-
der to shoot their feature films in Canada.  The figures compiled in the 
                                                          
 191. See, e.g., The Mark Cuban Weblog, The Problem with unlimited on demand video (April 
11, 2006).  
Cut to the movie industry. The movie industry is non linear. Movies come out and essen-
tially are available as PPV with the delivery mechanism being the theater or on DVD. 
But as with any non linear network, the user has to proactively choose the content rather 
than just turning to a channel and have it available to them . . . TV is about getting away 
from hassles and relaxing.  Its about choosing to be entertained, educated or informed.  
Its not about working to do any of these. Its lean back experiences. 
Id., available at http://www.blogmaverick.com (last visited May 4, 2006). 
192.     Historically, advertisers rather than viewers have paid for TV programs, and the available 
TV programs simply have  been broadcast at pre-announced times so that viewers can “tune in” if 
they are interested in any particular program.  In contrast, viewers have paid for movies, and the 
viewers in one way or another have had to “order” a particular movie to watch.  See, e.g., Matthew 
Honan, Here Comes the iTunes Movie Store, Macworld (March 27, 2006) (“[NPD Techworld ana-
lyst Ross] Rubin . . . notes that  films and TV shows have two very different distribution models. 
‘[TV shows] were not really competing with any other media, the incremental revenue provided a 
way to monetize access that didn’t exist before. With movies it’s a little different,’  . . . [with] exist-
ing distribution outlets, such as pay per view.”), available at http://playlistmag.com/feat 
ures/2006/03/27/moviestore/index.php (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 193. See, e.g, Warner Brothers is divided into many divisions, two of which are “Warner Bros. 
Pictures Inc.” and “Warner Bros. Television Distribution Inc.”  See description of Warner Brothers’ 
divisions, available at http://www.warenrbros.co.uk/main/privacy/privacy_list.html (last visited 
May  4, 2006). 
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major reports documenting this phenomenon are discussed below.  As 
these films are then imported into the U.S. at the conclusion of filming, 
there necessarily has been a significant increase in subsidized Canadian-
origin feature film imports into the U.S.194 
(a)  CFTPA Reports 
The most comprehensive figures published in Canada regarding the 
feature film production industry since enactment of the PSTC Programs 
are those found in the annual Profile reports published by the Canadian 
Film and Television Production Association (CFTPA) (hereinafter re-
ferred to collectively as the “CFTPA Reports” or individually as the 
“CFTPA Profile [Year] Report”).195  The CFPTA Profile 2006 Report 
can be accessed directly from that home page, and past CFTPA Profile 
Reports can be accessed by choosing “Newsroom” and then “Archives,” 
starting from that home page. 
The figures stated in the CFTPA Reports, as summarized below in 
Exhibit 1, reveal that total feature film production in Canada grew from 
$420 million in 1997, just prior to enactment of the federal PSTC Pro-
gram, to $1.04 billion by the beginning of 2004.  This represents a 
growth rate of 148% in the Canadian feature film production industry 
during that time period.  During 2004 (the last year for which final an-
nual figures are publicly available in Canada), total feature film produc-
tion in Canada decreased to $801 million, which decrease, according to 
the Canadian federal government, was attributable in part to (1) compet-
ing film subsidies offered by third countries; (2) competing film subsi-
dies offered by the U.S. state and federal governments; (3) unusual ex-
ternal conditions such as the SARS panic; and (4) an unfavorable 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.196  As a result, in 2005, several of 
the Canadian provinces increased their PSTC incentive percentages sig-
nificantly, and there is some evidence that these more generous incen-
tives have already had some effect in halting this downward trend.197  In 
any case, the growth rate in the Canadian feature film production indus-
try between 1997 and the beginning of 2005 was still 110%, as revealed 
in the CFTPA Reports. 
The tremendous growth in Canada’s feature film production indus-
try clearly is attributable to the growth in “foreign location production,” 
                                                          
 194. See supra Part IV (U.S. Film Industry). 
 195. For general information on the CFTPA Report, see http://www.cftpa.ca. 
 196. Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in 
Canada  1 (March 2005). 
 197. Id. 
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which is defined as the shooting in Canada of feature films that were de-
veloped elsewhere.198This foreign location production sector grew ap-
proximately 350% between 1995 and 2005.199  Exhibit 1 demonstrates 
that, in 1997, foreign location shooting constituted only 51% of total fea-
ture film production in Canada.  Following implementation of the PSTC 
Program in 1998, however, this percentage rose to 80% by 2003, before 
dropping slightly to 76% in 2004.  Furthermore, the Canadian Govern-
ment reports that its generous tax incentives, in particular its PSTC film 
incentives, are largely responsible for this significant growth in foreign 
location shooting.200 
Exhibit 1 also demonstrates that the production of U.S.-developed 
feature films in Canada for the most part has been growing steadily since 
commencement of the Canadian federal PSTC Program, until very re-
cently, in 2004.  In 1997, U.S. film companies spent approximately $202 
million on the production of feature films in Canada.  Then, with the ex-
ception of a slight decrease in production expenditures during 2000-
2001 attributable to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and U.S. companies’ sub-
sequent fears of doing business abroad as well as a writers’ strike in Hol-
lywood, the production expenditures of U.S. film companies in Canada 
increased 290% between 1997, and the beginning of 2004.  During 2003 
alone, U.S. film companies spent approximately $789 million shooting 
feature films in Canada.  The shooting of U.S.-developed feature films in 
Canada dropped to $576 million in 2004, but, again, the enactment of 
even more generous PSTC tax incentives in several of the Canadian 
provinces in 2005 seems to have at least slowed this downward trend.
                                                          
 198. See, e.g., CFTPA Profile 2005 Report, at 17 (detailing growth in both foreign location 
production and Canadian production in Canadian feature film production industry); CFTPA Profile 
2006 Report, at 69 (“Foreign location production is film or video production shot in Canada by U.S. 
or foreign studios and independent producers.  In this type of production, the U.S. or foreign pro-
ducer retains the copyright, but Canada benefits in the form of direct and spin-off jobs and eco-
nomic activity.”); Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 196, at 3 (“Foreign location pro-
duction  . . . is film or video production taking place in Canada, but financed by a non-Canadian 
owned and controlled company.”). 
 199. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 196, at 4. 
 200. Id. at 9. 
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EXHIBIT 1 201 
 
Production of Feature Films in Canada (U.S. Dollars, Millions) 




dian Films 420 530 760 714 632 824 1041 801 5722 
% Growth 




Production  213 382 561 549 476 630 830 606 4247 
% Growth 
from 1997             290% 185% 185% 
% For  
Location of 
all Canadian 




Production 202* 363* 533* 522* 452* 598* 789* 576* 4035* 
 % Growth  
1997-2004             290% 185% 185% 
                                                          
 201. Annual Profile reports published by Canadian Film and Television Production Associa-
tion (CFTPA) for these years.  Note that CFTPA reports figures in accordance with Canada’s fiscal 
year, which begins on April 1 of each year.  Accordingly, the figures reported for each year cover 
nine months of the year indicated and three months of the following year.  For example, the “1997” 
figures are for the twelve-month period commencing on April 1, 1997 and ending on March 31, 
1998. These reports are available at http://www.cftpa.ca.  The CFPTA Profile 2006 Report can be 
accessed directly from that home page, and past CFTPA Profile Reports can be accessed by choos-
ing “Newsroom” and then “Archives,” starting from that home page (last visited on May 7, 2006). 
  As the 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by 
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20 (2002), the 2002-03 Activity Report: 
Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, 
at 16 (2003), and the 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by 
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004) all state that the overwhelm-
ing majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed, each of the figures highlighted 
with an asterisk is simply 95% of the applicable total foreign location production figure.  CAVCO is 
part of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and all of CAVCO’s Activity Reports are available 
on-line at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/act_reports_e.cfm (last visited May 
7, 2006).  
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(b)  Department of Canadian Heritage Reports 
Figures published by the Department of Canadian Heritage, as set 
forth in Exhibit 2 below, confirm that approximately $830 million in to-
tal foreign location production expenses were incurred in Canada to pro-
duce feature films in 2003. Of this figure, approximately 95%, or ap-
proximately $800 million, was attributable to U.S.-developed feature 
films produced in Canada during that year.  As of the spring of 2006, the 
Department of Canadian Heritage had not yet published figures for 
2004.  Assuming, according to figures published in the CFTPA Reports 
discussed above, that production expenditures incurred by U.S. film 
companies in producing feature films in Canada in 1997 totaled ap-
proximately $200 million, then the CAVCO Reports substantiate that 
approximately $600 million in feature film expenditures migrated to 
Canada from the U.S. between 1997 and the end of 2003. 
 
EXHIBIT 2 202 
 
Feature Film Production in Canada 
(U.S. Dollars, Millions) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Foreign 
Location  
Production  382 561 549 476 629 830 
U.S. Foreign 
Location  
Shooting 363* 533* 522* 452* 598* 789* 
                                                          
 202. Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in 
Canada 29 ( March 2005) (Annex D) (citing CFTPA Profile 2005 and Association of Provincial 
Funding Agencies (APFA)). This report is available at www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ged-gol/index_e.cfm 
(at this home page, choose “Publications”)  (last visited May 7, 2006). 
  As the 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by 
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20 (2002), the 2002-03 Activity Report: 
Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, 
at 16 (2003), and the 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by 
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004) all state that the overwhelm-
ing majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed, each of the figures highlighted 
with an asterisk is simply 95% of the applicable total foreign location production figure.  CAVCO is 
part of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and all of CAVCO’s Activity Reports are available 
on-line at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/act_reports_e.cfm  (last visited May 
7, 2006).  
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(c)  CEIDR Reports 
The tremendous growth in the production of U.S.-developed feature 
films in Canada following Canada’s enactment of the PSTC Program in 
1997 is also demonstrated by a U.S. source, the Center for the Enter-
tainment Industry Data and Reports (CEIDR), in three reports that the 
CEIDR published in 2000, 2001, and 2002.203  These reports, hereinafter 
referred to as the CEIDR Reports, cover feature film production in the 
U.S. and Canada (including all feature-length films that grossed at least 
$500,000 at the box office) during the production years 1998 - 2001.  
These figures, as compiled in the CEIDR Report for 2001 (published in 
2002), are reproduced in Exhibit 3, below. 
These figures demonstrate that total feature film production expen-
ditures incurred in Canada grew from $430 million in 1998 to $1.047 
billion in 2001, resulting in an overall 144% increase in the production 
of feature films in Canada during that four-year period.204  Furthermore, 
the CEIDR Reports document that this approximate $617 million growth 
in feature film production in Canada was accompanied by an approxi-
mate $683 million loss in feature film production in the U.S. during 
those four years.  This $683 million loss in the U.S. represented a loss of 
17.4% of the U.S. feature film production industry during those years 
alone, according to the CEIDR Report for 2001.205 
                                                          
 203. Stephen Katz & Associates, 1999 Motion Picture and Movie-of-the-Week Production Sur-
vey (2000); The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature 
Film Production From The U.S. to Canada: Year 2000 Production Report (2001); The Center for 
Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film Production From The 
U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report (2002). All of these reports can be found 
at www.ceidr.org (last visited on March 17, 2006). 
 204. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE supra note 5, at 19 (The CFTPA, Department of 
Canadian Heritage, and CEIDR Report figures are also substantiated in part by a U.S. Department 
of Commerce estimate that $355 million was paid to Canadians working on the production of U.S-
developed feature films in the year 2000). 
 205. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data & Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 201, at 
3. 
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EXHIBIT 3 206 
 
 
(d)  Los Angeles County Economic Development  
Corporation Reports 
The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation (the 
LAEDC) published a report in November 2005207 that provides strong 
evidence that the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film production indus-
try has continued unabated since 2001.  Exhibit 4, shown below, repro-
duced from the above report, illustrates that “location production days” 
in the Los Angeles area decreased from a high of 46,808 in 2000 to a 
low of 43,976 in 2001, then increased very slightly to 44,415 in 2002, 
and then decreased again to 44,231 in 2003.  The number of location 
production days then increased to 52,707 in 2004, but according to this 
report, this recent increase in location production days was due primarily 
                                                          
 206. Center for the Entertainment Industry Data & Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report 4 (2002).  All of 
these reports can be found at www.ceidr.org (last visited on March 17, 2006). 
 207. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2. 
 
Feature Film Production in the U.S. and 
Canada (U.S. Dollars, Millions) 





Budgets of Features 
Produced in U.S. 3928 3554 3365 3244     
              
1998-2001         -683   
              
1998-2001           
-
17.40% 
              
Budgets of Features  
Produced in Canada 430 413 1022 1047    
              
1998-2001         +617   
              
1998-2001           +144% 
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to “a jump in activity due to [reality] TV production.”208  “Location pro-
duction days” are defined as off-studio lot film production activities (in-
cluding TV and feature film production) in the City of Los Angeles, un-
incorporated areas of Los Angeles County, and the cities of Diamond 
Bar, South Gate and West Hollywood.  Included within these figures are 
also production days in the Angeles National Forest and the facilities of 
the Los Angeles Unified School District.209 
As the figures in Exhibit 4 include TV production as well as feature 
film production, they do not reveal the true state of the feature film in-
dustry.  However, as TV production in the U.S. has started to increase in 
recent years on account of reality TV, as indicated above, the figures 
most likely mask a more serious outsourcing trend for the U.S. feature 
film production industry.  Furthermore, as indicated, these figures by 
definition do not include feature films shot by the major studios, and, as 
stated above, by 2004, 45% of major studio feature films were filmed 
outside of the U.S.210 
Furthermore, the LAEDC’s description of the state of the film pro-
duction industry in the Los Angeles area during 2001-2004 only tells 
part of the story, as filming takes place in many other areas of the U.S., 
and Los Angeles clearly has lost production to other states on account of 
those states’ generous film incentives.  At the same time, the over-
whelming majority (87.5%) of California’s film industry workers works 
and lives in Los Angeles County,211 and in 2002 California itself em-
ployed between 58% and 70% of all U.S. film workers212 and generated 
between 69% and 81% of film industry earnings nationwide.213  Thus, as 
the Los Angeles area clearly is the center of film production in the U.S., 
the substantial decrease in feature film production in the Los Angeles 
area appears to provide even further evidence that there has been a sig-
nificant outsourcing of the U.S. feature film production industry to other 





                                                          
 208. Id. at 4. 
 209. Id. 
 210. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2,  at 15. 
 211. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 4. 
 212. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 2 (different  percentages 
based on different figures reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
and the MPAA). 
 213. Id. 
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EXHIBIT 4 214 
 



















(e)  Anecdotal Evidence 
Overwhelming anecdotal evidence confirms the above statistics 
documenting the significant decline of the feature film production indus-
try in the U.S.  For example, citing off-shore production of film projects, 
the Directors Guild of America (DGA) removed the five cities of At-
lanta, Boston, Dallas, Miami and Orlando from its list of “production 
centers” in mid-2002.215  A DGA spokesman said that there simply was 
not sufficient work in these cities “to merit continuing the production 
center designation.” 216  Similarly, for several years, North Carolina was 
third in the nation behind California and New York in terms of total film 
production revenue from all sources (feature films, television, commer-
cials, and industrial films).217  For example, in 1999, total direct spend-
                                                          
 214.  Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, Film Industry Profile of Califor-
nia/Los Angeles County 4 ( November 29, 2005), available at http://www.laedc.info/pdf/Film-
2005.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 215. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at 
10 (citing Dave McNary, DGA Scratches 5 Cities From List, DAILY VARIETY (May 28, 2002)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17 (citing Bashirah Muttalib, N.C. Prod’n Breezy in ‘00, 
DAILY VARIETY (June 21, 2000); Bashirah Muttalib, Watering WB’s “Tree:” N.C. Beats Out Van-
couver For New Series, DAILY VARIETY (June 19, 2003)). 
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ing on film-making there came to approximately $300 million.218  By 
2002, it was down 23% to $230.8 million.219 
The DGA maintains figures regarding the U.S. share of feature 
films produced under DGA contracts, and this data reveals that, in 2003, 
of 154 feature films released under DGA contracts, 20 were filmed in 
Canada, 8 in Europe, 3 in Australia or New Zealand and 6 in the 
U.K./Ireland.220  The DGA’s figures also illustrate that the U.S. share of 
total feature productions declined each year from 2001 to 2003.221 
At the other end of the spectrum from big-budget films shot under 
DGA contracts are small-budget independent films.  Evidence regarding 
the outsourcing of this type of film is just as alarming. At a meeting of 
independent film producers, held in Beverly Hills on June 17, 2004,222  
Tom Berry, president of Reel One Entertainment, explained that he in-
tended to make 8 movies in 2004, all in Canada.  Crystal Sky president-
CEO Steven Paul said that five years ago, he made all of his movies in 
the U.S., but now he produces most of his 8-10 projects a year out of the 
country.  Andrew Stevens, president-CEO of Andrew Stevens Enter-
tainment, reported that he was planning to shoot 12 pictures that year, 
but only 2 to 4 of them were to be made in the U.S.  Nu Image reported 
that it was planning to produce 12 features in 2004, but only two of them 
would be shot in the U.S.  As Nu Image company co-chairman Avi 
Lerner said, “It’s all about money[,]”clearly meaning that U.S. filmmak-
ers can make more money by producing their films outside of the U.S on 
account of foreign countries’ exceedingly generous film subsidies. 
Again, by 2004, a number of other countries had copied Canada’s 
successful film subsidy programs and the outsourcing of the U.S. enter-
tainment industry picked up even more steam.  A review of the June 10, 
2004 issue of the magazine Production Weekly, for example, listed a to-
tal of 52 feature films with scheduled start dates. 223  Of these 52 fea-
tures, 28 were scheduled to be shot in the Untied States, 20 were sched-
uled to be shot in foreign countries (including 5 in Canada) and 4 were 
to be shot in unknown locations.” 224 
                                                          
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 12. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Representatives of FTAC attended this meeting and recorded the comments attributed to 
the various independent film producers at this meeting. These comments were subsequently re-
ported in the FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17. 
 223. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 16-17 (citing Production Weekly, Issue #421, available at 
http://www.productionweekly.com (last visited June 10, 2004)). 
 224. Id. 
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All of the above figures demonstrate that the outsourcing of the 
U.S. feature film production industry to other countries, especially Can-
ada, has been quite significant.  Furthermore, as more and more U.S.-
developed feature films are shot in Canada and are then imported into 
the U.S. for marketing, distribution and the occasional performance of 
post-production services, importations into the U.S. of subsidized, Ca-
nadian-origin feature films have also increased significantly.225  Accord-
ingly, the first prong of the material injury test – increasing imports of 
the subsidized product – is met. 
(3)  Effect of Subsidized Imports on U.S. Prices 
Typically, one part of a film company in the U.S. does not shoot a 
movie and then sell it to another part of that same company for distribu-
tion.  Thus, such U.S. “sale prices” are not available for comparison to 
the price of U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada and then 
imported into the U.S. for distribution.  In any event, though, an arm’s 
length price for a feature film produced in Canada and then imported 
into the U.S. and an arm’s length price in the U.S. for a feature film pro-
duced in the U.S. and then sold to another company in the U.S. for dis-
tribution would cover the costs of film production plus a reasonable 
profit figure.  Furthermore, as the profit figure included in both such 
prices would be derived rather than actual in any case, the proper analy-
sis for determining the effect of the increasing imports of subsidized fea-
ture films produced in Canada on U.S. “prices” essentially would in-
volve a review of the effect of those subsidies on the costs of shooting a 
feature film in the U.S.  When viewed in this manner, there is no ques-
tion that the costs of producing feature films in the U.S. have been sup-
pressed so that they can compete with the heavily subsidized U.S.-
developed films produced in Canada and other countries. 
One source reports that the average budget for a feature film pro-
duced in the U.S. declined by $3.9 million (13%) from $31.2 million in 
2000 to $27.3 million in 2001.226  Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests 
                                                          
 225. In the future, more and more feature films may be transmitted to the U.S. via electronic 
means, and today, electronic transmissions are not considered to be “importations” and customs 
duties are not assessed on such submissions.  See supra note 167.  Therefore, in the future, it may be 
difficult to establish that importations of subsidized feature films into the U.S. are increasing.  This 
is beyond the scope of this article, however, as most feature films produced outside of the U.S. to-
day are transmitted to the U.S. in a tangible format.  See supra Part IV (US. Film Industry).  At the 
same time, given that a feature film can be reconstituted into a physical product following its elec-
tronic transmission, a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body still could rule, in the context of the SCM 
Agreement, that electronic transmissions of subsidized feature films into a country constitute impor-
tations.  See supra note 167. 
 226. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
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that this downward pressure on the costs of production in the U.S. has 
continued, and every cost component has been affected.  For example, as 
is discussed below, wages and salaries, as well as various fringe benefits, 
of feature film production workers in the U.S. have decreased.  Simi-
larly, as explained below, businesses such as restaurants, hotels, and cos-
tume shops catering to the feature film industry in the U.S. have reduced 
their costs to local film production companies in order to retain business 
in the local area.  Even so, many of these businesses nonetheless have 
gone out of business entirely.  Finally, as is discussed above, state and 
local governments have provided all kinds of incentives and subsidies, 
such as reduced fees for film permits and land rentals, grants, loan guar-
antees, and tax incentives to the U.S. movie houses in order to entice 
them to retain film production in the U.S.  Again, even the federal gov-
ernment, in the Jobs Creation Act of 2004,227 provided a tax incentive 
for U.S. movie companies to film at least smaller-budget films in the 
U.S.  Of course, U.S. taxpayers, including, in particular, the film indus-
try workers who live in the areas most affected by the outsourcing of the 
U.S. film industry, ultimately pay the cost of these government subsi-
dies, thereby reducing their wages and salaries even further.  All of these 
sacrifices on the part of film workers, companies providing services to 
the film industry, and members of the public, have combined to lower 
the costs of feature film production in the U.S. below what they other-
wise would be.  This phenomenon is discussed in detail below. 
(a)  Reduced Wages, Salaries and Fringe Benefits 
of Film Production Workers 
Numerous employees in the feature film production industry have 
lost their jobs in the industry in recent years.  Those workers, of course, 
no longer receive any type of wage, salary or fringe benefit from the film 
industry.  In fact, many former film production workers in the U.S. are 
no longer even eligible for unemployment insurance payments as they 
have been out of work for so long.228  The magnitude of lost jobs in the 
U.S. feature film production industry is discussed below in the section 
entitled “Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Employment.”229 
                                                                                                                                 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at 
1.  In Canada, for the same period, there was a slight decline of $0.8 million (-3%) from $27.6 mil-
lion in 1998 to $26.8 million in 2001, as Canada began to suffer its own runaway production prob-
lem.  Id. 
 227. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 108 Cong. § 244 (2004). 
 228. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh, 
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)). 
 229. See infra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(d) (Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Em-
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In addition, many of those individuals who have been able to obtain 
work in the U.S. feature film production industry have had to make sig-
nificant wage, salary, and benefit concessions in order to obtain this 
work.  The Screen Actors Guild (the SAG), for example, reports that its 
members for several years have had to forego wage increases and at 
times even agree to reduce their wage rates and overall benefits in order 
to decrease the production costs for U.S. feature film makers.  Some cit-
ies, such as New York City, have even boasted on their websites that 
film industry employees have agreed to take wage cuts in order to retain 
feature film production locally.230 
The Hollywood Entertainment Labor Council reported in 2002 that 
SAG members were losing not only current wages, but also future resid-
ual payments and contributions to their health and pension funds, to out-
sourced film production.231 In 2004, the SAG announced that it was even 
raising the eligibility requirements for its health plan. 232  Among the 
reasons cited for this action were not just the expected skyrocketing 
costs of prescriptions and medical treatment but runaway production and 
its resulting decline in contributions to the plan’s funding from current 
members’ earnings.233 
Of course, the major stars typically do not sacrifice their salaries or 
benefit packages in order to retain feature film production in the U.S.  
They simply relocate to the applicable foreign country for the duration 
of film shoots.  Recently, though, even some of these people have been 
affected by the increasing imports of subsidized feature films from Can-
ada and other countries.  For example, Arnold Schwarzenegger, when he 
was running for Governor of California in 2003, agreed to take a mas-
sive $8.4 million reduction to his salary for starring in Terminator Three, 
so that Warner Brothers would agree to shoot the movie in California 
rather than in Canada.234 
                                                                                                                                 
ployment). 
 230. The City of New York Mayor’s Office of Film, Theatre and Broadcasting, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/film/html/incentives/made_ny_incentive.shtml (last visited June 14, 2005, 
however, language no longer appears on website). 
 231. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at  
10 (citing Dave McNary, Cannes heat on SAG Rule 1, DAILY VARIETY (May 19, 2002)). 
 232. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18 (citing Dave McNary, SAG forced to cut back health 
plan, DAILY VARIETY (July 31, 2001)). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Internet Movie Database, Terminator Three, available at http://www.imdb.com/tital/ 
tt0181852/news (published on March 7, 2002) (last visited on March 30, 2006).  Since becoming 
Governor of California, Swartzenagger has also formed a commission, together with Governor 
Pataki of New York, to investigate methods of retaining film production in the U.S., including 
granting additional state and local tax incentives to film companies that shoot their films in those 
states. 
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(b)  Reduction of Other Direct Costs of Film  
Production 
A wide variety of feature film production support companies, such 
as film development laboratories, talent agencies, costume rental com-
panies, and hotels and restaurants have suffered serious economic harm 
as a result of outsourced feature film production.  These companies, like 
the film production workers themselves, have attempted to reduce their 
fees and costs in order to retain feature film production in the U.S., but 
many such companies have gone out of business in any case.  Many ex-
amples of the hardships faced and concessions made by these companies 
are discussed below in the section entitled “Utilization of Capacity.”  
These price reductions offered by such support companies clearly con-
tribute to the depression of the costs of feature film production in the 
U.S. 
(c)  Reduction of Feature Film Production Costs 
through Government Subsidies in U.S. 
As discussed above, a number of state and local governments in the 
U.S., in an effort to retain feature film production in the U.S. (and also to 
develop their own feature film production industries), have provided a 
wide range of types of assistance to film companies.  These subsidies in-
clude, for example, reduction or elimination of fees for items such as po-
lice protection, reduced costs for stage and studio rentals, low interest 
loans, loan guarantees, reduction or elimination of various taxes, includ-
ing, for example, reduction or elimination of sales taxes charged by 
businesses such as hotels and restaurants catering to the film industry, 
and outright grants of funds. 
Warner Brothers, for example, received from North Carolina, New 
Hanover County, and Wilmington an outright grant of $750,000 to 
maintain the production of the television series “One Tree Hill” in Wil-
mington instead of move it to Canada.235  Obviously, such subsidies re-
duce the costs of producing films in the U.S. as the reduction of U.S 
costs is the rationale for the provision of the subsidies in the first place.  
Again, though, U.S. taxpayers, in particular those living in locations es-
pecially affected by runaway production, ultimately have to pay for 
these government services and subsidies.  By way of example, 
“[a]lthough steadily employed on the [One Tree Hill] show, one local 
                                                          
 235. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14 (citing Bashirah Muttalib, Watering WB’s ‘Tree:’ N.C. 
Beats Out Vancouver for New Series, DAILY VARIETY (June 19, 2003)). 
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taxpayer [in the Wilmington area even] referred to . . . [the $750,000 
payment to Warner Brothers] as “extortion.”236 
Similarly, the State of Wyoming attempted to raise $900,000, at the 
request of a line producer at Focus Films, in order to entice it to film 
Brokeback Mountain (Annie Proulx’s novel about Wyoming) in that 
state.  However, Wyoming was able to raise only $100,000, and Focus 
Films concluded this was an insufficient amount and filmed this movie 
in Calgary, Canada, instead, where it received significantly more gener-
ous subsidies.237  As stated above, by late 2004, even the U.S. Govern-
ment had established a tax incentive for feature film producers who 
shoot smaller-budget films in the U.S. 
The above-discussed sacrifices made by film production workers, 
owners and workers in film support companies, and U.S. taxpayers to 
retain feature film production in the U.S. have been quite substantial.  
Also, without question, these sacrifices have lowered the costs of pro-
ducing feature films in the U.S.  Unfortunately, as discussed in this arti-
cle, all of these sacrifices together have been insufficient to stem the out-
sourcing of U.S. feature film production to other countries offering very 
generous film subsidies. 
(4)  Impact of the Subsidized Imports on the Domestic 
Industry 
The great majority of economic factors and indices that should be 
analyzed, according to the SCM Agreement, indicate that the subsidized 
Canadian-origin feature films have seriously detrimentally affected the 
U.S. feature film production industry.  Data on “cash flow” and “the 
ability to raise capital or investments” in the U.S. feature film industry is 
not readily available, so these factors are not addressed.  In addition, the 
number of feature films produced in the U.S. and maintained in U.S. 
film makers “inventory” decreases by definition when the number of 
U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S. declines.  Accord-
ingly, the decline in the “inventory” of such films maintained by U.S. 
film producers is not discussed separately from the decrease in the “out-
put” of the U.S. feature film production industry.  Each of the other fac-
tors listed in Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement as bearing on the issue 
of material injury, is discussed in turn, below. 
 
                                                          
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 15. 
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(a)  Actual and Potential Decline in Output 
The production of U.S.-developed feature films in Canada has 
grown significantly in recent years.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
great majority of this production otherwise would have occurred in the 
U.S.  In 2004, the production of U.S.-developed feature films in Canada 
did decrease, but it appears that this decrease has largely been made up 
for by increases in production of U.S.-developed films in other coun-
tries.  Furthermore, given the recent increase in several Canadian prov-
inces’ production incentive percentages, the Canadian federal govern-
ment believes that Canada has had some success in stemming its own 
runaway production problem. Accordingly, the output of the feature film 
production industry in the U.S. has been negatively affected on account 
of Canada’s PSTC film incentives.  Also, the U.S. feature film produc-
tion industry has actually suffered an absolute decline in recent years.  
This measure of the impact of subsidized feature film imports from Can-
ada appears to demonstrate material injury to the U.S. feature film pro-
duction industry. 
(b)  Market Share 
Given Canada’s tremendous growth in the production of U.S.-
developed feature films and the loss thereof in the U.S., the U.S.’ share 
of the world market for feature film production has declined.  The U.S.’ 
decline in world market share is demonstrated in Exhibits 5 and 6. In 
particular, these Exhibits illustrate that the U.S. feature film industry has 
declined from a 70% share of the world market in 1998 to a 58% share 
of the world market in 2001.  During these same years, Canada’ share of 
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This transfer in world market share from the U.S. to Canada ap-
pears to have continued until recently, when Canada itself suffered a de-
crease in the production of feature films, primarily U.S.-developed fea-
ture films.  Additionally, as noted above, it doesn’t appear that the U.S.’ 
share of the world market has increased as a result.  Rather, it seems that 
                                                          
 238. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report 10 (2002). 
 239. Id. 
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Canada since 2004 has simply shared the production of U.S.-developed 
films with a number of third countries.  Exhibits 7, 8 and 9240 indicate 
that, by 2004, only 35% of U.S.-developed feature films were being pro-
duced in the U.S.  (Note that Exhibits 5 and 6 illustrate the percentage of 
worldwide feature film production contributed by the U.S, Canada, and 
all other countries as a group, while Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 show solely 
where U.S.-developed feature films have been produced in recent years). 
 
EXHIBIT 7 241 
 
 
                                                          
 240. These exhibits were produced on May 15, 2005 through data base searches conducted 
using the international movie data base maintained at www.imdb.com, and they are based on the 
number of feature films rather than budget data. Specifically, the “pro’ version of imdb was used, 
and the “Advanced Search” function was utilized.  For each release year, the movies released by 
U.S. film companies were queried. For “country and box office,” the “U.S.” was entered.  For “film-
ing location,” each country concerned (such as “Australia” or the “U.S”) was entered separately.  
For “type of title,” “feature film” was entered.  Again, as stated above, no effort was made not to 
double-count films that were produced in multiple foreign locations, so the data compiled overstate 
the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry to that extent.  To repeat, though, feature films are 
not commonly shot in multiple foreign locations.  In addition, it should be emphasized that the data 
reflected in each of these exhibits concerns the previous production year, as films released in a par-
ticular year typically were produced during the previous year.  For example, the data reflected in 
Exhibit 9 concern feature films produced during 2003 and released in 2004.  Finally, note that while 
the author is not aware of any manner in which the IMDB data base is incomplete or inaccurate, as 
it is not known how or when data is entered into the data base, there is no guarantee that the data 
contained therein is either complete or accurate. 
 241. Data base search conducted on May 15, 2005 using the international movie data base 
maintained at www.imdb.com and based on numbers of films rather than budget data. As U.S.-
developed feature films constitute the great majority of feature films exhibited in the U.S, Canada, 
and numerous third countries, Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 provide further support, even if indirect support, 
for the conclusion that the U.S. has continued to lose significant market share in the U.S., Canada, 
various third countries, and the worldwide market for feature films.  Hence, this second measure of 
the impact of the subsidized imports from Canada also indicates that the feature film production 
industry in the U.S. has been materially injured by Canada’s PSTC film incentives. 
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EXHIBIT 8 242 
 
 
EXHIBIT 9 243 
 
(c)  Factors Affecting Domestic Prices 
As demonstrated above, “domestic prices” or, in other words, the 
costs of producing feature films in the U.S., have declined or at least 
been suppressed, so as to make feature films produced in the U.S. more 
competitive when compared with subsidized feature films produced in 
other countries, including Canada.  Accordingly, this factor also demon-
                                                          
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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strates that the subsidized imports from Canada are causing material in-
jury to the U.S. feature film production industry. 
(d) Actual and Potential Negative Effects on 
Employment 
“We are creating the jobs your children want.”  This is the rallying 
cry that the Canadian Government has used over the last few years to 
develop taxpayer support for the PSTC Programs established for the film 
industry.244  This strategy involves moving jobs from the U.S. to Canada, 
and it clearly has been exceedingly successful.  As discussed further be-
low, both government agencies and private groups in Canada and the 
U.S. evidence this fact. 
CFTPA, in its annual Profile Reports, reveals that the number of di-
rect jobs producing U.S.-developed feature films in Canada has grown 
from 3,528 employees in 1997 to 12,200 employees in 2003.  The 
CFTPA also estimates that for every direct job in the industry, 1.6 indi-
rect jobs in Canada are also created.  Indirect jobs include, for example, 
jobs in the hotel, restaurant, and retail sale business catering to the film 
industry.  Thus, the CFTPA reports that the number of such indirect jobs 
associated with the production of U.S.-developed feature films in Can-
ada has grown from 5,645 in 1997 to 19,520 in 2003.  The total number 
of direct and indirect jobs associated with the feature film industry that 
were outsourced from the U.S. to the Canadian feature film industry, 
then, grew from 9,173 in 1997 to a whopping 31,720 in 2003.  This 
represents a 246% growth in U.S.-developed feature film jobs in Canada 
over the course of this six-year period.  This transfer of direct and indi-
rect jobs in the feature film industry from the U.S. to Canada is illus-
trated in Exhibit 10. 
As indicated above, in 2004, Canada experienced its own decrease 
in feature film production, in particular the production of U.S.-developed 
feature films.  As Exhibit 10 indicates, CFTPA figures reveal that, dur-
ing 2004, approximately 21,960 jobs (8,100 direct jobs and 12, 960 indi-
rect jobs) were lost from the U.S. to Canada.  Thus, feature film produc-
tion jobs certainly are still being lost to Canada, but at a reduced amount.  
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, there is some evidence to 
suggest that Canada has at least started to reverse this downward trend in 
its own feature film production industry. 
 
 
                                                          
 244. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 8. 
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EXHIBIT 10 245 
 
  
Jobs Created in Canada and Lost in U.S. in Feature Film 
Industry ($U.S. Millions) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Direct 
Jobs 3,864 3,528 6,708 9,680 9,200 8,148 10,712 12,200 8,100 
Indirect 
Jobs 6,182 5,645 10,733 15,488 14,720 13,037 17,139 19,520 12,960 
Total 




The CEIDR Report for 2001 (published in 2002) confirms that the 
magnitude of the job loss in the U.S. feature film production industry is 
quite significant.  Specifically, it states that 27,313 jobs were lost in the 
U.S. feature film industry in that year alone.246  The CEIDR Report for 
2001, in fact, reveals that, in each of the four years covered by its stud-
ies, 1998-2001, an average of 25,000 jobs per year were lost in the U.S. 
feature film production industry. 247 
As discussed above, California and the Los Angeles area in particu-
lar have been especially hard hit by the outsourcing of the U.S. feature 
film production industry.  According to the California Employment De-
velopment Department, jobs in the feature film and video production in-
dustry in California fell from a high of 127,400 in 1999 to a low of 
105,800 in 2002, and then rose only slightly to 106,300 in 2003.248  
There was an increase to 118,600 in 2004.249  Similar job losses in the 
motion picture and video production industry in Los Angeles County 
during these years were reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics.250 
Statistics for the entire film industry (including TV shows, MOWs, 
and commercials) are even more alarming.  Jack Kyser, chief economist 
                                                          
 245. CFTPA Profile 2005 Report, at 17 and CFTPA Profile 2006 Report, at 53, 55, in conjunc-
tion with the Association des producteurs de films et de télévision du Québec (APFTQ) and the De-
partment of Canadian Heritage and Nordicity Group Ltd. (Total number of direct and indirect jobs 
created in foreign location production attributed to feature film production in accordance with ratio 
that foreign location feature film production bears to total foreign location production). 
 246. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at  
3. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 11 (citing California Employment Develop-
ment Department statistics). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 12-13. 
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for the LAEDC, “found a loss of 32,400 [total film] . . .  business jobs in 
the Los Angeles area between 1999’s peak employment figure of 
146,000 and the final 2003 figure of 113,600, which was lower than his 
original prediction for the year of 116,100.  Film industry employment 
in Los Angeles has been declining steadily every year in between, with-
out any recovery: in 2000, it fell to 138,900, in 2001 to 126,100, and in 
2002 to 121,000 . . . .” 251  “The problem with the film industry, [accord-
ing to Kyser,] is that everyone sees it in the light of ‘Entertainment To-
night’ and ‘Access Hollywood’ – all the glitz and glamour – and they 
don’t see that the bulk of the industry is below the line and that’s what’s 
hurting.”252 
UCLA Anderson Forecast senior economist Christopher Thornberg 
confirmed Kyser’s figures and predictions regarding the precipitous de-
cline of the Hollywood film industry (including TV productions).  In 
September of 2003, he stated that “I don’t think the industry will leave 
Los Angeles, but it looks as if local production jobs are slowly declining 
and moving elsewhere.  Los Angeles and New York remain the centers 
for the industry’s deal-making, financing and advertising.”253 Of course, 
as FTAC spokespeople (who, again, are dedicated to retaining film pro-
duction in the U.S.) have noted: 
The physical production of a feature film or television project is in-
credibly labor intensive, requiring large numbers of specialized, highly 
skilled workers and artists in positions which far outnumber Thorn-
berg’s “management jobs” with a studio or production company.  A 
shift in these numerous middle class jobs from cities in the United 
States to foreign locations has severe adverse economic impact, and is 
a serious problem.254 
When U.S. film workers lose their jobs, they obviously are harmed 
by the loss of the direct wages and salaries that they otherwise would 
have derived from those jobs.  In addition, “SAG members have lost re-
sidual payments, important safety protections, and significant contribu-
tions to their health and pension funds . .  .  because of work done out of 
the country . . . .”255  And, again, some industry workers have been out 
                                                          
 251. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14-15, (citing Dave McNary, H’w’d Jobs Outlook ‘Less 
than Inspiring, DAILY VARIETY (February 9, 2003)); Jesse Hiestand, L.A.’s Showbiz Exodus Eases 
Off: 2,500 Jobs May Be Lost in ‘04, About a Third of ‘03 Drop, Hollywood Reporter (February 9, 
2004); Dave McNary, Jobs Picture Remains Grim, DAILY VARIETY  (July 21, 2003)). 
 252. Id. at 14. 
 253. Id. at 14 (citing Dave McNary, Showbiz Jobs Dip in 3Q, DAILY VARIETY (December 11, 
2003); Dave McNary, BizJobs Leaving, StudySez, DAILY VARIETY  (September 24, 2003). 
 254. Id. at 14. 
 255. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at  
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of work so long that they no longer even qualify for unemployment in-
surance.256 
That film production workers have been suffering greatly in the 
U.S. is further illustrated by the fact that requests by such employees to 
the Directors’ Guild Foundation for short-term, no interest loans have 
been increasing.257  Similarly, a number of film workers have applied for 
financial aid to the Motion Picture Fund in the past several years.258  A 
number of Hollywood film industry veterans report that they have been 
able to survive only because they have been able to sell or refinance 
their mortgages in Southern California where real estate values have 
been escalating.259 
It certainly appears that the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film 
production industry, to Canada and elsewhere, has effectively destroyed 
the livelihoods of many people who formerly were employed in the in-
dustry.  Even more ominously, it appears that the future dominance of 
the U.S. in the feature film industry is jeopardized, as our children’s jobs 
in this industry are outsourced to workers in other countries through the 
use of exceedingly generous foreign subsidies.  In other words, for the 
most part, it does not appear that Canada and other countries are “creat-
ing” jobs for their children in the entertainment industry but rather are 
stealing them from the U.S.  This factor of “Actual and Potential Nega-
tive Effects on Employment” illustrates, perhaps more dramatically than 
any other factor, that the subsidized feature film imports from Canada 
seem to be causing material injury to the U.S. feature film production 
industry. 
                                                                                                                                 
10. 
 256. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh, 
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)). 
 257. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18 (citing Letter to Directors Guild members from Delbert 
Mann, Directors Guild Foundation Chairman of the Board (October 2002)). 
 258. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18. 
 259. Id.  Again, even Canadian film industry employees have started to feel the sting of out-
sourced production, now that other countries around the world have copied Canada’s successful 
film subsidy programs.  In some cities, Canadian film workers have been out of work for several 
weeks or months, and some Canadian film employees have made concessions on salary rates and 
benefit levels in order to retain work in Canada.  This boom-bust cycle is not surprising, of course, 
as “foreign subsides do not create new jobs, they merely relocate existing jobs from one country to 
another[,],” (FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 20), and, as Telefilm Canada executive director Wayne 
Clarkson put it succinctly recently, “[b]uilding [the Canadian film] . . . industry based on foreign 
production [was] . . . like building [a] house on quicksand . . . .”  CFTPA Profile 2005 Report (see 
supra Part VI.D.2.a.(2).(a) (CFTPA Reports), at 6; see also The Razor’s Edge: Canadian Producers 
in the Global Economy, available at http://www.cftpa.ca/newsroom/pdf_profile/profile2004-
english.pdf  (January 2004) (last visited May 4, 2006). 
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(e) Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Wages 
As discussed above, wages in the feature film production industry 
have declined in recent years.  This is not surprising, given the large 
number of industry workers who have lost their jobs completely or are 
only occasionally employed in the industry.  That is, those still actively 
seeking employment in the industry have very little bargaining power in 
the marketplace, and this weak bargaining power manifests itself in the 
form of lower wages, salaries, residuals, and other benefits received by a 
worker when employed, as SAG and other employee representatives 
have made clear.  Examples of SAG members and other industry em-
ployees agreeing to wage decreases or at least wage freezes in order to 
retain feature film production in the U.S. were discussed above.  In the 
spring of 2006, the producers of Home of the Brave, which was being 
filmed in Spokane, Washington, moved the production in the middle of 
filming up to Vancouver, Canada, on account of a labor dispute over 
whether union wage rates should be paid to certain below-the-line work-
ers.260  This action demonstrates very dramatically that U.S. film work-
ers have very little bargaining power to resist wage decreases.  If a pro-
ducer isn’t happy with the wages rates in the U.S., there is always the 
opportunity for the producer to escape to Canada or another country, 
where government subsidies dramatically reduce the effective wage rates 
for below-the-line workers.  Hence, this factor, like all of those dis-
cussed above, indicates that the increasing subsidized feature film im-
ports from Canada are materially injuring the U.S. feature film produc-
tion industry. 
(f)  Utilization of Capacity 
Given the great decline of the feature film production industry in 
the U.S., capacity in the industry is underutilized.  This is demonstrated 
by the great numbers of unemployed feature film workers (discussed 
above), little-used stages and sound studios in several cities around the 
U.S., and the number of companies that have stopped catering exclu-
sively to the film industry or have gone out of business entirely.  The 
underutilization of capacity in the industry is also demonstrated by the 
fact that the major movie studios have removed five cities from their list 
of “production centers,” a large number of state and regional film offices 
                                                          
 260. See Union Dispute Brings Movie Shoot to Vancouver, ASSOCIATED PRESS (March 28, 
2006), available at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060328/movie_vanco 
uver_0603 (last visited March 31, 2006). 
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have closed completely, and almost every state has cut funding for its 
film office.261 
As indicated above, there are a great many anecdotal examples of 
companies dedicated to the film industry suffering financially or closing 
their doors.  For example, in June of 2004, the Oregon Film Office re-
ported that “[o]ur film lab just closed, smaller grip and lighting compa-
nies have closed, and one of the two remaining is on the ropes.  Our 
crew depth has gone from three crews deep to one and a half because 
crews have left for other areas or left the business altogether.”262 Simi-
larly, the Washington Film Office reported in June of 2004 that “[w]e 
have several vendors who are holding on by a thread, including equip-
ment suppliers and talent agencies.  Half of our crew base has either 
moved to LA or gotten out of the business entirely.”263 
FTAC spokespeople reported during the same time period that 
[i]n Hollywood, long-established businesses which service the motion 
picture industry with rentals of various items have gone out of business 
or, if surviving, report huge losses.  Some typical examples: Alpha 
Medical, which rents medical equipment solely for film industry use as 
props and set dressing, says it has downsized its staff from 25 to 15 
employees.264  Independent Studio Services, a well-known prop rental 
and fabrication company, reports its sales are down $1.5 million and 
that 2003 was the first year it has ever lost money.  It has downsized 
from 90 to 25 regular employees and has had to reduce the size of its 
physical plant.  Nights of Neon, a neon fabrication and rental company 
which also does some business outside the film industry, has lost 50% 
of its studio business, and has contracted in size from 10 to 5 employ-
ees.265 
FTAC also has noted that training opportunities for young actors in 
the U.S. are disappearing.  As indicated above, Canada’s actors’ union, 
ACTRA, offers a workshop to teach Canadian actors how to use Ameri-
can accents, so that fewer American actors need be hired on any film 
production in Canada.  As a result, young actors in the U.S. who nor-
mally would have received training in minor roles in U.S. feature films 
                                                          
 261. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film 
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at  
10-11. 
 262. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting June 18 2004 e-mail from Veronica Rinard, 
Oregon Film & Video Office in response to a request for information on state losses from out-
sourced production). 
 263. Id. (quoting June 18, 2004 e-mail from Suzy Kellett, Washington State Film Office, in 
response to a request for information on state losses from outsourced production). 
 264. Id. at 18. 
 265. Id. at 19. 
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now are not receiving that training, and the pool of talented young U.S. 
actors is shrinking.266  The evaporation of jobs for promising new U.S. 
actors was demonstrated quite clearly during the filming of the U.S.-
developed movie Cold Mountain in Romania.  Reportedly, American 
tourists were grabbed off the streets and offered parts in the movie be-
cause there were not enough American actors available in Romania to 
fill the spots.267 
All of these examples of the underutilized capacity in the U.S. fea-
ture film industry also lead to the conclusion that the subsidized feature 
film imports from Canada are causing material injury to the U.S. feature 
film production industry. 
(g)  Producer Profits 
The Motion Picture Association of America (the MPAA) has ar-
gued that the PSTC film incentives actually increase film producers’ 
profits by lowering their production costs, and thus the incentives are not 
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.  If producers’ profits were the 
only criterion for a showing of material injury listed in the SCM Agree-
ment, the MPAA might have a point.  The growth or decline in produc-
ers’ profits, however, is only one criterion among many other criteria 
listed in the SCM Agreement for determining whether a U.S. industry is 
being materially injured by foreign subsidies, and the WTO Members 
quite clearly would not have included all of the above-discussed criteria 
if they had considered such criteria irrelevant to a finding of material in-
jury.  
Furthermore, the WTO Panel in Indonesia –Autos,268 considered 
whether the United States could claim it was suffering “serious preju-
dice” in the context of the SCM Agreement solely on the basis that cer-
tain U.S. companies were producing automobiles outside of the U.S. for 
sale in Indonesia, where they had to compete with automobiles subsi-
dized by the Government of Indonesia.  The WTO Panel in that case 
ruled emphatically in the negative on that question, on the ground that 
the WTO rules do not protect national companies but rather national in-
dustries and national products.269  The strongest evidence that the 
MPAA’s argument is incorrect is that Article 16.1 of the SCM Agree-
ment provides that, in a determination of “material injury,” the term 
“domestic industry” may be interpreted as excluding those producers 
                                                          
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (citing Phelim McAleer, That Big Break Awaits in Romania, Los Angeles Times 
(January 2, 2004)). 
 268. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59, WT/DS64/R (adopted on July 2, 1998). 
 269. Id. at paras. 14.198-14.204, 15.1(e). 
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who are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves the im-
porters of the allegedly subsidized product.  Hence, the fact that film 
producers’ profits increase when they shoot their films outside of the 
U.S. essentially is irrelevant.  In any case, the factor of producers’ profits 
is the only factor discussed that indicates that the subsidized imports 
from Canada are not materially injuring the U.S. feature film production 
industry. 
In summary, the PSTC film incentives that Canada is providing are 
quite substantial, and the great majority of the above-discussed factors 
show significant contractions in the U.S. feature film production indus-
try, especially since commencement of the PSTC Program in Canada in 
1998.  As stated above, in order for a WTO Member’s subsidies to be 
found to contravene the SCM Agreement, those subsidies need be only 
one cause of the material injury or threat of material injury being suf-
fered by the relevant domestic industry in another WTO Member.270  In 
light of all of the above, the conclusion seems inescapable that the PSTC 
film incentives in Canada are causing or, at the very least, are threaten-
ing to cause material injury to the U.S. feature film production industry.  
Accordingly, Canada’s PSTC film subsidies (especially when consid-
ered in conjunction with film subsidies provided by other countries)271 
likely are causing “adverse effects” to the U.S. feature film industry on 
this basis and hence likely are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations 
under the SCM Agreement. 
b.  Serious Prejudice 
Additionally, it appears that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are se-
riously prejudicing the U.S. feature film production industry.  To repeat, 
“ ‘[s]erious prejudice to the interests of another Member’ is used in  . . . 
[the SCM] Agreement in] the same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of 
Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice.”272  
Furthermore, Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement provides that serious 
prejudice exists where: 
(a)  the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a 
like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing 
Member; 
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a 
                                                          
 270. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34, at 728. 
 271. Subsidies provided by various countries can be aggregated in a material injury determina-
tion.  See SCM Agreement, Article 15.3. 
 272. SCM Agreement, Article 5, n. 13. 
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like product of another Member from a third country market; 
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the 
subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of an-
other Member in the same market or significant price suppression, 
price depression or lost sales in the same market; or 
(d)  the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of 
the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or 
commodity[ ] as compared to the average share it had during the pre-
vious period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend 
over a period when subsidies have been granted.273 
As indicated, the relevant industry in a “serious prejudice” analysis 
is that industry in the complaining WTO Member that produces a “like 
product,” just as in the case of a “material injury” analysis.  As ex-
plained above, in the section entitled “Like Product to Subsidized Fea-
ture Films,” the industry in the U.S. producing a like product to the fea-
ture films subsidized by the Canadian governments is the feature film 
production industry.  Accordingly, the serious prejudice analysis pro-
vided in this article focuses on that industry.  Note further, that, for the 
purpose of Article 6, paragraph 3(b): 
[T]he displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in 
which . . . it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in the 
relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized 
product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to dem-
onstrate clear trends in the development of the market for the product 
concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year).  
[“]Change in relative shares of the market” shall include any of the fol-
lowing situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the 
subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product re-
mains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the sub-
sidy, it would have declined; (c ) the market share of the subsidized 
product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been in the case 
in the absence of the subsidy.274 
                                                          
 273. SCM Agreement, Article 6.3, paras (a)-(d). 
 274. SCM Agreement, Article 6.4.  Note that serious prejudice will not be found in any case 
where there is a “voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from the 
complaining Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the complaining Members 
have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new markets)[.]”  SCM Agreement, 
Article 6.7(e).  This latter provision could be interpreted to cover the instant situation, where many 
U.S. film companies are voluntarily choosing to reduce their feature film production in the U.S. and 
instead conduct their production operations in Canada and other countries.  However, the WTO 
Panel in Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at para. 14.203, found that each of the various para-
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To repeat, if any one of the four effects set forth in paragraphs (a) – 
(d), above, has occurred in connection with the U.S. feature film produc-
tion industry as a result of Canada’s combined PSTC film subsidies, 
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are causing “serious prejudice” to the 
U.S. feature film production industry.  In fact, however, it appears that 
most, if not all, of these effects are occurring as a result of Canada PSTC 
film incentives. 
As indicated above, market share data can be determinative on the 
issue of whether serious prejudice is demonstrated on the basis of para-
graph (b) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.275  Market share data is 
also highly relevant on the issue of whether serious prejudice is illus-
trated on the basis of paragraph (a) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agree-
ment.276  As the above section regarding “material injury” to the U.S. 
feature film production industry makes clear, during each of the four 
years 1998 – 2001, Canada’s share of the world market for feature film 
production increased and the U.S.’ share of the world market for feature 
film production decreased.  Specifically, in 1998, Canada’s share of the 
world’s feature film production market was 8%, and by the end of 2001, 
its share of this market was 19%.  In contrast, the U.S. share of the world 
market for feature film production in 1998 was 70%, and at the end of 
2001, it was 58%.  Again, Exhibits 5 and 6, above, illustrate this 11% 
increase in Canada’s market share of the worldwide feature film produc-
tion industry and the concomitant 12% loss in the U.S.’ share of this 
market.277 
                                                                                                                                 
graphs of Article 6.7 clearly assumes that the product allegedly being replaced by the subsidized 
product has, in fact, first been produced in the complaining Member (in this case, the U.S.).  In 
other words, the provisions of Article 6.7 refer to restrictions on domestic exports, not restrictions 
on domestic production.  This is consistent with Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement, which pro-
vides that the “domestic industry” in an analysis of “material injury” can exclude domestic produc-
ers who are “related[ ] to the exporters or importers or are themselves the importers of the allegedly 
subsided product or a like product from other countries . . . .”  Again, the SCM Agreement protects 
products that are produced within a particular WTO Member, not producers who are located within 
that WTO Member.  Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.198-14.204, 15.1(e). 
 275. See Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.208-14.211. 
 276. Id. 
 277. The Canadian Government has been candid that “foreign location production” has been 
responsible for the phenomenal growth in its own feature film industry, with “foreign location pro-
duction” being defined by the Canadian Government as “the production of a feature film in Canada 
where the copyright of that film is owned by a non-Canadian.”  See supra notes 198-200.  It has also 
pointed out that the overwhelming majority (often reaching 95%) of foreign location projects over 
the last decade have been U.S.-developed projects. See 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities 
and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20 
(2002); 2002-03 Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period 
April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, at 16 (2003), and 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and 
Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004) 
(stating that the overwhelming majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed).  
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Comprehensive market share data for the worldwide feature film 
production industry since 2001 has not been readily available in the last 
few years.278  Still, private industry groups in Canada, as well the Cana-
dian federal government, have claimed that the feature film production 
industry in Canada continued to grow during the 2002 – 2003 period.  
Specifically, according to these sources, the volume of Canadian feature 
film production grew from $US 824 million in 2002 to $US 1.04 billion 
by the end of 2003.279  Again, during those same years, it appears that 
the volume of U.S. feature film production declined.  This latter point is 
difficult to confirm, as national U.S. statistics on the industry have not 
been published. 280  What does appear to be true, however, is that feature 
film production industry in the Los Angeles area declined significantly 
during those years, and the Los Angeles area unquestionably is the cen-
ter of feature film production in both California and the U.S. as a whole.  
Specifically, California’s share of production of U.S.-developed feature 
                                                                                                                                 
As most feature films shown in many countries of the world are U.S.-developed (note: not necessar-
ily produced), the fact that Canada has produced a greater percentage of U.S.-developed films 
should result in Canada obtaining a larger percentage of many countries’ feature film market during 
each of those years.  See, e.g.,  France proposes ‘European Cinema Weeks’ to Fight Hollywood 
Domination, Associated Press (November 18, 2005) (French Culture Minister Renaud Donnedieu 
de Vabres asked in an address in 2005 that Europeans promote European films in the form of 
‘European cinema weeks’, “in order to see more European films and because 70 percent of films 
shown in EU movie theatres are American”), available at 
http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/11/18/051118191 
730.tms64jw7.html (last visited May 4, 2006); The Business of Media Violence, Media Awareness 
Network (2006) (“Already, almost 80% of movies sold overseas came from the U.S. movie indus-
try.  Increasingly, U.S. firms are buying up screens and production entities around the word.”),  
available at http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/issues/violence/business_media_violence.cfm 
(last visited May 4, 2006); Minoru Sugaya, The Development of Film Policy in Canada and Japan, 
28 Keio Communication 53, 64 (2006) (“[T]he share of Canadian films in the box office sale be-
tween January and September 2004 was 4.8 percent, while that of U.S. films was 87.2 percent.”), 
available at  www.mediacom.keio.ac.jp/publication/pdf2006/review28/02_Minoru%20SUGAYA. 
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 278. In early 2006, The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Reports (CEDIR) began 
compiling a new report regarding the status of the entire U.S. film industry as of the end of 2005.  
This report should be publicly available soon.  Author’s Interview with Steve Katz, author of this 
new CEIDR Report (April 8, 2006); see also Scott Kaye,  Report on the June 2005 National Execu-
tive Board Meeting, International Cinematographers Guild  (July 20, 2005) (“Our [National Execu-
tive Board] NEB adopted a resolution calling for the commission of a new [CEIDR] report, spend-
ing up to $15,000 to help fund it . . . .”), available at www.cameraguild.com/news/guild/05_07_20 
_executive_board_meeting.html (last visited May 4, 2006); Local 44 Newsreel, Volume 16, Issue 8, 
Newsletter of IATSE Local 44 (November, 2005) (“The recent SAG election that put several new 
members on their board and elected an active, progressive President has resulted in SAG’s donation 
of $10,000 to fund the CEIDR report . . . . “), available at  www.local44.com/content/newsreel/05N 
OVEMBER%202005%20NEWSREEL%20for%20web.pdf (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 279. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(2)(a) (discussing CFTPA Reports). 
 280. A decline in film production in Los Angeles, for example, could be countered by a gain in 
film production in New York City. 
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films decreased by 5.5% from 31% in 2000 to 25.5% by the end of 
2003.281  In 2000, California produced 212 out of U.S.-developed 683 
feature films.  By 2003, it only produced 151 out of 593 US.-developed 
feature films.282 
As discussed above, during 2004, Canada suffered a decline in its 
own feature film production industry.283  At the same time, the U.S. fea-
ture film production industry does not appear to have been the benefici-
ary.  To a large extent, it appears that third countries were able to entice 
U.S. film producers to shoot more films in their locales, to the detriment 
of both the U.S. and the Canadian feature film production industries.284  
The Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation reported in 
March of 2005 that 45% of all major studio films were shot outside the 
U.S. in 2004,285 and Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 (produced based on data con-
tained in the international movie data base maintained at 
http://www.imdb.com) indicate that a whopping 65% of all U.S.-
developed feature films were produced outside of the U.S. by the 2004 
release year.286  While these exhibits overstate the outsourcing of the 
U.S. feature film production industry for the reasons discussed above in 
Section VI.D.2.a.(4)((b) (Market Share), the sizeable magnitude of the 
phenomenon and the consequent significant decrease in the U.S. share in 
the worldwide market for the production of feature films are unmistak-
able. 
Again, in late 2004 and early 2005, government representatives 
throughout Canada warned that the various Canadian governments might 
need to increase their PSTC film incentives in order to retain feature film 
production in Canada.287  Then, a number of the provinces followed suit 
                                                          
 281. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Hollywood Re-
porter). 
 282. Id. 
 283. CFTPA Profile 2006 Report at 39, 55. 
 284. Id. at 9-10. The CFTPA Profile 2006 Report states that total foreign location production 
in Canada decreased 23% in 2004.  Specifically, foreign location production for feature films de-
creased from $US 830 million to $US 606 million.  See supra Exhibit 1.  The Department of Cana-
dian Heritage stated “a U.S. reaction against so called ‘runaway’ production and the implementation 
of competitive state incentives” contributed to a decline in foreign location production between 
2002-03 and 2003-04.  In addition, its report noted “increased global competition” factored into the 
decreased production.  Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location 
Production in Canada 1 (March 2005). 
 285. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Hollywood Re-
porter). 
 286. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(b) (Market Share). 
 287. The Department of Canadian Heritage reported that in late 2004 and early 2005, several 
Canadian provinces “increased their respective tax incentives for foreign location production.” De-
partment of Canadian Heritage, supra note 284, at 1.  Canada estimates such increases in provincial 
subsidies, added to the federal subsidy, “will help stem the decline experienced recently.” Id.  In an 
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and increased their PSTC tax benefits in 2005, and Canadian industry 
experts hope that these even more generous subsidies have at least stated 
to reverse the decline of Canadian feature film production.288 
In summary, the feature film production industry in Canada has ex-
perienced phenomenal growth since the commencement of the federal 
PSTC program in 1998, and the U.S. feature film production industry 
clearly has experienced a significant decline during that same time pe-
riod.  Moreover, the various Canadian governments have been forthright 
that their PSTC film incentives have been largely responsible for this 
shift in feature film production activities in North America.289  Both pri-
vate industry groups in Canada and the Canadian federal government 
have explained that the feature film production industry started to de-
cline in Canada in 2004, in part because of a combination of (1) compet-
ing film subsidy programs offered by governments in third countries; (2) 
competing film subsidy programs offered by the federal and state gov-
ernments in the U.S.; (3) unusual external conditions such as the SARS 
panic; and (4) an unfavorable exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar 
making production in Canada more expensive.290 
In light of all of the above, the connection between Canada’s PSTC 
film incentives and the growth of the Canadian feature film production 
industry through production of U.S.-developed projects is clear.  In addi-
tion, as most feature films shown in Canada and many other countries 
are, in fact, U.S.-developed films,291 it should not be difficult for the 
U.S. to demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies have caused the 
displacement or impedance of imports of U.S.-origin feature films into 
Canada as well as into numerous third countries.292  Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                                 
effort to retain foreign location production, the Canadian federal government raised its own incen-
tive from 11% to 16%.  See, e.g., Brendan Kelly, Fear of Flight, Canada Grapples With Its Own 
Runaway Production, VARIETY (September 7, 2004), available at http://www.variety.com/article/ 
VR1117910185?categoryid=1753&cs=1 (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 288. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 287, at 1 (noting current and anticipated 
levels of foreign location production in provinces for 2005-06 were positive).  See Appendix B for a 
summary of the major PSTC film incentive programs in Canada, current as of March 2005. 
 289. The Canadian film industry has grown substantially due to the tax incentives it provides 
for foreign location production.  See supra note 129.  Ninety-five percent of Canadian foreign loca-
tion originates from the United States.  See, e.g., 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES 
AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003 TO MARCH 31, 2004, 
16 (2004). 
 290. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 287, at 1 (explaining contributing factors 
for loss of total foreign location production, including television and feature film production); see 
CFTPA Profile 2006 Report, at 55 (showing sudden loss in feature film foreign location produc-
tion). 
 291. See supra note 275. 
 292. The “imports” referred to in Articles 6.3(a) and (b) of the SCM Agreement must refer to 
products produced in the complaining WTO Member, rather than simply products of any origin ex-
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U.S. should be able to establish that its own feature film production in-
dustry has been “seriously prejudiced” on the basis of the adverse effects 
set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, 
as set forth above. 
In addition, as has been discussed at length above, the PSTC film 
subsidies have, in fact, caused significant suppression of the production 
costs (prices) of feature films produced in the U.S. so that they can com-
pete with the U.S.-developed feature films that are produced in Canada 
with the benefit of the PSTC incentives.  Thus, the U.S. also should be 
able to establish serious prejudice on the basis of the adverse effect set 
out in paragraph (c) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement. 
Finally, as a feature film is not a “primary product,” the serious 
prejudice test set forth in paragraph (d), above, arguably is irrelevant.  
Still, it is noteworthy that, as discussed above, Canada’s share of the 
worldwide market for feature films clearly increased during the 1998-
2001 period, while the U.S.’ share of the worldwide market for feature 
films decreased during this period.293  In addition, as just discussed 
above, this trend appears to have continued, at least through 2003.  Ac-
cordingly, if paragraph (d) is relevant, the U.S. should also be able to es-
tablish serious prejudice to the U.S. feature film production industry 
based on paragraph (d).  Thus, given the combined effects of paragraphs 
(a) – (d) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, it appears very likely that 
the U.S. should prevail on a claim that the Canadian PSTC film incen-
tives are causing, or at the very least, are threatening to cause, serious 
prejudice to the U.S. feature film production industry. 
It is also noteworthy that, when the SCM Agreement first went into 
effect, the SCM Agreement provided that “the total ad valorem subsidi-
zation [ ] of a product exceeding 5 per cent[ ] . . . establishes a presump-
tion of serious prejudice . . . .”294  This presumption of serious prejudice 
based on a 5% ad valorem subsidization figure was abolished as of De-
cember 31, 1999 pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement,295 but it 
is still useful to attempt to calculate the ad valorem subsidization figure 
in this case to determine whether this 5% subsidization figure is met. 
                                                                                                                                 
ported from that country.  Again, the WTO Appellate Body in Indonesia – Autos,  WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (adopted on July 2, 1998)  made clear that the SCM 
Agreement protects products made in the complaining WTO Member, not companies based in the 
complaining WTO Member that choose to produce their products outside of that country. See supra 
note 267. 
 293. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(b) (Market Share). 
 294. SCM Agreement, Article 6.1 (emphasis added.) 
 295. See, e.g., TN/RL/GEN/14, available at www.wto.org/docsonline/SearchDocuments/Sim 
pleDocuments (last visited March 10, 2006). 
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This ad valorem subsidization figure is to be calculated “ . . .  in 
accordance with Annex IV of the [SCM] Agreement[,]296 which 
provides, inter alia, that: 
 
1. Any calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of para-
graph 1(a) of Article 6 shall be done in terms of the cost to the granting 
government. 
2. Except as provided in paragraphs 3 through 5, in determining 
whether the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 5 per cent of the 
value of the product, the value of the product shall be calculated as the 
total value of the recipient firm’s sales in the most recent 12-month pe-
riod, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which 
the subsidy is granted.297 
3. Where the subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a given prod-
uct, the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the 
recipient firm’s sales of that product in the most recent 12-month pe-
riod, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which 
the subsidy is granted. 
.  .  . 
6. In determining the overall rate of subsidization in a given year, sub-
sidies given under different programmes and by different authorities in 
the territory of a Member shall be aggregated . . . . 298 
 
As discussed above, the Canadian PSTC film subsidies are based on 
a percentage of “qualifying labor costs” incurred in Canada during the 
production of a film.  Hence, as the subsidies are tied to the production of 
a given product - a film – Annex IV of the SCM Agreement indicates 
that the “value of the product” for each relevant company should be cal-
                                                          
 296. SCM Agreement, Article 6, n. 14. 
 297. In the case of tax-related subsidies, the value of the product is to be calculated as the total 
value of the recipient firm’s sales in the fiscal year in which the tax-related measure was earned.  
Annex IV, paragraph 2; SCM Agreement, n. 64.  Given the reference to a “fiscal year,” this particu-
lar provision appears to refer to an income tax-related subsidy. Id.  As stated, in the case of the Ca-
nadian PSTC film subsidies, the tax credits are technically earned by Canadian film companies 
when the companies produce the films in question and utilize Canadian labor in the films.  How-
ever, some or all of the funds are provided to the film companies at or near the commencement of 
filming.  Hence, it makes more sense to calculate the 5% subsidization rate in accordance with each 
recipient firm’s “sales” of the product in the most recent 12-month period for which sales data is 
available. 
 298. SCM Agreement, Annex IV, paras 1-3, 6. 
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culated, as set forth in paragraph 3, above.  This paragraph, again, pro-
vides that the subsidization figure should be calculated in accordance 
with the total value of that company’s “sales of subsidized films” in the 
most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding 
the period in which the subsidy is granted.  Reference to the preceding 
12-month period of sales in this paragraph is an acknowledgment of the 
fact that subsidies based on the production or sale of a particular product 
would in most cases will be granted to recipient firms following the pro-
duction or sale of that product.  In other words, it takes into account the 
time gap between the production/sale of the product and the payment of 
the corresponding subsidy.  As stated above, however, in the case of the 
PSTC incentives, however, a large portion of the incentive is provided to 
the film maker prior to or at the commencement of production, with any 
remaining amount due to the film company provided at the end of pro-
duction.299 
Given that the Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are directly tied to the 
production costs of the films produced by each recipient firm, the sub-
sidization figure arguably should be calculated with reference to those 
production costs, rather than with reference to the “sales” of those films 
to the companies importing the films into the U.S.  This is particularly 
the case, as it is possible that the phrase “production costs” simply was 
inadvertently omitted from paragraph 3, above, when both “production” 
and “sales” were referred to at the beginning of the paragraph. 
Moreover, U.S. film companies often establish a separate entity for 
the production of any feature film, whether it is produced in the U.S. or 
Canada.300  The copyright to the film usually is not transferred to the 
Canadian entity, and accordingly the Canadian entity generally does not 
make a profit by “selling” the film itself to the U.S. copyright owner.301  
The Canadian entity is simply paid a processing fee, and at the conclu-
sion of production, the separate corporate entity established for the film 
generally is abolished.302  In any case, it would also be exceedingly dif-
ficult to derive an arm’s length price for a U.S.-developed film produced 
in Canada, as the finances of U.S. film companies are notorious for be-
ing shrouded in mystery and all but impossible to decipher.303 
                                                          
 299. See supra note 78, at 13-19 (discussing Canada Revenue Agency’s processing of PSTC 
claims). 
 300. See, e.g., Jean Ross, BudgetBbrief, California Budget Project 3 (August 2005), available 
at http://www.cbp.org/2005/0508_bbmoviecredits.pdf. (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See, e.g, Pierce O’ Donnell, Dennis McDougal, Fatal Subtraction: The Inside Story of 
Buchwald v. Paramount, Audio Literature (2d ed., June 1996) (an inside review of movie industry 
finances detailing humorist Art Buchwald’s and partner Alain Bernheim’s lawsuit against Para-
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For all of these reasons, it makes sense to calculate the subsidiza-
tion figure with respect to production costs, rather than sales revenues.  
Furthermore, it should not be difficult for the U.S. to establish that the 
total subsidization of each subsidized film shot in Canada is quite sig-
nificant and certainly totals more than 5% of the production costs, in at 
least the great majority of cases.  
To begin with, it is clear from the face of both the federal and pro-
vincial PSTC laws that each such government is prepared to provide 
subsidies amounting to substantially more than 5% of the production 
costs of each film.  Again, at the present time, the federal government 
provides a tax credit equal to 16% of the qualifying labor costs incurred 
in Canada and it does not impose any upper limit on the percentage of 
production costs that it will reimburse.  The provincial governments 
provide additional subsidies of between 18% and 50% of qualifying la-
bor costs, and while some of the provincial governments do have an up-
per limit on the percentage of production costs that can be reimbursed, 
the lowest such maximum is 15% of production costs enforced by the 
Province of Prince Edward Island.304 Therefore, it is certainly possible 
for the subsidies provided with respect to any film to total significantly 
more than 5% of the production costs incurred in Canada. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, both the federal and provincial 
governments in Canada advertise that their combined PSTC subsidies 
will cover a significantly higher percentage of the production costs of a 
film,305 and numerous articles and studies have reported that the PSTC 
subsidies constitute between 7% and 15% of the production costs of a 
film shot in Canada.306  CAVCO, for example, indicates that qualifying 
labor costs are approximately 50% of a typical budget associated with a 
PSTC film presented for CAVCO approval, and thus, according to 
                                                                                                                                 
mount Pictures based on Paramount’s refusal to pay them any proceeds from the movie Coming to 
America (starring Eddie Murphy) on the basis that the box office blockbuster allegedly had failed to 
make any profit). 
 304. See Appendix B. 
 305. See, e.g., CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE (CAVCO) , Film or Video 
Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-
ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm (August 02, 2004) (last visited March 28, 2006); 
British Colombia Film Commission, Tax Credits, available at http://www.bcfilmcommission.com/ 
finance (last visited March 28, 2006). 
 306. See, e.g., The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of 
Feature Film Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, su-
pra note 203, at 10; Department of Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), Final Destina-
tion: A Comparison  of Film Tax Incentives in Australia and Canada  2-4  (June 2003), available at 
www.dcita.gov.au/home/publications (last visited May, 2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
supra note 5, at 19; Directors Guild of America, Runaway Production Update – October 2004 (Oc-
tober 2004), available at http://www.dga.org/thedga/leg_rp_updte-101104-a.php3 (last visited May 
7, 2006). 
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CAVCO, the federal PSTC subsidy prior to 2003 alone would have been 
equal to 11% of 50%, or 5.55% of total production costs, and the federal 
PSTC subsidy alone after 2003 would have been equal to 16% of 50% , 
or  8% of total production costs.307 Also, movie house executives at both 
the major and the independent studios have justified their outsourcing of 
film production to Canada by pointing to the substantial percentage of 
production costs covered by the PSTC subsidies.308 
Most important, application of a simple mathematical formula 
makes clear that the 5% subsidization figure is almost certainly met with 
respect to any U.S.-developed, subsidized feature film produced in Can-
ada.  This calculation is based on the fact that labor costs – funds spent 
on the wages and salaries of those working to produce the film - consti-
tute approximately 50% of the production costs of a film.309  Also, be-
low-the-line labor costs310 – those labor costs that tend to move to an-
other country – typically constitute 60% of the total labor costs on a 
film.311  Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that approximately 30% 
of the budget of a feature film is comprised of below-the-line or “qualify-
ing labor costs” (60% multiplied by 50%).  Finally, today, as discussed 
above, the lowest combined federal and provincial subsidy rate is 34% 
(16% on the federal level plus 18% on the provincial level for British 
Colombia and Ontario312 of “qualifying labor expenses” (those labor ex-
penses incurred in Canada)). 
                                                          
 307. See, e.g., 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS 
ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003 TO MARCH 31, 2004, supra note 72, at 
5-6. 
 308. See, e.g., FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17 (reporting the comment “It’s all about money,” 
allegedly made by Avi Lerner, co-chairman of Nu Image, at a June 17, 2004 meeting in Beverly 
Hills, in explaining why Nu Image was planning to shoot only two of its 12 features in 2004 in the 
U.S.). 
 309. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 72, available at 
http://www.ftac.org/html/2a-dgasag.html (last visited May 5, 2006) (assuming that qualifying labor 
expenditures in Canada total approximately 50% of production costs); 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY 
REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003 
TO MARCH 31, 2004, supra note 73, at 5-6 (indicating that approximately 50% of budgets presented 
for CAVCO approval consist of qualifying labor costs.) 
 310. The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 28 (citing John W. Cones, Film Finance and Dis-
tribution: A Dictionary of Terms).  
Below-the-line [labor costs are] . . . [f]ilm budget items relating to the technical expenses 
and labor  . . . involved in producing a film, i.e., relating to mechanical, crew, extras, art, 
sets, camera, electrical, wardrobe, transportation, raw film stock, printing, and post-
production . . . The phrase “below-the-line” refers to the location of the specific expense 
items/person on the budget. 
Id. 
 311. Department of Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), supra note 306, at 4 (Ap-
proximately 60% of a film’s budget is attributable to below-the-line costs). 
 312. See Appendix B. 
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Hence, without even investigating individual film costs, one would 
expect to find that at least 10.2% (34% of 30%) of the production costs 
of a U.S.-developed film produced in Canada today is subsidized by the 
applicable Canadian governments.  For all of the above reasons, it ap-
pears very likely that the 5% subsidization figure is met, if production 
costs are used in the calculation of the 5% subsidization figure. 
In conclusion, then, the U.S. should be able to establish that Can-
ada’s PSTC film subsidies are causing material injury or a threat thereof, 
as well as serious prejudice or a threat thereof, to the U.S. feature film 
production industry.  Accordingly, the U.S. should be able to establish 
that Canada’s PSTC film incentives constitute actionable subsidies pro-
vided to a specific industry that are causing adverse effects to the inter-
ests of the U.S. and hence they are not in compliance with Canada’s ob-
ligations under the SCM Agreement. 
VII.  REMEDIES, OBSTACLES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As is discussed above in Section VI, the evidence demonstrates that 
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are inconsistent with its obligations un-
der the SCM Agreement, because they cause adverse effects to the fea-
ture film production industry in the U.S.  For this same reason,  the U.S. 
Government could impose countervailing tariffs on the subsidized films 
when they enter the U.S., in accordance with 701 of the Tariff Act of 
1930, as amended.313  This section of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended, is referred to as “Section 701.”  Hence, U.S. interested parties 
could both request the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (the 
USTR) to have the U.S. initiate a dispute resolution proceeding in the 
WTO as well as file a countervailing duty petition with the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce under Section 701 (referred to as a “Section701 
petition”).  Furthermore, a domestic interested party could file a petition 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974314 with the USTR as a 
method of prompting the U.S. Government to initiate a WTO dispute 
resolution proceeding against Canada.  Such a petition is referred to as a 
“Section 301 petition,” and this section of the Trade Act of 1974 is re-
ferred to as “Section 301.”  Each of these three remedies will be dis-
cussed in turn, below.  Then, various obstacles facing interested parties 
in successfully pursuing these remedies are discussed.  Finally, recom-
mendations on how domestic interested parties may best proceed to chal-
lenge these subsidies are provided. 
                                                          
 313. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2005). 
 314. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2005). 
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A.  Remedies 
1.  Initiate a WTO Proceeding 
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular those feature film work-
ers who have been harmed by the Canadian PSTC film subsidies, could 
request that the USTR initiate a proceeding against Canada under the 
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, including the special dispute 
settlement procedures set forth in the SCM Agreement.315  Such a re-
quest need not follow any particular format, but the U.S. Government, in 
response to such a request, has complete discretion as to whether to pur-
sue a dispute proceeding against another country in the WTO.316  The 
USTR is not even obligated to respond in any fashion to such a request.  
In fact, it is not unusual for such a request filed by domestic interested 
parties to languish at the USTR for several years.317  The USTR might 
also be especially tempted in this case to ignore such a request, as the 
powerful MPAA appears to oppose any challenge to the subsidies.318 
The USTR can self-initiate a dispute proceeding in the WTO.319 
                                                          
 315. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 
I.L.M. 1226 (Apr. 5, 1994)  (detailing the dispute over settlement procedures of the WTO).  Addi-
tional dispute settlement procedures applicable to a WTO member’s subsidy program that allegedly 
is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement on the ground that it adversely affects the interests of an-
other WTO Member are found in the SCM Agreement, supra note 19, Article 7. 
 316. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law 103-465, December 8, 1994, Section 
102(c)(1)(A) (providing that only the United States has a cause of action or a defense under any of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements). 
 317. See, e.g., USTR’s Zoellick Says WTO Biotech Case Aims to Quell Fears, International 
Information Programs (May 13, 2003) (U.S. biotech industry waited many years for the U.S. bring a 
case in the WTO against the EU challenging the EU’s moratorium on the importation of biotech 
foods into the EU, as U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick acknowledged when the U.S. fi-
nally brought a case in 2003.  At that time, he stated that “after nearly five years the United States is 
finally acting to challenge in the World Trade Organization (WTO) the European Union (EU) mora-
torium on food derived from biotechnology because harm from the EU stalling has begun to spread 
globally”), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-726528.html (last visited 
May 2, 2006). 
 318. See, e.g., MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties 
Pursuant to § 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as Amended (2001); Staff report to Mary J. Alford, City 
Manager, Burbank, California, Runaway Production – Consideration of the Film and Television 
Action Committee Resolution (March 15, 2005) (reviewing reasons for the MPAA’s opposition to 
Burbank City Council’s resolution in favor of Section 301 petition), available at 
http://www.ci.burbank.ca.us/agendas/ag_council/2005/sr031505_5.html  (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 319. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2005). 
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2.  File a Section 301 Petition 
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular those feature film work-
ers who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could also 
file a Section 301 petition with the USTR.320  The USTR can self-initiate 
a Section 301 action,321 but, in practice, the USTR rarely does so.  There 
are two subparts of Section 301 that are relevant –  Subpart (A) and 
Subpart (B).  Each of these subparts is discussed separately. 
a.  Section 301(A) 
Section 301(A) provides a method for the USTR to identify unfair 
trade practices harming U.S. producers and request reform of those prac-
tices by the responsible foreign governments, backed up by the threat of 
sanctions.322  Under Section 301(A), the USTR would determine 
whether an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country: (i) violates, or is 
inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the 
U.S. under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or 
restricts U.S. commerce.323  In the instant case, the petitioners would al-
lege that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are inconsistent with Canada’s 
obligations under the SCM Agreement because the subsidies adversely 
affect the U.S. feature film production industry.324 
After a Section 301 petition is filed, the USTR is required to decide 
within 45 days whether to “initiate an investigation.”325  Hence, the main 
advantage of a Section 301(A) action is that it would force the USTR to 
take some action regarding Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.  However, it 
is important to point out that the USTR still could decide not to initiate 
an investigation of Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.326 
Technically, reasonably tight time limits apply for the completion 
of Section 301 investigations.327  Today, however, the USTR must ex-
tend the deadlines for every Section 301 investigation, because the U.S. 
has agreed to suspend any investigation initiated under Section 301 until 
the completion of a WTO dispute proceeding on the same issue.  Spe-
cifically, in the WTO Panel on U.S. – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 
                                                          
 320. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2005). 
 321. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (2005). 
 322. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2005). 
 323. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (2005). 
 324. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.(Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be 
Causing Adverse Effects to  the U.S. Feature Film Industry). 
 325. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (2005). 
 326. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(3) (2005). 
 327. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4) (2005). 
78
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
WRIGHT1.DOC 6/1/2006  2:40:25 PM 
2006] INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME 817 
of 1974,328 the U.S. asserted that its Statement of Administrative Action 
(the SAA) accompanying passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act329 had clarified that the U.S. would not conduct a Section 301 inves-
tigation in such a manner as to unilaterally determine whether another 
country is violating a WTO Agreement such as the SCM Agreement.330  
Based on this assertion, the Panel in this case approved Section 301 ac-
tions as being consistent with the WTO dispute resolution scheme.331 
Hence, if the USTR did agree to initiate a Section 301 investigation 
of Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, it would then hold its investigation in 
abeyance, initiate a dispute resolution proceeding against Canada in the 
WTO, and then finally conclude its own investigation based on the WTO 
decision.  In essence, therefore, a Section 301(A) petition today is sim-
ply a method of forcing the USTR to consider initiating a dispute pro-
ceeding against another country in the WTO. 
b.  Section 301(B) 
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular the feature film workers 
who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could also file 
a Section 301(B) petition with the USTR.332  In such a case, these parties 
would be asking that the USTR investigate whether “an act, policy, or 
practice of a country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or 
restricts United States commerce.”333  The USTR in such a case would 
also have to decide whether action to correct the foreign practice would 
be appropriate and feasible.334 
Under Section 301(B), however, the USTR possesses even broader 
discretion regarding whether to initiate an investigation and impose 
sanctions against foreign countries.335  Therefore, domestic interested 
parties are more likely to obtain relief via a Section 301(A) petition than 
a Section 301(B) petition. 
3.  File a Section 701 Petition 
Lastly, interested parties in the U.S., in particular the feature film 
workers who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could 
                                                          
 328. United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS/152/R, adopted on 
December 22, 1999. 
 329. Public Law 103-465, December 8, 1994. 
 330. See International Information Programs supra note 317, at para.  4.539. 
 331. Id. at VIII (Conclusions). 
 332. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2005). 
 333. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (2005). 
 334. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (2005). 
 335. See id. 
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file a petition with the International Trade Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (the DOC) requesting that it initiate an inves-
tigation into whether countervailing duties should be imposed on the 
imports of subsidized feature films into the U.S.336  Again, such actions 
are brought under Section 701.337  In such a case, the International Trade 
Commission (the ITC) would first conduct a preliminary injury investi-
gation into whether the PSTC film subsidies are materially injuring the 
U.S. feature film production industry.338  If the ITC’s preliminary injury 
investigation results in a positive determination, then the DOC would 
conduct a preliminary subsidy investigation to determine if the subsidies 
are actionable.339  Next, assuming that the DOC’s investigation results in 
a positive determination, the DOC would proceed to conduct the final 
subsidy investigation, and then finally the ITC would conduct the final 
injury investigation.340  However, the U.S. has no power to order Canada 
to abolish the subsidies at the conclusion of a Section 701 duty proceed-
ing.  Rather, the U.S. would calculate and impose a proper tariff rate to 
counter the subsidies received by each Canadian film maker exporting 
feature films to the U.S. 
In a petition requesting a countervailing investigation, the domestic 
interested parties would have to demonstrate to the DOC that at least 
25% of the employees in the industry support the filing of the petition.341  
This issue of standing arose in 2001, when FTAC and several film in-
dustry unions filed a Section 701 petition with the DOC.342  Predictably, 
the MPAA opposed FTAC’s petition, based in part on this issue of 
standing, arguing that the petitioners had shown that only 23.5% of film 
workers in the U.S. supported the filing of such a petition at that time.343  
The petitioners then withdrew their countervailing duty petition and they 
have not refiled it since.  Still, workers in the U.S. film industry clearly 
seem to support the imposition of some type of trade sanction against 
countries that provide illegal film subsidies.344 
                                                          
 336. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (2005). 
 337. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2005). 
 338. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005). 
 339. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (2005). 
 340. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (2005). 
 341. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(4)(A)(i) (2005). 
 342. MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties Pursuant 
to § 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended ( 2001). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh, 
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)); see also FTAC’s website, available at 
http://www.ftac.org/html/support.html (last visited May 11, 2006), which lists the various enter-
tainment trade unions that support trade sanctions against Canada with respect to its film subsidies. 
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It appears that the issue of standing could be overcome and a Sec-
tion 701 petition could be successfully filed.  In addition to the issue of 
standing in Section 701 cases, however, countervailing investigations 
often take several years to conclude.  Furthermore, even assuming that 
countervailing duties would be warranted, the imposition of such duties 
on the importation of Canadian-origin feature films into the U.S. may be 
counterproductive in the long run.  This is the case, because if a counter-
vailing tariff were imposed, the Canadian governments could simply re-
spond by granting even more generous subsidies, which Canadian Gov-
ernment spokespersons appear willing to consider.345  While yet another 
countervailing investigation could then be initiated and further counter-
vailing tariffs imposed, this could simply result in yet another escalation 
in the PSTC subsidy rates.  In other words, there is the strong possibility 
that this remedy would accomplish nothing more than another subsidy 
spiral.  At the same time, the imposition of countervailing duties on fea-
ture film exports to the U.S. could cause Canada to abolish the PSTC 
film incentives or at least make them less generous. 
Finally, it would be difficult to assess the countervailing duties on 
the importation of feature films from Canada.  The countervailing duty 
rate for each film would be extremely high, and there would be a great 
outcry from the MPAA, with the MPAA most likely claiming it would 
have to raise movie ticket prices as a result of the imposition of such a 
high tariff.  Also, such a high tariff would lead to significant attempts by 
U.S. importers to circumvent the tariff, for example by electronically 
transmitting more films to the U.S., as such transmissions today gener-
ally are not considered importations346 and furthermore are difficult to 
trace.  All in all, the practical hurdles to establishing and collecting a 
countervailing tariff are formidable. 
B.  Obstacles 
1.  MPAA Opposition 
The MPAA argues that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are consis-
tent with Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement, and that, in 
any case, it would be counterproductive for the U.S. to challenge the 
                                                          
 345. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 12 (citing Canadian Film and Television Production 
Association, Profile 2003: An Economic Report on the Canadian Film and Television Production 
Industry; Risky Business: Canadian Producers in the Global Economy  8 ( 2003), available at 
http://www.cftpa.ca/newsroom/pdf_profile/profile2003-english.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 346. See supra notes 163, 167. 
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subsidies.347  The MPAA’s most commonly voiced argument in this re-
gard is that the producers constitute the “movie industry,” and the share-
holders of the producers are not adversely affected by the subsidies.348 
Surely, though, as indicated above, corporate shareholders are only one 
component of any particular industry in a country, especially as the eco-
nomic well-being of the shareholders is not necessarily consistent with 
the economic well-being of other components of a national industry, 
such as the workers in that industry.  In fact, the WTO Panel in Indone-
sia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,349 ruled that 
the WTO laws protect national products rather than national companies, 
and thus the SCM Agreement did not protect the U.S. in that case be-
cause no producers of U.S.-origin automobiles were being harmed by 
Indonesia’s automobile subsidy program.350  This decision provides 
strong support for the conclusion that, under the SCM Agreement, the 
shareholders in an industry, at most, should be treated as only one com-
ponent of a domestic industry.  That the SCM Agreement is intended to 
protect much more than just industry shareholders is also demonstrated 
by the long list of factors which Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement 
states should be considered on the issue of whether the domestic indus-
try producing a “like product” in a complaining WTO Member is being 
materially injured by foreign subsidies.351  Again, if company profits 
were the only relevant factor, the WTO Members need not have included 
any of the other factors listed in Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement.352 
Furthermore, the MPAA could argue that a film is a “service” 
rather than a “good” and thus claim that neither the SCM Agreement nor 
U.S. countervailing duty law applies to Canada’s PSTC film subsi-
dies.353  On the other hand, as discussed above, the MPAA has argued at 
various times that a film is a “good” for tax purposes.354 The MPAA 
members, of course, also routinely copyright their films, and a movie 
                                                          
 347. See, e.g., Staff report to Mary J. Alford, City Manager, Burbank, California, Runaway 
Production – Consideration of the Film and Television Action Committee Resolution (March 15, 
2005), available at http://www.ci.burbank.ca.us/agendas/ag_council/2005/sr031505_5.html (last 
visited May 9, 2006) (reviewing reasons for the MPAA’s opposition to Burbank City Council’s 
resolution in favor of Section 301 petition). 
 348. See, e.g., MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties 
Pursuant to §701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended (2001). 
 349. Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179. 
 350. Id. at paras. 14.198 - 14.201. 
 351. These factors include economic indicators such as the utilization of capacity, product 
prices, wages, employment, and investment in the industry in the complaining member.  SCM 
Agreement, supra note 18, at Part V, Article 15.4. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See supra Part VI, Section B (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in Connection 
with the Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – Namely, Feature Films). 
 354. See supra note 160. 
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can be copyrighted in the first place only if it is capable of being mani-
fested in some physical form.355  The MPAA has even succeeded in get-
ting the USTR to initiate a Section 301(C) action known as a “Special 
301 action” against foreign countries that allow their nationals to 
download copies of the MPAA’s movies via the internet, thereby alleg-
edly infringing their copyrighted movies.356  If a movie is only a service, 
it is difficult to comprehend how it can be copied. 
In light of all of the above, the MPAA’s support for Canada’s 
PSTC film subsidies is more likely explained by the fact that these sub-
sidies are extremely financially rewarding for the MPAA members.357  
Accordingly, the MPAA members and other U.S. film makers can be 
expected to continue to take advantage of these subsidies and continue to 
outsource feature film production to other countries, if they are permit-
ted to do so. 
2.  Lack of International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees 
(IATSE) Leadership Support 
The leadership of one of the entertainment industry labor unions, 
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), cur-
rently does not support a legal challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsi-
dies.358  This is the case, even though many IATSE members themselves 
do support such a challenge.359  The leadership of the IATSE maintains 
that IATSE is an international union,360 and, for this reason, the leader-
ship supports IATSE members in Canada who are benefiting from the 
new film industry jobs in Canada.  Therefore, the IATSE leadership ex-
plains, it doesn’t oppose Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.  It is possible, 
however, that the reason that the IATSE leadership does not oppose for-
                                                          
 355. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005). 
 356. See, e.g., http://www.ftac.orghtml/impact.php (last visited May 7, 2006).  Similarly, the 
studios’ recent triumph in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.  
Groktster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), is based on the premise that one’s electronic copying of a 
song via the internet constitutes copyright infringement. 
 357. See MPAA, Members Page, available at http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUsMembers.asp 
(listing members as Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Uni-
versal City Studios LLLP, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc) (last visited March 10, 2006). 
 358. IATSE, Made in USA, available at http://www.iatse.org/indexold.html (unofficial site 
noting that official position is “members of our union are not being harmed” by runaway produc-
tions) (last visited November. 6, 2005). 
 359. Id; see also http://www.ftac.org/html/support.html (listing the various IATSE locals and 
other entertainment trade unions that support trade sanctions against Canada with respect to its film 
subsidies) (last visited May 5, 2006) . 
 360. IATSE National, Welcome to IATSE, http://www.iatse-intl.org/about/welcome.html (last 
visited November 6, 2005). 
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eign film subsidies is that IATSE makes more money through the pay-
ment of the initial dues paid by a new Canadian member of IATSE than 
through the payment of on-going dues from a long-time U.S. member.361 
While most large unions, like IATSE, have international alliances 
with their fellow members in other countries, it is extremely unusual for 
the leadership of a union in the U.S. to actually support the outsourcing 
of a U.S. industry which is putting its own U.S. members out of work.  
Moreover, as a union is supposed to be a democratic institution and thus 
is supposed to represent the interests of its members, one could argue 
that the failure of the IATSE leadership in the U.S. to represent its mem-
bers’ interests can be ignored and what matters is the fact that individual 
IATSE members support a challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.  
This is especially the case, as a number of other entertainment industry 
labor unions have endorsed a U.S. challenge to the PSTC film incen-
tives.362  Given that the U.S. Government is not required to pursue a le-
gal challenge to the PSTC film incentives, however, the failure of the 
IATSE leadership to support such a challenge is a not insignificant ob-
stacle to such a challenge. 
3.  Recent Data on the U.S. Feature Film Industry 
During the last few years, neither U.S. government agencies nor 
U.S. private entities have published comprehensive data on the state of 
the entire U.S. feature film production industry. Various Canadian enti-
ties have published annual figures on the growth of the Canadian feature 
film production industry and the concomitant decline of the U.S. feature 
film production industry, and these figures have been presented in this 
article. 363 Interested parties in the U.S., however, should not rely solely 
on data published in Canada to support their legal challenge to Canada’s 
PSTC film subsidies. 
In the spring of 2006, the Center for Entertainment Industry 
Data Reports (CEIDR) commenced work on a thorough review of the 
entire U.S. film industry through 2005.364 This report should be publicly 
available soon,365 and it is possible that it will provide much of the data 
that is needed for a legal challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies. 
                                                          
 361. See, e.g., posting by “Charles,” Addressing Union Problems (July 7, 1999). “I’m sure that 
the recent [IATSE] layoffs put a crimp into the lucrative aspect of new members and the revenues 
that initiation fees and new membership dues generate.” Id., available at www.animationnation. 
com/wwwboard/messages/514.html  (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 362. See supra note 356. 
 363. See supra Part VI, Section D.2 (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be 
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry). 
 364. See supra note 275. 
 365. Id. 
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C.  Recommendations 
1.  Compile Recent Data on Adverse Effects to U.S. Feature Film 
Production Industry 
As the U.S. Government has the discretion not to pursue a legal 
challenge to Canada’s PSTC film incentives, it is very important that in-
terested parties in the U.S. present a very compelling case demonstrating 
the adverse effects that the subsidies are causing to the U.S. feature film 
production industry.  The data presented in this article, much of which 
was published by Canadian private and government agencies, document 
such adverse effects.  However, the most up-to-date data available in 
both Canada and the U.S. on these adverse effects to the U.S. feature 
film industry should be compiled and summarized in order to prepare the 
strongest possible legal challenge to the PSTC film incentives.  Again, 
the report published by CEIDR and covering the period through 2005 
may provide much, if not all, of this data. 
2.  Document Union Support, Particularly from IATSE, for a Legal 
Challenge to the PSTC Film Incentives 
As stated above, the leadership of IATSE, one of the entertainment 
labor unions, does not support a legal challenge to the PSTC film incen-
tives.366  While the U.S. Government might initiate a legal challenge to 
the incentives without the MPAA’s support, there is a significant chance 
that it would not do so if IATSE, in addition to the MPAA, opposes a 
legal challenge to the incentives. 
Therefore, if rank and file IATSE members do indeed support a le-
gal challenge to the incentives (which, again, appears to be the case and 
of course is logical), it is recommended that interested parties in the U.S. 
first attempt to compile proof of these IATSE members’ support.  This 
proof should be included with any request filed by interested parties to 
initiate a legal challenge to the incentives. 
3.  Prepare Response to MPAA’s Opposition 
The MPAA most likely will oppose any legal challenge to the 
PSTC film incentives.  The MPAA’s main arguments are discussed 
above.367  Thus, interested parties in the U.S. should be prepared to pro-
                                                          
 366. See supra note 355. 
 367. See supra Part VII, Section B.1 (MPAA Opposition). 
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vide counterarguments to the MPAA’s main arguments.  This article has 
discussed some of the possible counterarguments.368 
4.  File a Section 301(A) Petition 
It is recommended that interested parties in the U.S. file a Section 
301 petition with the USTR as a method of requesting the initiation of a 
WTO dispute resolution proceeding challenging the consistency of Can-
ada’s PSTC film incentives with the SCM Agreement.369  This recom-
mendation is based on the fact that the USTR must respond to a Section 
301 petition and need not respond to a request for the commencement of 
a WTO dispute resolution proceeding per se.370  At the present time, 
FTAC and a group of entertainment unions are planning to file a Section 
301(A) petition with the USTR on the issue of Canada’s film incen-
tives.371  They have even been successful in getting several city councils, 
including the City Councils of Santa Monica, Burbank, West Holly-
wood, and Glendale to pass a resolution in favor of such a filing.372 
Unless the USTR declines to initiate an investigation of the PSTC 
film incentives under Section 301A, it is recommended that interested 
parties not file a Section 701 countervailing duty petition with the DOC.  
While a Section 701 petition ultimately might prompt Canada to abolish 
the PSTC film incentives or at least make them less generous, there are 
many disadvantages to a Section 701 petition.373 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is strongly recommended that the U.S. Government pursue a legal 
challenge testing the consistency of the foreign film subsidies, and in 
particular the Canadian PSTC film subsidies, with the SCM Agreement 
before the U.S. feature film production industry disappears completely.  
This action is warranted on account of the material injury that the U.S. 
                                                          
 368. Id.; see also supra Part VI, Section B (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in 
Connection with the Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – namely, Feature Films). 
 369. This procedure is outlined above.  See supra Part VII, Section A.2 (File a 301 Petition). 
 370. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (2005). 
 371. See FTAC’s website, available at http://www.ftac.org (last visited May 13, 2006); see 
also supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh, and Ann 
Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)). 
 372. See Mark R. Madler, City Backs Production Probe, BURBANK LEADER (April 30, 2005); 
Film and Television Action Committee, FTAC Wins Again, found at http://www.ftac.org (last vis-
ited November 6, 2005); available at http://www.weho.org/download/index.cfm?fuseaction=down 
load&cid=3624 (last visited March 22, 2006) (City of West Hollywood City Council meeting agen-
das, including original agenda for July 18, 2005 meeting); see also generally, http://www.ftac.org/ 
html/support.html (last visited May 7, 2006). 
 373. See Part VII, Section A.3 (File a Section 701 Petition). 
86
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
WRIGHT1.DOC 6/1/2006  2:40:25 PM 
2006] INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME 825 
feature film industry appears to be suffering and the fact that these sub-
sidies appear to be inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the 
SCM Agreement.  In addition, it likely would be counterproductive for 
the U.S. Government to either impose countervailing tariffs on imported, 
subsidized feature films or provide further domestic subsidies to the fea-
ture film industry.  These latter actions in all likelihood would simply 
lead other governments to raise their film subsidy rates yet again. 
In particular, it is recommended that interested parties in the U.S. 
file a Section 301(A) petition with the USTR as a method of prompting 
the U.S. to initiate a WTO dispute resolution proceeding against Canada.  
First, though, interested parties in the U.S should compile up-to-date 
evidence of the adverse effects that the U.S. feature film production in-
dustry is suffering, secure proof of union support, especially IATSE 
support, for a WTO dispute proceeding, and prepare counterarguments 
to the MPAA’s likely opposition to such a proceeding. 
The MPAA’s opposition to a legal challenge to the Canadian subsi-
dies should not dissuade interested parties from challenging these subsi-
dies.  While film producers benefit financially from the subsidies, the 
subsidies harm not only current and former industry workers, but also 
U.S. taxpayers paying the price of maintaining competing federal, state 
and local film subsidies in the U.S., as well as all U.S. citizens wishing 
to retain a vibrant U.S. feature film production industry. 
During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations cul-
minating in the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the U.S. took the po-
sition that U.S. workers should focus on providing high-paying services 
and high technology goods containing intellectual property, and they 
should leave the production of labor-intensive, low-tech goods to work-
ers in other countries.374  Accordingly, the U.S. did not push for mini-
mum labor standards in the WTO, which are applicable primarily to the 
production of low-tech goods.  As a result, many U.S. companies have 
continued to outsource the production of  low-tech goods to other coun-
tries where lower wage rates prevail.  If the U.S. in those negotiations 
also agreed that high-tech items containing intellectual property, such as 
feature films and computer software, are services that are not protected 
by the SCM Agreement and hence other countries can subsidize their 
production with impunity, the U.S. arguably made a bad bargain during 
the Uruguay Round. 
In summary, Canada and other WTO Members should not be per-
mitted to circumvent the SCM Agreement simply because the share-
                                                          
 374. See, e.g., Tad Crawford, The Copyright Impact of the World Trade Organization, 
ALLWORTH PRESS (noting goal of United States was to strengthen copyright protection), available 
at http://www.allworth.com/articles/article01.htm  (last visited November 6, 2005). 
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holders of U.S. movie houses benefit from these countries’ unfair trade 
practices as well.  A decision to forego a challenge to the foreign film 
subsidies in order to satisfy the MPAA would go a long way toward con-
firming the conviction of the WTO’s critics that the WTO rules exist 
solely to protect the interests of wealthy and powerful corporate share-
holders.  In contrast, a decision on the part of the U.S. Government to 
challenge the foreign film subsidies would be consistent with the mis-
sion of the WTO, which to enforce the rules of fair and free trade among 
the WTO nations so as to promote and protect the economic well-being 
of all WTO Members and the national industries in those Members. 
IX.  APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
U.S. Feature Films Produced in Canada – 2000** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 




Cinetel Films  $17.2M * 








2000 Bait Castle Rock En-tertainment Warner Bros. $35M 
2000 Battlefield Earth Battlefield Pro-ductions LLC Warner Bros. $73M 
2000 Beautiful Joe Beautiful Films Columbia TriStar Home Video 
 $17.2M 
* 
2000 Best in Show Castle Rock En-tertainment 
Warner Bros. Do-
mestic Television $6M 
2000 Bless the Child Paramount Pic-tures 
Paramount Home 
Video $40M 
2000 Bonhoeffer: Agent of Grace 
NFP Teleart Ber-







Lions Gate Films $5M 
2000 Chain of Fools Bel Air Enter-tainment Warner Bros. $20M 
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2000 Dracula 2000 Dimension Films Dimension Films $28M 
2000 Duets Beacon Commu-nications LLC 
Buena Vista Pic-
tures $15M 





2000 Fear of Flying Trimark Pictures Trimark Pictures  $17.2M * 
2000 Final Destina-tion 
Hard Eight Pic-
tures New Line Cinema $23M 
2000 Finding Forres-ter 
Columbia Pic-
tures Corporation Columbia Pictures $43M 
2000 Frequency New Line Cinema New Line Home Video $31M 
2000 Get Carter Carter Produc-tions LLC Warner Bros. $40M 
2000 Ginger Snaps Copper Heart En-tertainment 




2000 Gossip Outlaw Produc-tions Warner Bros. $14M 
2000 




tions Artistic License $7.3M 
2000 Isn’t She Great Mutual Film Cor-poration 
Universal Home 
Entertainment $36M 










2000 Mercy Franchise Pictures Columbia TriStar Home Video 
 $17.2M 
* 
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2000 Reindeer Games Dimension Films Buena Vista Home Video (BVHV) $36M 
2000 Romeo Must Die Silver Pictures Warner Bros. $25M 







2000 Scary Movie Brillstein-Grey Entertainment Dimension Films $19M 
2000 Screwed Robert Simonds Productions 
Universal Home 
Entertainment $10M 







2000 Shanghai Noon Roger Birnbaum Productions 
Buena Vista Pic-
tures $55M 
2000 Skipped Parts Skipped Parts Productions Trimark Pictures 
 $17.2M 
* 
2000 Snow Day Nickelodeon Movies Paramount Pictures $13M 
2000 Something Be-tween Us     
 $17.2M 
* 
2000 Steal This Movie 
Lakeshore Inter-
national Trimark Video 
 $17.2M 
* 
2000 The 6th Day Phoenix Pictures Columbia TriStar Home Video $82M 
2000 The Art of War Amen Ra Films Warner Bros. $40M 










2000 The Highway-man   Lions Gate Films 
 $17.2M 
* 
2000 The Ladies Man SNL Studios Paramount Pictures $11M 
2000 The Loser Branti Film Pro-ductions Columbia Pictures $20M 
2000 The Magic of Marciano 
Cape Atlantic 
Productions Outrider Pictures $4.5M 
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2000 The Spreading Ground 
Alpine Pictures 
Inc. Smooth Pictures 
$17.2M 
* 
2000 The Weight of Water Canal+ Lions Gate Films $16M 
2000 The Whole Nine Yards Franchise Pictures Warner Bros. $24M 
2000 Thomas and the Magic Railroad Destination Films Destination Films $19M 
2000 Trixie Pandora Cinema Columbia TriStar Home Video 
$17.2M 
* 
2000 Turn It Up New Line Cinema New Line Cinema $9M 
2000 Urban Legends: Final Cut Original Film 
Sony Pictures En-
tertainment $15M 
2000 Waking the Dead 
Gramercy Pic-
tures USA Entertainment $8.5M 
2000 Where the Money Is 
Gramercy Pic-
tures Universal Pictures $18M 





                                                2000 Total of Budgets: $1395.5M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
were “earliest release between January 2000 and December 2000, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 




U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2001** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 
2001 3000 Miles to Grace-land 
3000 Miles 
Productions Warner Bros. $62M 
2001 Along Came a Spider David Brown Productions 
Paramount 
Pictures $28M 
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2001 Angel Eyes Franchise Pic-tures Warner Bros. $38M 







2001 Blow Apostle New Line Cinema $30M 

















2001 Cats & Dogs Mad Chance Warner Bros. $60M 









2001 Don’t Say a Word Further Films   $50M 
2001 Down to Earth 3 Art Enter-tainment 
Paramount 
Pictures $30M 
2001 Driven Champs Pro-ductions Inc. Warner Bros. $72M 
2001 Exit Wounds Silver Pictures Warner Bros. $33M 





2001 Focus Carros Pictures Paramount Classics 
 $19.4M
* 






2001 Get Over It Ignite Enter-tainment 
Miramax 
Films $10M 
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ration 
2001 Harvard Man Kushner-Locke Company 
Cowboy Pic-
tures $5.5M 
2001 Head Over Heels Universal Pic-tures 
Universal 
Pictures $14M 
2001 Hedwig and the An-gry Inch Killer Films 
Fine Line 
Features $6M 
2001 Heist Franchise Pic-tures 
Warner 
Home Video $35M 
2001 Iris Mirage Enter-prises 
Miramax 
Films $5.5M 






2001 Jet Boy      $19.4M* 




sal Pictures $22M 





















2001 Little Shop of Erotica   Private Screenings 
 $19.4M
* 








2001 On the Line Miramax Films Miramax Films $10M 
2001 One Eyed King Cutting Edge Entertainment 
Lions Gate 
Films $6.5M 
2001 Out Cold Donners’ Com-pany 
Buena Vista 
Pictures $11M 





2001 Picture Claire Alliance Atlan- Serendipity  
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2001 Prozac Nation Giv’en Films Miramax Films $9M 
2001 Rat Race Alphaville Films 
Paramount 
Pictures $48M 
2001 Replicant 777 Films Cor-poration 
Artisan En-
tertainment $17M 
























2001 See Spot Run Robert Simonds Productions 
Warner 
Home Video $16M 
2001 Serendipity Simon Fields Productions 
Miramax 
Films $28M 











2001 Swordfish Jonathan Krane Group 
Warner 
Home Video $80M 






2001 Tart Interlight Lions Gate Films $3.3M 
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2001 The Pledge Franchise Pic-tures Warner Bros. $45M 






2001 The Safety of Objects Killer Films IFC Films  $19.4M* 
2001 The Score Eagle Point Production 
Paramount 
Pictures $68M 
2001 The Shipping News Miramax Films Miramax Films $35M 





2001 The Whole Shebang Original Voices Inc. 2 Match 
 $19.4M
* 




Warner Bros. $20M 






2001 Valentine Cupid Produc-tions Inc. Warner Bros. $10M 







2001 Who Is Cletis Tout? Itasca Pictures Paramount Classics 
$19.4M
* 
                                                  2001 Total of Budgets: $1747.2M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
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were “earliest release between January 2001 and December 2001, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 




U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2002** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 
2002 40 Days and 40 Nights Milo Productions 
Miramax 
Films $17M 
2002 Abandon Bedford Falls Productions 
Paramount 
Pictures $25M 
2002 Ascension Zuno Films Canyon Cin-ema $500K 






2002 Ballistic: Ecks vs. Sever 
Dante Entertain-
ment Warner Bros. $70M 







2002 Blade II Amen Ra Films New Line Cin-ema $55M 
2002 Cabin Fever Black Sky Enter-tainment 
Lions Gate 
Films $1.5M 







2002 Cheats Bender-Spink Inc. Destination Films 
 $24.5M
* 
2002 Chicago Miramax Films Miramax Films $45M 
2002 City of Ghosts Banyan Tree MGM Home Entertainment $17.5M 










2002 D-Tox Capella Interna- Columbia $55M 
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   $24.5M* 
2002 Death to Smoochy Mad Chance 
Warner Home 
Video $55M 
2002 Edge of Madness Lions Gate Films Lions Gate Films 
 $24.5M
* 
2002 Even Steven A Dreamin’ Pro-duction   
 $24.5M
* 
2002 FeardotCom ApolloMedia Warner Bros. $42M 







2002 Ghost Ship Dark Castle En-tertainment Warner Bros. $35M 
2002 Halloween: Res-urrection Dimension Films 
Buena Vista 
International $15M 
2002 I Spy C-2 Pictures Columbia Pic-tures $70M 










Films LLC $7M 
2002 John Q Burg/Koules Pro-ductions 
New Line Cin-
ema $36M 























2002 Minority Report Amblin Enter-tainment 
Twentieth 
Century Fox $102M 
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Corporation 






























2002 Paid in Full Dimension Films Dimension Films 
 $24.5M
* 










2002 Rollerball Atlas Entertain-ment 
MGM Home 
Entertainment $70M 
2002 Snow Dogs Galapagos Pro-ductions 
Buena Vista 
Pictures $35M 





2002 The Adventures of Pluto Nash 
Castle Rock En-
tertainment Warner Bros. $100M 















The Santa Clause 
2: The Mrs. 
Clause 
Boxing Cat Films Buena Vista Pictures $60M 
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Home Video $68M 





2002 They Focus Features Dimension Films $17M 
2002 Trapped Columbia Pictures Columbia Pic-tures $30M 
2002 Triggermen Ballpark Produc-tions Ltd. 
Franchise Pic-
tures $12M 




























2002 You Stupid Man ApolloMedia 01 Distribuzi-one 
 $24.5M
* 
                                                  2002 Total of Budgets: $1886M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
were “earliest release between January 2002 and December 2002, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 
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Appendix A 
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2003** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 
2003 A Guy Thing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) 
MGM Home 
Entertainment $20M 














2003 Beyond Borders Camelot Pictures Paramount Pictures $35M 



















2003 Crime Spree Hannibal Pictures DEJ Produc-tions $10M 
2003 Dreamcatcher Castle Rock En-tertainment Warner Bros. $68M 
2003 Elf Guy Walks into a Bar Productions 
New Line Cin-
ema $33M 











2003 Final Destination 2 New Line Cinema 
New Line Cin-
ema $26M 
2003 Freddy Vs. Jason Avery Pix New Line Cin-ema $25M 
2003 Good Boy! Jim Henson Pic-tures 
MGM Home 
Entertainment $18M 
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2003 Honey Marc Platt Pro-ductions 
Universal Pic-
tures $17M 










2003 How to Deal Focus Features New Line Cin-ema $16M 










2003 Levity Columbia Pictures Corporation Studio Canal $7.5M 










2003 Open Range Beacon Pictures Buena Vista Pictures $26M 





2003 Rhinoceros Eyes Directors Program Madstone Films 
 $24.1M
* 
2003 Scary Movie 3 Brad Grey Pic-tures 
Dimension 
Films $45M 





2003 Shattered Glass Baumgarten Mer-ims Productions 
Lions Gate 
Films $6M 










2003 The Core Core Prods. Inc. Paramount Pictures $74M 
2003 The Event Emotion Pictures ThinkFilm Inc.  $24.1M* 
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2003 The In-Laws Franchise Pictures Warner Bros.  $24.1M* 






The League of 
Extraordinary 
Gentlemen 











2003 The Recruit Birnbaum/Barber Buena Vista Pictures 
 $24.1M
* 
2003 Timeline Donners’ Com-pany 
Paramount 
Home Video $80M 





2003 Willard Hard Eight Pic-tures 
New Line Cin-
ema $22M 












                                              2003 Total of Budgets: $1468.5M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
were “earliest release between January 2003 and December 2003, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 
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Appendix A 
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2004** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 














2004 A Hole in One Beech Hill Films    $22.2M* 




















2004 Blade: Trinity Marvel Enter-prises 
New Line Cin-
ema $65M 
2004 Catwoman DiNovi Pictures Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. $85M 





2004 Cellular Electric Enter-tainment 
New Line Cin-
ema $25M 





















2004 Day of the Scor-pion 
Gum Spirits Pro-
ductions   $1K 
2004 Godsend 2929 Productions    $22.2M* 
2004 Harold & Kumar Endgame Enter- New Line Cin- $9M 
103
Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
WRIGHT1.DOC 6/1/2006  2:40:25 PM 
842 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:739 
Go to White 
Castle 
tainment ema 











2004 Jersey Girl Beverly Detroit Miramax Films $35M 
2004 Mean Girls Broadway Video Paramount Pictures $17M 
2004 Miracle Mayhem Pictures Buena Vista Pictures 
 $22.2M
* 








2004 My Brother’s Keeper 
Little Ricky Pro-
ductions Inc.   
 $22.2M
* 
2004 New York Min-ute DiNovi Pictures Warner Bros. $30M 



































2004 Secret Window Columbia Pictures Corporation 
Columbia Pic-
tures $40M 





2004 Shall We Dance Miramax Films   $40M 
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2004 Taking Lives Atmosphere Pic-tures Warner Bros. 
 $22.2M
* 
2004 The Aviator Appian Way Miramax Films $116M 
2004 The Butterfly Effect Bender-Spink Inc. 
New Line Cin-
ema $13M 
















2004 The Lazarus Child 
Eagle Pictures 
S.p.a. Warner Bros. 
 $22.2M
* 
2004 The Notebook Avery Pix New Line Cin-ema $30M 


























2004 Walking Tall Burke/Samples/Foster Productions 
MGM Home 
Entertainment $56M 












2004 What Lies Above 
Shavick Enter-
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2004 Wicker Park Lakeshore Enter-tainment 
MGM Home 
Entertainment $30M 
                                              2004 Total of Budgets: $1685.4M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
were “earliest release between January 2004 and December 2004, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 




U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2005** 
Year Title Production Distributors Budget 
2005 A History of Violence Bender-Spink Inc. 
New Line Cin-
ema $32M 
2005 Alone in the Dark AITD Productions 
Lions Gate 
Films $20M 
2005 An American Haunting AfterDark Films 
Freestyle Re-
leasing LLC $14M 
2005 An Unfinished Life 
Initial Entertain-
ment Group (IEG) 
Miramax 
Films $30M 
2005 Are We There Yet? Cube Vision 
Columbia Pic-
tures $32M 
2005 Assault on Pre-cinct 13 Biscayne Pictures Rogue Pictures $20M 
2005 Aurora Borealis entitled enter-tainment   
 $14.6M
* 
2005 Blood + Kisses Llama Pictures   $500K 






2005 Booth Pony Canyon En-terprises (I)   
 $14.6M
* 
2005 Brokeback Mountain Focus Features Focus Features $14M 
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2005 Cake First Look Media Lions Gate Films 
 $14.6M
* 

















2005 Cinderella Man Imagine Enter-tainment 
Universal Pic-
tures $88M 
2005 Dark Water Pandemonium Productions 
Buena Vista 
Pictures $30M 
2005 Darkest Hour Moviehouse Pic-tures   $300K 











2005 Edison Edison Produc-tions Inc.   $25.1M 
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2005 Four Brothers Di Bonaventura Pictures 
Paramount 
Pictures $40M 















2005 Insecticidal Way Below the Line Productions   
 $14.6M
* 
2005 It Waits Centaurus Films   $1.2M 
2005 Just Friends Bender-Spink Inc. New Line Cin-ema 
 $14.6M
* 


















2005 Mem-o-re 3210 Films   $3.5M 






















2005 Rent 1492 Pictures Sony Pictures Releasing $40M 
2005 Runt Joseph A. English Productions   $500K 





2005 Saw II Twisted Pictures Lions Gate Films $4M 
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2005 Tamara Armada Pictures Lions Gate Films $4.75M 
2005 The Ballad of Jack and Rose 
Elevation Film-




2005 The Big White Ascendant Pic-tures 
Ascendant Pic-
tures $18M 





2005 The Exorcism of Emily Rose Firm Films 
Screen Gems 
Inc. $20M 













2005 The Jacket 2929 Productions Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. $29M 





2005 The Man New Line Cinema New Line Cin-ema 
 $14.6M
* 
2005 The Pacifier Spyglass Enter-tainment 
Buena Vista 
Pictures $56M 





ner of Defiance, 
Ohio 










Pictures Inc. $25M 
2005 Three Bad Men Iron Horse Enter-tainment 
Iron Horse En-
tertainment $650K 





2005 Underclassman Miramax Films Miramax Films 
 $14.6M
* 
2005 When Hearts Run Wild 
Arabella Films 
LLC   $10M 
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2005 Where the Truth Lies 
Serendipity Point 
Films ThinkFilm Inc. $25M 





                                              2005 Total of Budgets:  $1284.7M 
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget infor-
mation.  The average was compiled using the available budget numbers 
for the year. 
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made 
using information at http://www.IMDB.com.  The search parameters 
were “earliest release between January 2005 and December 2005, and 
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’, 
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Ti-






PROVINCE PSTC SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
ALBERTA N/A 20% of production costs (this is a 
non-recoupable grant, not a tax credit) 
BRITISH 
COLUMBIA 
18% of eligible 
BC labour 
6% regional bonus 
15% digital animation or video effects 
bonus 
MANITOBA 45% of eligible 
MB labour 
Additional 5% if 50% of shooting 
days are 40 km or more outside of 
Winnipeg’s centre 
Additional 5% if third film shot 
within 2-year period 
NEW 
BRUNSWICK 
40% of eligible 
NB labour 




40% of eligible 
labour 




40% of eligible 
NS labour 
40% for productions shot outside 
Halifax 




18% of eligible 
ON labour 
3% regional bonus 
Canadian Provincial Production Incentives
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35% - 50% 
of eligible 
labour 
(this is a re-
bate, not a 
tax credit) 
Capped at 15% of production costs 
 




* Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), Depart-
ment of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location 
Production in Canada, March 2005, at Annex B, p. 25. 
 
Appendix B 
Canadian Provincial Incentives* 
 
 
PROVINCE PSTC SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
SASKATCHE
WAN 
35% of eligible 
SK labour 
Capped at 50% of production costs 
5% regional bonus 
YUKON 35% of eli-
gible YK 
labour 
(this is a re-
bate not a 
tax credit) 
50% travel rebate 
35% training rebate 
 
 
* Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), Depart-
ment of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location 












Canadian Provincial Production Incentives 
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STATE INCENTIVE DESCRIPTION 
ARIZONA Income tax 
credit 
20% transferable income tax credit on 
in-state production expenditures on  
projects spending $3 million or more 
(10% when spending under $3 mil-
lion). 
50% sales and use tax rebate on pur-
chase or lease of tangible property on 
productions spending $1 million or 
more. To qualify, a production must 






15% reimbursement of qualified Flor-
ida expenditures for production 
spending at least $850,000. 
Funded at $10 million per year. 
GEORGIA Income tax 
credit 
9% transferable income tax credits on 
all costs spent in Georgia, plus: 
3% credit on wages paid to GA resi-
dents, plus: 
2% credit for TV productions that 
spend more than $20 million annu-
ally, plus: 





25% transferable income tax credit on 
first $25,000 of wages paid to Illinois 
residents. 
 
LOUISIANA Investor tax 
credit, em-
ployment and 
labor tax cred, 
sales & use tax 
exclusion 
25% transferable tax credit on Louisi-
ana spending (if spending exceeds $8 
million, otherwise 10% credit ) plus: 
10% credit on total aggregate payroll 
of Louisiana residents (excluding 
salaries in excess of $1 million) plus: 
4% sales and use tax exclusion. 
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
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*Current as of June 10, 2005.  Source: California Film Commis-
sion, reported in Los Angeles County Economic Development Corpora-
tion, What Is the Cost of Run-Away Production?  Jobs, Wages, Eco-
nomic Output and State Tax Revenue at Risk When Motion Picture 






STATE INCENTIVE DESCRIPTION 
MARYLAND Film produc-
tion activity  
Wage rebate up to $12,500 per eligi-
ble employee for projects spending 






12% refundable tax credit on up to 
$50,000. in wages paid to Montana 
residents. 
8% credit on total in-state spending. 
NEW YORK Film produc-
tion tax credit  
10% refundable tax credit of quali-
fied expenditures, capped at $100 
million over 4 years. 
City of New York offers the same 
incentive with a refundable tax credit 
equal to 5% of qualified expendi-




15% of eligible in-state costs.  
Capped at $2 million per year. 
Sales tax exemption on tangible 





labor rebate  
10% rebate on in Oregon costs, 
capped at $250,000 per film produc-
tion. 
No sales tax on all purchases. 
6.2% rebate on Oregon wages (pend-
ing). 
*Current as of June 10, 2005.  Source: California Film Commis-
sion. 
 
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
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20% assignable tax credit of qualified 
Pennsylvania costs when spending 
60% of production costs in state ($10 








40% transferable labor tax credit 
(paid to Puerto Rican residents).  At 
least 50% of the shooting must take 





vestor  tax 
credit (non 
transferable) 
25% tax credit for all Rhode Island 
spending when spending is over 
$300,000. 
Investor will receive 15% tax credit 
for budgets between $300,000 and $5 
million.  For budgets over $5 million, 






15% rebate of total aggregate payroll 
for employees who are subject to 
South Carolina withholding, if in-
state 
spending is at least $1 million.  Plus: 
7% sales tax exemption for purchases 
of in-state goods and services.  Plus: 
15% rebate program for in-state pur-
chases/rentals. 
Capped at $10 million annually. 




Sample of Other International Production Incentives* 
 
Australia 
The Australian Federal Government has a refundable tax offset 
worth 12.5% of the production’s Qualifying Australian Production Ex-
penditure. This is claimed by the production company through the com-
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
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pany’s tax return. A fact sheet, guidelines and application forms are 
available from See http://www.dcita.gov.au/filmtaxoffset. 
In addition, the Australian State Agencies offer generous financial 
support and assistance through payroll tax rebates or exemptions, cast 
and crew wage rebates, location attraction grants and the provision of 
free or subsidized public service resources.  
Contact details for all States  
available at http://www.ausfilm.com.au 
 
Melbourne Incentives 
In addition to the Australian Government’s 12.5% film tax offset, 







There are many financial benefits in basing your next production in 
Queensland, including the generous suite of incentives offered by the 
Queensland Government through the PFTC. These include: 
*Payroll Tax Rebates 
*Head of Department Rebates 
*Cast & Crew Salary Rebates 
Furthermore, a 12.5% refundable tax offset is available from the 
Australian Federal Government for projects that spend a minimum 
$15M AUD on qualifying production activity in Australia. 
Available at http://www.pftc.com.au 
 
South Australia Incentives 
A 10% employment rebate is available on all eligible SA labour 
expenditure on any eligible film or television production. The employ-
ment rebate is not a tax rebate and therefore is not tied to a year-end tax 
return. It can be paid in installments, with the first (potentially largest) 
installment paid on the first day of principle photography. This means 
that the production is provided with additional cash flow when it is most 
useful – during the shoot. This rebate is in addition to the 6% payroll tax 
exemption and the tax offset rebate. The 10% employment rebate is 
available for drama productions intended for television or theatrical re-
lease that have not received production investment from the SAFC and 
is available to projects with at least 50% of the shoot occurring in South 
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Australia. 
A payroll tax exemption on eligible productions shot in SA reduces 
the film’s payroll total by approximately 6 per cent. Note that this is an 
up-front exemption, not a rebate. To be eligible for the exemption, pro-
jects must be produced wholly or substantially within South Australia, 
employ SA residents, and provide significant economic benefits to the 
State. 
Source: Data as of March 6, 2006. Association of Film Commis-
sioners International, International Incentives, March 2006, found at 
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed 
April 26, 2006). 
Production queries regarding the South Australian Film & Televi-
sion Employment Rebate can be directed to the Head of Studio Services, 
Rory McGregor at mcgregorr@ safilm.com.au or 088348 9308. 




Belgium provides a tax shelter for qualifying films. 
Available at http://www.vaf.be/frames.asp?page=1&lang=1 




Available at http://www.minasfilmcommission.com.br 





The Canadian Federal Government’s Film or Video Production 
Services Tax Credit is primarily for foreign production and has been in-
creased to 16% of Canadian labour costs from 11%. 
The Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit amounts to 
25% of expenditures for services provided by Canadians. In order to 
qualify for this tax credit, either the director or screenwriter and one of 
the two highest paid actors must be Canadian. Moreover, the production 
must earn at least six points based on key personnel being Canadian. 
 
CO-PRODUCTION 
Canada has entered into co-production treaties that are in effect for 
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58 countries. The treaties set minimum standards for financial and crea-
tive participation, and are administered by Telefilm Canada. Qualifying 
co-productions are eligible for all government incentives and benefits 
accorded Canadian Films. For more information contact: Canadian Au-
dio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO) 
Toll Free: (888) 433-2200 
Available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cavco 
 
Calgary (Province of Alberta) Incentives 
Productions in the Calgary region can access provincial and federal 
programs providing eligibility requirements are met. 
Available at http://www.calgaryeconomicdevelopment.com 
 
British Columbia Incentives 
Available at http://www.filmcolumbiashuswap.com 
 
New Brunswick Incentives 
40% Labour Tax Credit 
Available at http://www.nbfilm.com 
 
Okanagan (Province of British Columbia) Incentives 
Productions in British Columbia can access a variety of provincial 
and federal tax credit programs and if eligibility requirements are met, a 
producer can combine them to access exceptional savings. Please contact 




* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of 
March 2006.  Source: Association of Film Commissioners International, 
International Incentives, March 2006, available at 
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed 
April 26, 2006). 
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Ontario Incentives 
The province of Ontario offers an 18% refundable tax credit on On-
tario labour through the Ontario Production Services Tax Credit 
(OPSTC), in addition to the Canadian government 16% rebate. 
Also available is the Ontario Computer Animation and Special Ef-
fects Tax Credit, (OCASE), a refundable tax credit to Ontario-based Ca-
nadian and foreign-controlled corporations of 20% of qualifying Ontario 
labour expenditures for film and television digital animation and digital 
visual effects. 
Available at http://www.omdc.on.ca/English/Tax-Incentives.html 
 
Yukon Incentives 




Tax Rebate (similar to Australian tax offset): If a fully-funded pro-
duction expends in Fiji a minimum F$250,000 of qualifying Fiji expen-
diture representing at least 35% of the budget, then it can claim back 
15% of its Fiji expenditure. 




In the Co-production Framework, many sources of financing are 
available through French producers. 






Funding can be applied for at FilmFernsehFonds Bayern GmbH 
Available at http://www.fff-bayern.de 
Available at http://www.film-commission-bavaria.de 
 
Berlin Brandenburg Incentives 
In Germany, a German producer or the German Co-producer can 
ask for money at the regional film funding institution. The Berlin Bran-
denburg Film Commission BBFC is a department of the Medienboard, 
which is the regional film funding institution in Berlin and Brandenburg. 
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On top of that there are strong production service companies like Studio 
Babelsberg that can co-finance due to state guarantees. For further in-
formation, please, contact the Berlin Brandenburg Film Commission 
BBFC. 
Available at http://www.medienboard.de 
 
Hamburg Incentives 
See FilmFörderung Hamburg’s website for funding guidelines. 
Available at http://www.ffhh.de. 
 
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of 
March 2006.  Source: Association of Film Commissioners International, 









18% tax break on Irish spend 
Experienced Irish co-producers 
No sales tax 
12.5% corporate tax rate 
Network of Film Commissions offering free support 




Our unique position means producers can avail of both Section 481 
in the Republic of Ireland and Sale and Leaseback in the North of Ire-
land without leaving the Film Commission region. There are many fi-
nancing schemes including Made in N.I. Lottery Fund and the Regional 
Support Fund Loan which can work in our region. You won’t need to 
move Production Office! 
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Local Film Fund: (70.000 euros per Feature Film); (20.000 euros 
per Documentary Film) and (3.000 euros per Short Film) Other pro-
grams include: tax rebate, free shooting permits and authorizations, and 
lots and lots of discounted services. 











The office of the Rotterdam Film Commissioner, established in 
1999, strives to be a facilitative focus for the increasing number of do-
mestic and foreign producers who wish to film and work in the Rotter-
dam region. It provides information about locations, studios, local ser-
vices that are available, and professionals active in the film industry. It 
mediates during the establishment of contacts and applications for finan-
cial support and is an intermediary between producers and municipal 
services. The office does this free of charge and with a minimum of un-
necessary red tape. 




The Large Budget Screen Production Grant (LBSPG) scheme 
whereby an eligible project will be granted a sum totalling 12.5% of the 
Qualifying New Zealand Production Expenditure (QNZPE). Where the 
value of the QNZPE is between NZ$15 million and NZ$50 million, 
QNZPE must be at least 70 per cent of the film’s total production ex-
penditure. 
 
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of 
March 2006.  Source: Association of Film Commissioners International, 
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International Incentives, March 2006, found at 
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf. 
Where the value of the QNZPE is NZ$50 million or more it will 
qualify for the grant regardless  of the percentage ratio of QNZPE to the 
screen production’s total production expenditure. 
For television series, individual episodes, which have completed 
principal photography within any 12 month period and with a minimum 
average spend of NZ$500,000 per commercial hour, may be bundled to 
achieve the total of NZ$15 million. 






Available at http://www.barcelonafilm.com 
 
Tenerife Incentives 
The Canary Islands Special Zone offers special incentives to those 
companies that set up a company in the Canary Islands 






For free during tree days we can offer you full support with location 
scouting. We can also help you with all the preparations including trans-
ports, living arrangements, organising permits, information from local 
contacts and authorities, all in order to get the production off to a suc-
cessful start. 




Productions which qualify as British films are eligible to apply for 
national funding and for the benefits of the UK’s tax relief structures. 
There are two ways that a film may qualify as British – either via Sched-
ule 1 or an official coproduction. Sale and leaseback is currently the 
mechanism through which the UK’s tax breaks are channelled. Section 
48 allows benefits for films with budgets of less than £15,000,000 and 
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Section 42 allows benefits for films with any budget.  The UK Govern-
ment recently announced plans for the future of UK tax relief for film: 
Section 48: A new tax credit for qualifying films with budgets of 
under £20m will replace Section 48 in 2006. The relief will apply to 
100% of the film’s budget and will be worth approximately 20% of pro-
duction costs. Section 48 will continue to be available for films in pro-
duction by 1st April 2006 and completed by 1st January 2007. 
Section 42: Section 42 will be replaced in 2006 with a new tax 
credit similar to the proposed replacement for Section 48. Section 42 
will continue until the new relief is in place. 
http://www.ukfilmcouncil.org.uk (Select Filming in the UK, British 
Qualification) 
 
Guernsey - Channel Islands Incentives 
For short shoots the Film Commissioner will act as a Location 
Manager and pre-shoot will act as a location scout. The services of the 
commission are free and there is no permitting scheme operating in the 
Islands. Many locations are available free of charge. 
Available at http://www.guernseyfilms.com 
 
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of 
March 2006.  Source: Association of Film Commissioners International, 
International Incentives, March 2006, available at 
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed 
April 26, 2006). 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
England – North West Vision Incentives 
Free film liaison service with experienced staff 
Funding and co-production opportunities 
On-line crew and facilities database and searchable locations library 
(from April 05) 
Printed production guide 
Competitive facility & crew rates (30% cheaper than London) 
Film Friendly infrastructure 
International airport 
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Scotland Film Incentives 
Scottish Screen runs a range of funding schemes, from script devel-
opment and short film funds, to production funding and new media ini-
tiatives. Funding is to support the Scottish film industry, and there are 
always co-funding opportunities with Scottish producers. So far there 
have been a number of successful co-productions with European coun-
tries. 




40% Tax Credit 




Available at http://www.diatriba.net/venezuelafilmcommission 
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of 
March 2006.  Source: Association of Film Commissioners International, 
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